Fitzpatrick v. Crestfield Farm, Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 July 1978
• Citation: Fitzpatrick v. Crestfield Farm, Inc., 582 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978)
• Parties: Edward S. FITZPATRICK, Appellant, v. CRESTFIELD FARM, INC., Workmen's Compensation Board and James R. Yocom, Commissioner of Labor and Custodian of the Special Fund, Appellees.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

Page 44

582 S.W.2d 44

Edward S. FITZPATRICK, Appellant, v. CRESTFIELD FARM, INC., Workmen's Compensation Board and James R. Yocom, Commissioner of Labor and Custodian of the Special Fund, Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

July 14, 1978.

William G. Cox, Cox & Cox, Lexington, for appellant.

W. R. Patterson, Jr., Landrum, Patterson & Dickey, Robert S. Walker, III, Brown, Sledd & McCann, Lexington, for appellee, Crestfield Farm, Inc.

Kenneth E. Hollis, Gen. Counsel, Dept. of Labor, Frankfort, John Riehl, Jr., Asst. Counsel, Dept. of Labor, Louisville, for appellee, Special Fund.

William L. Huffman, Director, Workmen's Compensation Bd., Frankfort, for appellee, Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Board.

Before LESTER, VANCE and WILHOIT, JJ.

LESTER, Judge.

Appellant takes issue with a decision of the circuit court which reversed an award of the Workmen's Compensation Board.

In order to dispose of this appeal in an expeditious manner, we will briefly comment that appellant's third issue presented to us, namely, that the agriculture exclusion contained in the Workmen's Compensation Act is violative of the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions because of discriminatory classification of workers, is without merit. Furthermore, as was the situation in Peck v. Condor, Ky., 540 S.W.2d 10 (1976), we will not express an opinion with respect to the possible invalidity of a statute when such an issue was not presented on appeal to the circuit court from the board.

The main thrust of this appeal is whether the operator of a farm who boarded thoroughbred race horses was excluded from the operation of the Workmen's Compensation Act in view of the definition of agriculture as provided in KRS 342.620(16). After a detailed review of the records of the board, the circuit court and the briefs before this court, we have concluded that the learned trial judge reached the correct conclusions in his well written and reasoned opinion and in affirming that judgment, we adopt his determinations as those of this court. The opinion of the Fayette Circuit Court follows.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Board holding that the Petitioner, Crestfield Farm, Inc., was an employer, mandatorily subject to and required to comply with the provisions of the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation law. The Board also awarded compensation to the Petitioner's employee, Edward S. Fitzpatrick, and dismissed the Special Fund from any liability by way of apportionment. However, since it is the opinion of this Court that the Workmen's Compensation Board was in error in holding Petitioner subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act, the other issues raised by this appeal need not be considered.

The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Board typically may be found contained in one short paragraph as follows:

"We hold that the defendant, Crestfield Farm, Inc., was not engaged Principally in agriculture. The financial report filed indicates the farm involved was operated principally for the boarding of horses. Therefore, this defendant was subject to the mandatory provisions of the Act."

KRS 342.630(1), for our purposes, sets out the employers mandatorily subject to the Act as follows:

(1) Any person, other than one engaged solely in agriculture, that has in this state one or more employees subject to this chapter.

It should be noted that in order to qualify for the so called agricultural exemption, a person must be engaged solely in agriculture and not merely engaged Principally in agriculture. The Board probably was confused by language used in KRS 342.610(2) which doesn't have anything to do with this case.

The evidence before the Board clearly and unequivocally established that the petitioner operated farm premises consisting of one hundred and twenty acres of land containing one horse barn, one barn used for both tobacco and horses, and one four stall shed used for horses and to store machinery. On this farm is raised tobacco, hay, cattle, and thoroughbred yearlings. Also, thoroughbred brood mares owned by other people are fed, housed and cared for on the farm. The financial report referred to by the Board shows the gross receipts from the operation of the farm over a three year period, 1972, 1973, and 1974. The report shows a breakdown of receipts from boarding brood mares, the sale of yearlings, the sale of cattle, the sale of tobacco, and other income. The report indicated that over the three year period mentioned an average of approximately 73% Of gross receipts came from boarding brood mares owned by others. Evidently, the Board came to the conclusion that feeding, housing and caring for brood mares on farm premises was not encompassed within the definition of agriculture. So far as we are able to determine from the authorities presented by the attorneys for the parties and from our own research, the Board in this case is the only Workmen's Compensation Board in the United States to have come up with such a startling conclusion. No authority for, nor any rational basis for such a conclusion is offered by the Board, nor by any of the attorneys for the parties and this Court can find none.

Many courts throughout the United States, including the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, have had occasion to define the meaning of "agriculture", "agricultural pursuits", "engaged in agriculture", and the like when faced with situations involving Workmen's Compensation Laws, tax laws, zoning laws, and other statutes using such terminology. Although some definitions have been more restrictive than others, we have not found where any Court has held that the usual practice of animal husbandry is not included within the general term "agriculture". According to Webster's Dictionary "animal husbandry" is a branch of agriculture concerned with the production and care of domestic animals.

KRS 342.620 undertakes to define agriculture as follows:

(16) "Agriculture" means the operation of farm premises, including the planting, cultivation, producing, growing, harvesting, and preparation for market of agricultural or horticultural commodities thereon, the raising of livestock for food products and for racing purposes, and poultry thereon, and any work performed as an incident to or in conjunction with such farm operations. It shall not include the commercial processing, packing, drying, storing, or canning of...