Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald
Decision Date | 30 November 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 33043.,33043. |
Citation | 639 S.E.2d 866 |
Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Parties | Patricia E. FITZGERALD, Petitioner Below, Respondent, v. Earl L. FITZGERALD, Respondent Below, Petitioner. |
1. "The appellate standard of review of questions of law answered and certified by a circuit court is de novo." Syllabus point 1, Gallapoo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 197 W.Va. 172, 475 S.E.2d 172 (1996).
2. " Syllabus point 2, Staton v. Staton, 218 W.Va. 201, 624 S.E.2d 548 (2005).
3. A workers' compensation permanent total disability award is considered to be wage replacement for the wages the injured employee would have earned but for his/her work-related injury and is not considered to be an award for the injured employee's pain and suffering resulting from such work-related injury.
4. "The primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature." Syllabus point 1, Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, 159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975).
5. In a divorce proceeding, that portion of a lump sum workers' compensation permanent total disability award that represents wages the injured spouse would have earned, but for his/her work-related injury, while the parties were married and cohabiting constitutes marital property subject to equitable distribution pursuant to W. Va.Code § 48-7-101, et seq.
Shawn D. Bayliss, Bayliss & Phalen, PLLC, Charleston, for the Petitioner, Earl L. Fitzgerald.
Beverly S. Selby, Charleston, for the Respondent, Patricia Fitzgerald.
This case comes before the Court upon questions certified by the Circuit Court of Putnam County inquiring whether a spouse's workers' compensation permanent total disability benefits constitute marital property or separate property for purposes of equitable distribution, and, based upon the classification of such benefits, how they should then be distributed to the parties. Upon a review of the parties' arguments, the record of the proceedings below, and the pertinent authorities, we answer the certified questions and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The facts of this matter are not disputed by the parties. Patricia Fitzgerald (hereinafter "Mrs. Fitzgerald") and Earl L. Fitzgerald (hereinafter "Mr. Fitzgerald") were married on May 28, 1989. Thereafter, on June 20, 1990, Mr. Fitzgerald sustained debilitating injuries in the course of and as a result of his employment. During the parties' marriage, Mr. Fitzgerald received workers' compensation benefits of approximately $90,654.27. The parties separated on January 4, 2002.
Subsequently, on October 25, 2002, the Workers' Compensation Division entered a final decision and awarded Mr. Fitzgerald permanent total disability benefits, retroactive to December 1, 1992, the date upon which he was determined to be permanently and totally disabled by a decision of the Social Security Administration. As a result of this ruling, Mr. Fitzgerald received additional workers' compensation benefits in the amount of $106,406.62 as a lump sum back award to compensate him for the period from December 1, 1992, through October 24, 2001, during which period the parties were still married and living together as husband and wife. Mr. Fitzgerald's actual receipt of this lump sum payment, however, occurred during the parties' separation.
On about January 10, 2002, Mrs. Fitzgerald filed a petition for divorce in the Family Court of Putnam County. The family court bifurcated the proceedings and granted the parties a divorce by order entered December 31, 2002.1 Deciding the appropriate disposition of Mr. Fitzgerald's workers' compensation benefits, the family court, by order entered April 7, 2004, determined that both of the aforementioned sums of workers' compensation benefits constituted marital property subject to equitable distribution. In short, the family court ruled that the first amount of such benefits in the amount of $90,654.27 was marital property because it was received during the parties' marriage. The family court further concluded that Mr. Fitzgerald's subsequent lump sum award of $106,406.62, though received after the parties had separated, nevertheless was also marital property because it constituted retroactive workers' compensation benefits payments for a period of time during which the parties were still married and cohabiting. As for the proper distribution of such benefits, the family court determined that Mr. Fitzgerald was entitled to claim twenty-five percent of such benefits as his separate property as compensation for the pain and suffering he endured as a result of his disabling injury. The family court then distributed the remaining benefits, which constituted marital property, equally between the parties.
To arrive at the precise amounts attributable to each party, the family court added together the two benefits amounts ($90,654.27 + $106,402.62 = $197,056.89); calculated Mr. Fitzgerald's twenty-five percent separate property for pain and suffering based upon the total of these two awards (25% × $197,056.89 = $49,264.22); deducted Mr. Fitzgerald's portion for pain and suffering from only his lump sum award ($106,402.62—$49,264.22 = $57,138.40); and awarded one-half of the remaining amount of the lump sum award to each party as marital property ($57,138.30/2 = $28,569.20).2
From this ruling, Mrs. Fitzgerald filed a motion to reconsider, complaining that the family court should have deducted Mr. Fitzgerald's twenty-five percent pain and suffering separate property from each of his two benefits payments rather than subtracting the amounts attributable to each award all from his $106,406.62 lump sum award. The family court denied Mrs. Fitzgerald's motion to reconsider.
Both parties then appealed the family court's ruling to the circuit court, with Mr. Fitzgerald asserting that the entire amount of the $106,406.62 lump sum award should be declared his separate property and Mrs. Fitzgerald arguing that the entire amount of the $106,406.62 lump sum award should be designated marital property subject to equitable distribution. Determining that the question of the proper distribution of an award of workers' compensation benefits was a matter of first impression in West Virginia, the circuit court, by order entered April 28, 2005, certified the following questions of law to this Court:
By order entered March 2, 2006, this Court accepted these certified questions for review.
The issues presented by the instant proceeding involve questions of law certified to this Court for resolution. We previously have held that "[t]he appellate standard of review of questions of law answered and certified by a circuit court is de novo." Syl. pt. 1, Gallapoo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 197 W.Va. 172, 475 S.E.2d 172 (1996). See also Syl. pt. 1, Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 206 W.Va. 133, 522 S.E.2d 424 (1999) (); Syl. pt. 1, Light v. Allstate Ins. Co., 203 W.Va. 27, 506 S.E.2d 64 (1998) (). Mindful of this standard, we proceed to consider the questions presented for our determination.
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Worley v. Beckley Mechanical, Inc.
...(1996)." Keatley v. Mercer County Bd. of Educ., 200 W.Va. 487, 492 n. 7, 490 S.E.2d 306, 311 n. 7 (1997). Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 219 W.Va. 774, ___, 639 S.E.2d 866, 876 (2006). After carefully weighing the policy of W.Va.Code § 55-2-15 in conjunction with a literal application of its lan......
-
Crawford v. W. Va. Dep't of Corrections-Work Release
...ex rel. Boan v. Richardson, 198 W.Va. 545, 482 S.E.2d 162 (1996), modified on other grounds as recognized by Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 219 W.Va. 774, 783, 639 S.E.2d 866, 875 (2006).13 We recognize that there are disability benefits provided under workers' compensation in addition to medica......
-
Grose v. Grose
...as marital property and the disability component as separate property. 218 W.Va. at 202, 624 S.E.2d at 549. Cf. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 219 W.Va. 774, 639 S.E.2d 866 (2006). The reason underlying the payment of benefits is not necessarily unchanging. Such was the case in Staton, where the......
-
Miller v. Wilson
...a divorce action as marital property." Syl. pt. 3, Whiting v. Whiting, 183 W.Va. 451, 396 S.E.2d 413 (1990).Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 219 W. Va. 774, 780, 639 S.E.2d 866, 872 (2006). Petitioner also argues that reallocation of cash deposited into marital accounts from the two projects prior......