Fitzpatrick v. Heckler, Civ. A. No. 85-1194-C.

• Decision Date: 17 June 1986
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 85-1194-C.
• Citation: 636 F. Supp. 860
• Parties: Leonard FITZPATRICK, Plaintiff, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

636 F. Supp. 860

Leonard FITZPATRICK, Plaintiff, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 85-1194-C.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

June 17, 1986.

William J. Gately, Jr., Wynn & Wynn, Taunton, Mass., Jane Eden, for plaintiff.

Asst. U.S. Atty. Marianne B. Bowler, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

CAFFREY, Chief Judge.

The plaintiff, Leonard Fitzpatrick, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking reversal of an adverse determination by the Secretary of Health and Human Services on his claim that he is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The matter is now before the Court on the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and the Secretary's motion for an order affirming her decision. For the reasons set forth below, I rule that the Secretary's determination that the plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, the Secretary's motion for affirmance should be granted, and the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment should be denied.

The plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and for disability insurance benefits on October 6, 1983, alleging an inability to work since May 13, 1983. The application was denied initially and on reconsideration by the Social Security Administration. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), before whom the plaintiff and his attorney appeared on October 15, 1984, considered the case de novo and, in a decision dated December 26, 1984, found that the plaintiff was not under a disability. On February 19, 1985 the Appeals Council approved the ALJ's decision and informed the plaintiff that the ALJ's decision stood as the final decision of the Secretary, subject to judicial review. The plaintiff then initiated the instant action in this Court.

Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), provides, inter alia, that "the court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing," and that "the findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." The Act defines disability in both Sections 216(i)(1) and 223(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(1) and 423(d)(1), as:

the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.

. . . . .

Section 223(d), 42 U.S.C. § 423(d), further provides that:

(2)(A) an individual ... shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. For purposes of the preceding sentence (with respect to any individual), `work which exists in the national economy' means work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.

* * * * * *

(3) ... a `physical or mental impairment' is an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.

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(5) An individual shall not be considered under a disability unless he furnishes such medical and other evidence of the existence thereof as the Secretary may require....

The Social Security Administration Regulations, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920, provide a five-step procedure for evaluating disability. Goodermote v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 690 F.2d 5, 6-7 (1st Cir.1982). In his decision the ALJ found that the plaintiff suffers from a respiratory ailment, a back condition, and carcinoma of the bladder, and that because of these ailments he is unable to perform his past relevant work as a quality control inspector or supervisor of inspectors in the tire manufacturing industry. The ALJ further found, however, that considering the plaintiff's residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience, See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545-1560, the plaintiff is able to perform "light work" within the meaning of the Regulations.¹ Finally, the ALJ found that the plaintiff's nonexertional limitations did not significantly reduce the range of jobs he was able to perform and, therefore, concluded that the plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.²

The plaintiff's principal argument is that although the ALJ considered each of his ailments individually and found that none of them alone were disabling, the ALJ failed to consider whether a combination of his ailments rendered him disabled. If the ALJ had done so, the plaintiff argues, he would have found that the plaintiff was unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity and thus was disabled within the meaning of the Act. The plaintiff also contends that the ALJ disregarded the substantial, uncontradicted medical evidence supporting the plaintiff's complaints of an incapacitating back condition and should be reversed on that basis as well. After careful reading of the record, particularly the ALJ's decision, and the arguments made on behalf of both parties, I rule that the ALJ's finding with respect to each of the plaintiff's specific impairments were supported by substantial evidence, that the ALJ did consider whether the combination of the plaintiff's ailments rendered him disabled, and that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's finding that the plaintiff's back condition alone was not disabling.

The ALJ reviewed the evidence on the record thoroughly before making his findings with respect to each of the plaintiff's major ailments. The ALJ found that while the plaintiff's respiratory problems constituted a "severe" impairment, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520-1521, they did not meet or equal the requirements of the pertinent listed impairment. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 3.03. Based upon my review of the record, I rule that there is substantial evidence to support these findings. A pulmonary function study performed in May, 1983 at the Goddard Memorial Hospital revealed "a pattern of mild obstructive airway disease," and the report of a similar study performed in April, 1984 stated that the plaintiff was suffering from a "moderate obstructive ventilatory defect." In a report dated April 20, 1984, Dr. Gertler diagnosed "chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, mild to moderate," but also stated that the plaintiff "is able to get by fairly well within his medical regimen." The Court is mindful that in a letter dated June 10, 1983, one of the plaintiff's treating physicians, Dr. Hyman L. Bloom, stated that the plaintiff's respiratory condition together with his other problems rendered him unfit for gainful occupation. It is settled law, however, that a physician's conclusion concerning disability is not controlling. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; Tremblay v. Secretary of Health and Human...