Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, No. 92-8306

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: Before FAY and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and RONEY; ANDERSON
• Citation: 2 F.3d 1112
• Parties: 62 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1484, 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,554, 2 A.D. Cases 1270, 3 ADD 320 Walter FITZPATRICK, Wayne E. Hall, William J. Hutchinson, Thomas Jones, Darryl J. Levette, Miguelito Marcelli, Andre D. Mitchell, Dennis Bernard Thomas, Melvin Whitehead, Gregory Wilkinson, Alfonzo L. Williams, and Elton M. Worthy, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF ATLANTA, Defendant-Appellee.
• Docket Number: No. 92-8306
• Decision Date: 27 September 1993

Page 1112

2 F.3d 1112 62 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1484,
62 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,554, 2 A.D. Cases 1270,
3 ADD 320 Walter FITZPATRICK, Wayne E. Hall, William J. Hutchinson,
Thomas Jones, Darryl J. Levette, Miguelito Marcelli, Andre
D. Mitchell, Dennis Bernard Thomas, Melvin Whitehead,
Gregory Wilkinson, Alfonzo L. Williams, and Elton M. Worthy,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CITY OF ATLANTA, Defendant-Appellee. No. 92-8306. United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit. Sept. 27, 1993.

Page 1113

Michael Weinstock, Weinstock & Scavo, Atlanta, GA, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Miguelito Marcelli, pro se.

Overtis Hicks Brantley, City of Atlanta Law Dept., Atlanta, GA, for defendant-appellee.

Paul Bogas, EEOC, Washington, DC, Rosalind A. Rubens, Willie Jake Lovett, Jr., Atlanta, GA, for amicus EEOC.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before FAY and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge:

This suit was brought against the City of Atlanta ("the City") by several African-American firefighters employed by the Atlanta Department of Public Safety, Bureau of Fire Services ("the Fire Department") who suffer from a medical condition on account of which they cannot shave their faces. Plaintiffs challenge a fire department regulation that requires all firefighters to be clean-shaven. They allege (1) that this "no-beard" rule has a discriminatory disparate impact on African-Americans in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq.; (2) that the no-beard rule was adopted for racially discriminatory reasons in violation of Title VII; (3) that the rule discriminates against the handicapped in violation of Sec. 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794(a); and (4) that the rule infringes the firefighters' constitutional right to substantive due process of law. ¹ The City defends the policy, contending that the

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respirator masks used by firefighters cannot safely be worn by bearded men. The district court granted summary judgment for the City and the firefighters have appealed. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In order to breathe in smoke-filled environments, firefighters must wear respirators, otherwise known as positive pressure self-contained breathing apparatuses ("SCBA's"). For the SCBA mask to operate properly and safely, its edges must be able to seal securely to the wearer's face. The parties do not dispute that a wearer's long facial hair can interfere with the forming of a proper seal. In an attempt to address the hazard posed by such hair, the City Fire Department until 1982 enforced a policy requiring all male firefighters to be completely clean-shaven. See Bureau of Fire Services Standard Operating Procedure 88.9.

The twelve plaintiff-appellant firefighters in this case are all African-American men who suffer from pseudofolliculitis barbae ("PFB"), a bacterial disorder which causes men's faces to become infected if they shave them. It is generally recognized that PFB disproportionately afflicts African-American men. At least one of the appellants, firefighter Darryl Levette, has been fighting with the City over its no-beard policy for more than ten years. Levette first challenged the requirement in 1982. In response to his complaints, the City modified its policy in order to accommodate firefighters with PFB. See Bureau of Fire Services Standard Operating Procedure 82.5 (R-31-Exhib. 1, Attach. B).

Under the modified policy, firefighters with PFB were permitted to participate in a program known as the "shaving clinic." Shaving clinic participants were allowed to wear very short "shadow" beards, which were not to exceed length limits specified by a dermatologist employed by the City. To enforce these limits, the Fire Department subjected the participating firefighters to a series of periodic beard inspections. It was believed that so long as the shadow beards were kept very short, the SCBA masks would still be able to seal sufficiently well to enable the firefighters to use them safely.

In 1988, after one of the appellant firefighters, William Hutchinson, complained that he had been wrongly refused permission to participate in the shaving clinic, the City decided to reconsider the shadow beard policy. On the recommendation of Del Corbin, the City's then-Assistant Commissioner of Public Safety, the Fire Department decided that shadow beards would no longer be permitted, on the grounds that even shadow beards may interfere with the safe use of SCBA's.

On November 4, 1988, the Department of Public Safety issued Special Order 3.9, directing the Fire Department to resume enforcement of Bureau of Fire Services Standard Operating Procedure 88.9, the no-beard rule. Under the new policy, firefighters who cannot be clean-shaven must be removed from firefighting duty. Such persons may be transferred to non-firefighting positions within the Department, if suitable openings are available. They may also apply for other available positions with the City but are accorded no special priority and must compete on an equal basis with other eligible candidates. Under the new policy such persons are granted the right to be temporarily reassigned from firefighting duties for a one-time period of ninety days. Dep't of Pub. Safety, Special Order 3.9 (R-33-Exhib. A). Male firefighters who cannot shave and for whom non-firefighting positions are not available within the Department are terminated, once they have exhausted their ninety days of temporary reassignment.

Firefighter Hutchinson challenged the new policy by filing a charge with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on December 14, 1988. In March 1989, the EEOC certified the charge as a "class" charge on behalf of all city firefighters adversely affected by the policy change. Magistrate's Report (R-43-2-3). The appellant firefighters initiated this suit on December 29, 1989. The district court issued and then extended a restraining order prohibiting the City from changing the terms or conditions

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of the plaintiff firefighters' employment during the pendency of the litigation before the district court. (R-3; R-42). The City has kept the appellant firefighters on the payroll and has permitted them to continue reporting for work at their regular fire stations, but it has required them to perform various janitorial duties instead of their regular jobs. Magistrate's Report (R-43-2-5).

The City answered the complaint and moved for summary judgment. The district court referred that motion to a magistrate judge and on November 18, 1991, adopted the magistrate's recommendation that the motion be granted. District Court Order (R-53), adopting Magistrate's Report (R-43). This appeal followed.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A. Introduction

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), a moving party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The substantive law applicable to the case determines which facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "The district court should resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant, and draw all justifiable inferences in his [or her] favor." U.S. v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In Adickes v. Kress, 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970), the Supreme Court instructed the federal courts to employ a two-part framework of shifting burdens to determine whether, as regards a given material fact, there exists a genuine issue precluding summary judgment. The operation of this framework was modified significantly in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The current framework is set out below.

B. Movant's Initial Burden

The movant's initial burden consists of a "responsibility [to] inform[ ] the ... court of the basis for its motion and [to] identify[ ] those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The nature of this responsibility varies, however, depending on whether the legal issues, as to which the facts in question pertain, are ones on which the movant or the non-movant would bear the burden of proof at trial.

1. For Issues on Which Movant Would Bear Burden of Proof at Trial

As interpreted by this court sitting en banc, Celotex requires that for issues on which the movant would bear the burden of proof at trial,

that party must show affirmatively the absence of a genuine issue of material fact: it must support its motion with credible evidence ... that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial. In other words, the moving party must show that, on all the essential elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. If the moving party makes such an affirmative showing, it is entitled to summary judgment unless the non-moving party, in response, come[s] forward with significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact.

Four Parcels, 941 F.2d at 1438 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original).

2. For Issues on Which Non-Movant Would Bear Burden of Proof at Trial

For issues, however, on which the non-movant would bear the burden of proof at trial,

the moving party is...