Fitzgerald v. Procunier

• Decision Date: 07 May 1975
• Docket Number: No. C-74-1969-CBR.,C-74-1969-CBR.
• Citation: 393 F. Supp. 335
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: Maurice FITZGERALD, Plaintiff, v. Raymond PROCUNIER, Individually and in his official capacity as Director of the California Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants.

393 F. Supp. 335

Maurice FITZGERALD, Plaintiff, v. Raymond PROCUNIER, Individually and in his official capacity as Director of the California Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants.

No. C-74-1969-CBR.

United States District Court, N. D. California.

May 7, 1975.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Susan B. Kaplan, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Edward P. O'Brien, Karl S. Mayer, Kenneth C. Young, San Francisco, Cal., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER

RENFREW, District Judge.

Plaintiff, in custody at San Quentin State Prison, brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Director of the California Department of Corrections, the Warden of San Quentin State Prison, and the California Adult Authority. Plaintiff sought a declaration that his rights had been violated under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, as well as injunctive relief designed to cure the effects of the alleged violations. This action comes before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to certain named individual defendants and defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff was found guilty of participating in an assault on other inmates by a prison disciplinary committee which meted out punishment for that offense. As a result of the finding by the disciplinary panel, a separate classification committee assigned plaintiff to administrative segregation, where he remains to date.

The complaint sets forth three somewhat overlapping and interrelated claims. First, plaintiff alleges that he was not afforded due process at his disciplinary proceeding. In a separate paragraph, he also claims: "Further punishing plaintiff in the classification while failing to provide him due process is a further violation of the 14th Amendment causing him to suffer further grievous loss." At oral argument counsel for defendants stated that it was his understanding that the only due process violation alleged with respect to the classification was that it was based on an invalid finding of the disciplinary committee. In response to a question from the Court, counsel for plaintiff apparently conceded this point. While the claim is poorly drafted and ambiguous and counsel have apparently restricted its intended scope, the Court declines to accept that restriction. Defendants are seeking summary judgment and plaintiff is a prisoner in segregation. Accordingly, and in light of plaintiff's third claim, the Court will construe the second claim as an independent due process attack on plaintiff's initial classification and continuing assignment to administrative segregation. In his third claim, plaintiff alleges that "defendants have inflicted cruel and unusual punishment on plaintiff * * * by punishing plaintiff without allowing him to defend himself and continuing to arbitrarily punish him without explicitly informing him of the reasons for the punishment or the total extent of punishment to be inflicted." To the extent that this claim actually raises due process objections to plaintiff's segregation, the Court has treated them as such under the second claim.

Upon consideration of the briefs, exhibits and arguments of counsel, and construing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and for the reasons stated below, the Court grants defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's first and third claims. With respect to plaintiff's second claim, the motion is granted on the issue of plaintiff's initial reclassification and denied on the issue of plaintiff's continuation in segregated status. The motion to dismiss is granted with respect to certain named defendants.

I. Statement of Facts

On June 2, 1974, an incident involving several racial assaults on prisoners took place on the third tier of the East Block Housing Unit at San Quentin. At least three white prisoners suffered knife wounds. On June 3, 1974, plaintiff, a black, was placed in administrative segregation in the North Block Housing Unit. On June 4, 1974, plaintiff received a Rules Violation Report, known in common parlance as a CDC 115, and a Supplemental Report. The CDC charged plaintiff with "conduct which lead sic to violence". The Supplemental Report stated: "At approximately 4:25 PM on 2 June, 1974, on the third tier Bayside of the East Block Housing Unit, a group of fifteen (15) to twenty (20) black inmates began running the length of the tier stabbing and assaulting white inmates." The Supplemental Report also contained the names of four victims and seventeen suspected assailants, including plaintiff.

