Fitzmaurice v. Mosier
| Decision Date | 20 December 1888 |
| Docket Number | 13,093 |
| Citation | 19 N.E. 180,116 Ind. 363 |
| Parties | Fitzmaurice v. Mosier |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Original Opinion of March 24, 1888, Reported at: 116 Ind 363.
There is much reason for extending the equity powers of the court where, as with us, there are no separate tribunals, but the rules of law and equity are administered by the same court. There is no good reason why a court should not exercise its equity power to direct the cancellation of a promissory note that justice requires should not be enforced. We can perceive no reason why a court may not decree the cancellation of a note which is shown to be entirely without validity and to have been wrongfully procured. We think the second paragraph of the complaint states a case in which justice will be subserved by decreeing the cancellation of the promissory note of the plaintiff in the hands of the defendant. That paragraph shows that the note in question was executed by the plaintiff in the belief that it was in payment of a debt due the defendant, that this belief was created by the representations of the latter, and that the representations were untrue, inasmuch as the debt was not that of the plaintiff, but of a different person. By means of the untruthful representations the defendant secured the promissory note of the plaintiff for an entirely different purpose from that for which he intended to execute it, and for which he believed he was executing it. We can not agree with appellant's counsel that the pleading simply shows a case of failure of consideration or of payment; on the contrary, we are satisfied that it shows (not as definitely and clearly as it might be desired, it must be said), that by false representations the defendant induced the plaintiff to execute a promissory note for a purpose entirely different from that for which he believed he was executing it. If, however, we take the more favorable view to the appellant and hold that the note was executed by mistake, we must decide the case against him, for, even on this theory, we should be compelled to hold that there was a material mistake of fact brought about by the false statements of the appellant, and that a note executed because of such a mistake can not be enforced. Parrish v Thurston, 87 Ind. 437.
Where the defendant knows that the plaintiff believes he is contracting about a different subject from that actually dealt with, it is a fraud...
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