Fitzgerald v. Henderson
Decision Date | 29 December 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 98-CV-1005.,98-CV-1005. |
Citation | 36 F.Supp.2d 490 |
Parties | Lisa L. FITZGERALD, Plaintiff, v. William HENDERSON, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
Featherstonhaugh Conway Law Firm, Albany, For Plaintiff; Richard Casagrande, Esq. Andrew Kirby, Esq.
United States Attorney's Office, United States Postal Service, Law Department-Windsor Field Office, Windsor, CT, For Defendant. Anne Gallaudet, Special AUSA, of Counsel.
Plaintiff Lisa Fitzgerald ("Fitzgerald" or "Plaintiff") brought the instant action on June 25, 1998, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., against William Henderson, Postmaster General of the United States Post Office ("Defendant") alleging, inter alia, sexual discrimination and harassment, and unlawful retaliation. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that she was subjected to unlawful sexual discrimination and harassment by her direct supervisor, Timothy Gerling ("Gerling"), which allegedly continued despite Plaintiff's numerous requests for intervention to Dennis King ("King"), Postmaster of the Lake Placid Post Office, where Plaintiff was employed as a letter carrier. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and monetary damages, and cross-moves for leave to amend her Amended Complaint.
Defendant now moves for partial dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), (6), or in the alternative, for partial summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, and to strike Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages from the Amended Complaint.1 Defendant also opposes Plaintiff's cross-motion for leave to amend her Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff filed her Complaint on June 25, 1998. After receiving a final decision from the United States Postal Service ("Postal Service"), rejecting and dismissing the remainder of Plaintiff's sexual discrimination and harassment claims, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on August 19, 1998. The Amended Complaint contains claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., stating various claims sounding in sexual discrimination and harassment.2 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges claims of disparate treatment based on gender, hostile work environment, and retaliation. See Amended Compl. at ¶¶ 119-24. Plaintiff also asserts a claim of constructive discharge related to her being on medical leave since September 25, 1997. See id. at ¶ 127. These claims all arise out of the same factual setting.
Plaintiff, a female, was an employee of the Postal Service since 1986 in the position of Grade 5 City Letter Carrier. On or about 1994, Gerling was hired as a supervisor in the Lake Placid Post Office, where he functioned as Plaintiff's direct supervisor.3 During this time, King was the Postmaster of the Lake Placid Post Office. Soon after Gerling started, Plaintiff alleges in her Amended Complaint, as paraphrased in Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law, that Gerling subjected her to a "series of unwelcome sexual advances" that included:
[S]tanding in close proximity to [Plaintiff], while softly laying his hand on her shoulder; shaking hands with her on a daily basis, and softly holding her hand for an unusually long period of time; entering her work cubical [sic], standing in close proximity to her, and effectively blocking her only means of egress; staring at her inappropriately while she was working at her sorting station or loading her mail truck; embracing her at the worksite; telling her that she looked nice in shorts; directing her to see him in his office, and then attempting to engage her in non-work related conversations; staring inappropriately at her body and asking her how much she weighed; telling her that he liked her long hair; inviting her to lunch; boasting to her that he will `father [her] first child'; asking her to meet him after work; running his hand through her hair; offering to teach her `relaxation techniques'; and inviting her to go dancing with him.
Around October 1994, Plaintiff agreed to meet with Gerling after work to "tell Gerling that she was not interested in engaging in a sexual relationship with him." Amended Compl. at ¶ 46. Her efforts allegedly proved unsuccessful, and from late 1994 into early 1995, Gerling made similar unwelcome advances toward Plaintiff, prompting her to seek the intervention of Postmaster King. These efforts, too, proved unsuccessful. Amended Compl. at ¶¶ 44-70.
In early April 1995, Plaintiff was issued a "letter of warning" by Gerling for declining to work overtime on a weekend in which she was not scheduled to work. The letter of warning represented a formal disciplinary action by the Postal Service. In response, Plaintiff filed a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement to contest the letter of warning. Gerling subsequently retracted the letter in return for Plaintiff's attendance at an "employee assistance program," where she met with a counselor to discuss issues relating to her employment. Plaintiff further asserts that Gerling agreed to withdraw his letter of warning after she threatened to file an EEO complaint alleging sexual harassment against him. Thereafter, Gerling allegedly continued to harass Plaintiff, subjecting her to harsher and more critical treatment than her co-workers.
On September 25, the situation culminated after Gerling allegedly yelled at Plaintiff in a profane manner and pointed his finger at her. Confronted by Gerling's growing hostility and harassment, Plaintiff alleges that she sought medical attention because she was unable to complete her duties. Since this incident, Plaintiff has been on medical leave, "totally disabled from working" and suffering from a number of "psychological and medical conditions ... directly arising from the trauma and harassment she suffered at the hands of supervisor Gerling." Amended Compl. at ¶¶ 110-13. Plaintiff contacted an EEO Postal Service Counselor on October 24, 1997, and filed her "EEO Complaint of Discrimination in the Postal Service Form" ("EEO Complaint") on January 30, 1998.
The standard for summary judgment is well-settled. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), if there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law ... where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); see also Chertkova v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 86 (1996). The moving party bears the initial burden of "informing the ... court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). The initial burden is to demonstrate "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585-86, 106 S.Ct. 1348. A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party; that is, whether the non-movant's case, if proved at trial, would be sufficient to survive a motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). When reasonable minds, however, could not differ as to the import of the evidence, then summary judgment is proper. Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849, 112 S.Ct. 152, 116 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991).
Although the trial court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of that party against whom summary judgment is sought, Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 465 (2d Cir.1989); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 249 (2d Cir.1985) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918, 108 S.Ct. 269, 98 L.Ed.2d 226 (1987), the motion will not be defeated by a non-movant who raises merely a "metaphysical doubt" concerning the facts or who only offers conjecture or surmise. Delaware & H.R. Co. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 178 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 928, 111 S.Ct. 2041, 114 L.Ed.2d 125 (1991) (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348); see also Western World Ins. Co. v. Stack Oil, Inc., 922 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir.1990). Indeed, the nonmoving party's opposition may not rest on mere allegations or denials of the moving party's pleading, but "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e).
The Court is aware of the dangers of summary judgment in connection with a Title VII claim. "Because direct evidence of ... discriminatory intent will rarely be found, `affidavits and depositions must be carefully scrutinized for circumstantial proof which, if believed, would show discrimination.'" Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir.1997) (quoting Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994)). "However, even in the discrimination context, a plaintiff must provide more than conclusory allegations of discrimination to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Id. (citing Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 829, ...
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