Plaintiff was assigned an investigating officer to whom he provided a list of approximately ten witnesses who could attest to his presence on the first tier at the time of the incident. The investigating officer submitted a report of the incident on June 10, 1974. Plaintiff appeared at a meeting of the disciplinary committee on June 14, 1974. Prior to that date the decision was made not to refer the matter to the district attorney for Marin County. The committee decided that further investigation was necessary and, at plaintiff's request, appointed a new investigating officer. Plaintiff provided his new officer with a list of witnesses as to his whereabouts at the time of the incident in question.

On June 21, 1974, plaintiff again appeared before the disciplinary committee. His investigator reported that plaintiff's witnesses had confirmed his alibi, but that the victims had positively identified him as a participant in the June 2 incident. The committee found plaintiff guilty and sentenced him to five days in isolation, with credit for time served, and thirty days' loss of privileges. They further referred him to the Full Classification Committee. At some time prior to June 23, 1974, plaintiff received a completed copy of the original CDC 115, informing him of the disciplinary committee's disposition. He also received a copy of his second investigator's report which named the victims who had identified him. On June 26, 1974, after a brief appearance by plaintiff, the Full Classification Committee assigned him to administrative segregation "for further observation", to be reviewed in 120 days. Plaintiff's status was subsequently reviewed by either the Sub-Classification Committee or individual correctional officers on July 16, August 28, September 27, October 1, and December 24, 1974. Plaintiff's status was reviewed by the Full Classification Committee on January 2, 1973, approximately 180 days after the initial classification. Plaintiff continues to be housed in segregation which includes greatly increased cell confinement, severe curtailment of privileges, denial of work, and the imposition of handcuffs and increased supervision during visits.

II. Plaintiff's Claim of Denial of Due Process at the Disciplinary Proceeding

Plaintiff complains of a denial of procedural due process at his June 21, 1974, disciplinary hearing, specifically the lack of adequate notice and an opportunity to call witnesses. A threshold question is what were the standards of due process applicable to prison disciplinary proceedings on June 21, 1974, in light of the non-retroactivity of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).

Prior to April 25, 1974, there was no definitive decision setting forth the procedural safeguards to be utilized in prison disciplinary proceedings in this Circuit. However, at a minimum, prisoners facing significant sanctions were to be afforded notice and a hearing. Allen v. Nelson, 354 F.Supp. 505, 513 (N.D.Cal. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 484 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1973).

On April 25, 1974, the Court of Appeals for this Circuit spelled out with considerable precision the due process rights to be afforded prisoners, including inter alia the right to written notice and the right to present witnesses subject to certain limitations. Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 818-820 (9th Cir. 1974). The defendants in that case timely filed a petition for rehearing which was still pending on June 26, 1974, when the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Wolff, supra, which established narrower due process rights than those set forth in Clutchette. On July 29, 1974, the Court of Appeals granted defendants' petition for rehearing restricted solely to the issue of Wolff's impact on the prior decision. On October 21, 1974, the Court of Appeals rendered its opinion on rehearing. Clutchette v. Procunier, 9 Cir., 510 F.2d 613. The court modified parts of the earlier opinion to conform with Wolff and reaffirmed it in all other respects, including the right to present witnesses and to have adequate notice. On December 24, 1974, the court held that its "decision in Clutchette shall only be applied prospectively". Wheeler v. Procunier, 9 Cir., 508 F.2d 888 (Second Revised Opinion on Rehearing). The question thus presented is whether the due process rights which were reaffirmed in October attached as of April 25 and hence would apply to a disciplinary hearing held on June 21. This Court concludes that they did not.

On June 21, 1974, the mandate in Clutchette had been stayed awaiting a decision on the petition for rehearing. Defendants were under no duty to institute new procedures conforming to that opinion, since a decision on rehearing might have mandated very different requirements. Had there been no petition for rehearing or had the petition been denied prior to June 21, 1974, defendants might be deemed to be put on notice that continued reliance on past procedures in such hearings was not justified. However, where, as here, there was a pending petition for rehearing, defendants need not be required to comply with the standards established even though those standards may have been ultimately reaffirmed.¹

While the specific safeguards outlined in Wolff and Clutchette do not apply to the disciplinary hearing of June 21, 1974,...