Fitzgerald v. Seaboard System R.R., Inc.

• Citation: 760 F.2d 1249
• Decision Date: 21 May 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-8633,84-8633
• Parties: Steven J. FITZGERALD, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. SEABOARD SYSTEM RAILROAD, INC., Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, and SEABOARD SYSTEM RAILROAD, INC., Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant. v. GEORGIA PORTS AUTHORITY, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1249

760 F.2d 1249

2 Fed.R.Serv.3d 112

Steven J. FITZGERALD, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. SEABOARD SYSTEM RAILROAD, INC., Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, and SEABOARD SYSTEM RAILROAD, INC., Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant. v. GEORGIA PORTS AUTHORITY, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.

No. 84-8633.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

May 21, 1985.

Grayson P. Lane, Brunswick, Ga. (argued), Fred T. Stapp, Jacksonville, Fla., for Fitzgerald.

Randall A. Jordan (argued), Mark J. Bujold, Brunswick, Ga., for Seaboard.

George H. Chamlee, Savannah, Ga., Daniel M. Formby, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), Atlanta, Ga., for Georgia Ports.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia.

Before KRAVITCH and CLARK, Circuit Judges, and WRIGHT ^*, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff Fitzgerald and against the defendant Seaboard System in the sum of $450,000.00 and judgment entered thereon. Subsequent to that judgment the district court entered a judgment in favor of the Georgia Ports Authority and against the Seaboard System, finding that the Seaboard could not collect indemnification from the Georgia Ports Authority based upon an indemnity agreement entered into between those two parties. Seaboard brings this appeal from both the jury verdict against it and the judgment entered by the court in favor of Georgia Ports Authority denying indemnification.

Prior to oral argument, the court notified counsel that it had a question with respect to whether diversity jurisdiction existed in this case between the original plaintiff Fitzgerald and the defendant Seaboard. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he was a citizen of the State of Florida and "defendant Seaboard System Railroad, Inc., is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Virginia having its principal place of business in a state other than the State of Florida...." ¹ Plaintiff further alleged that the matter in controversy exceeded, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum of $10,000.00.

In its answer, the defendant Seaboard alleged "[r]esponding to the allegations contained in Paragraph 1 of Plaintiff's Complaint, this Defendant admits that it is a foreign corporation and that the Plaintiff seeks damages in excess of Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars." The parties entered into a consolidated pre-trial order which was approved by the district court. ² With respect to jurisdiction the pre-trial order stated: "[t]he jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is founded on diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy. Plaintiff is a citizen of the State of Florida and the Defendant, Seaboard System Railroad, Inc., is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Virginia and having its principal place of business in a state other than Florida."

Sua sponte the court raised the issue of whether the principal place of business of the defendant Seaboard System, Inc. might be in Florida. Noting that the plaintiff had not alleged the principal place of business of the defendant Seaboard and wishing to be assured that the parties had not themselves attempted to confer jurisdiction upon the court of a case in which diversity might be lacking, the court asked counsel to submit written briefs with respect to whether diversity jurisdiction existed. The defendant Seaboard responded by brief and at oral argument with the contention that the principal place of business of the Seaboard is in Jacksonville, Florida, that counsel for the defendant erroneously overlooked this fact, as did apparently house counsel for defendant Seaboard to whom the pleadings were forwarded.

Counsel for the plaintiff both by brief and at oral argument urged that this court lacked the power to look behind the pleadings and the pre-trial order of the district court which found diversity jurisdiction. In response to oral interrogation, counsel for plaintiff stated that he did not know the location of the principal place of business of the Seaboard, but that it could be in Tennessee, Virginia, or Georgia. He urged that there was no legal basis authorizing an appellate court to remand a case to the district court for a factual determination of the location of the principal place of business of the Seaboard. He further argued that for this court to do so it would have to base such a decision upon information known to the court which was derived from sources outside the record and unknown to the plaintiff.

We disagree with counsel for the plaintiff and remand this case to the district court for a determination of the jurisdiction question raised herein. A federal court not only has the power but also the obligation at any time to inquire into jurisdiction whenever the possibility that jurisdiction does not exist arises. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 95 S.Ct. 1893, 44 L.Ed.2d 525 (1975); City of Kenosha, Wisconsin v....