Fix v. State
| Decision Date | 16 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 22S-CR-7 |
| Parties | Zachary Fix, Appellant (Defendant below) v. State of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Argued: February 24, 2022
Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court, No. 48C03-1803-F2-792 The Honorable Andrew Hopper, Judge
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No 20A-CR-1566
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Anderson, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Andrew Kobe
Ian McLean
Megan Michelle Smith
Jodi Kathryn Stein
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Burglary is the breaking into and entering of a building or structure of another person with the intent to commit a felony. Because the burglar need not actually carry out the underlying intended felony for criminal liability to attach, the offense is complete, for purposes of prosecution, at the moment the building or structure is broken into and entered. But does the offense itself end simply because the State has established criminal liability? We conclude that it does not, and hold that burglary is an ongoing crime that encompasses a defendant's conduct inside the premises, terminating only when the unlawful invasion ends.
So, despite the defendant here having armed himself after the breaking and entering, we affirm his conviction for level-2 felony burglary while armed with a deadly weapon. But because the length of the defendant's aggregate sentence exceeds the consecutive-sentencing cap imposed by Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2, we reverse and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
During the early morning hours of July 7, 2017, Zachary Fix and his friend, Bobby Yeagy, drove through Anderson, Indiana, in search of a place to rob-the loot from which they intended to eventually trade for drugs. Fruitless in their efforts, the two men-both high on heroin and meth-headed north to Alexandria. Their drive ultimately led them to the home of Robert Mudd, a paraplegic man to whom Yeagy had delivered pizza on several occasions. The medical condition from which Mudd suffered, arteriovenous malformation, resulted in a gradual paralysis of his lower body. Confined to a hospital bed in his living room, Mudd depended on family and healthcare workers for support.
When the perpetrators arrived at their victim's house, Fix cut the power and cable lines and disabled the security system. The two men then entered the residence through the back door, approached the bedridden Mudd, demanded that he direct them to anything of value, and threatened to kill him should he fail to cooperate. As Yeagy ransacked the home looking for medication, Fix took Mudd's cell phone, wallet, necklace, and life-alert pendant. At some point, Mudd reached for a handgun he kept under his pillow. A struggle ensued. Fix eventually wrested control of the weapon and pistol-whipped his victim, leaving Mudd with a laceration on the side of his head.
After about an hour, Fix and Yeagy left Mudd's home to unload their plundered goods, but not before drugging their victim with tranquilizers and warning him that they'd soon be back to finish the job. True to their word, Fix and Yeagy-pausing only to boost their meth-fueled high- returned about forty-five minutes later for a second round of looting. In the end, the perpetrators made off with an estimated $11, 000 worth of Mudd's property, including a dozen firearms, thousands of rounds of ammunition, various tools, medications, a safe, two cell phones, two cameras, a radio, and several debit and credit cards. Careless in covering their tracks, Fix and Yeagy left a trail of evidence that eventually led police to their doorstep.
The State charged Fix with several offenses: one count of level-2 felony burglary while armed with a deadly weapon; two counts of level-3 felony robbery (one based on bodily injury, and one based on the use of a deadly weapon); and one count of level-6 felony theft. See Ind. Code §§ 35-43-2-1, 35-42-5-1(a), 35-43-4-2(a) (2017). A jury found him guilty as charged. At the State's request, the trial court withheld judgment of conviction for level-3 felony armed robbery (to avoid double jeopardy) and sentenced Fix for the remaining offenses as follows: thirty years for level-2 felony burglary; six years for level-5 felony robbery as a lesser-included offense of level-3 felony robbery resulting in bodily injury (also to avoid double jeopardy); and two and a half years for level-6 felony theft. The trial court ordered Fix to serve these sentences consecutively, culminating in an aggregate term of thirty-eight and a half years.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that insufficient evidence supported Fix's conviction for level-2 felony burglary while armed with a deadly weapon. Fix v. State, 177 N.E.3d 837, 847 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021). Because the "criminal transgression of burglary is committed" when the defendant crosses the threshold of the premises in which he intends to commit a felony, and because Fix acquired the handgun only after crossing that threshold, the panel reasoned, the elevated offense had no leg to stand on. Id. at 845. Had the legislature intended to expand culpability to include acts committed after the breaking and entering, the panel added, it could have drafted the burglary statute accordingly. Id. The panel remanded with instructions for the trial court to enter judgment of conviction for a lesser-included form of burglary. Id. at 847.
In Part II of its opinion, the Court of Appeals (A) found no double-jeopardy violation for Fix's burglary and robbery convictions and (B), having vacated the conviction for the elevated burglary offense, instructed the trial court to enter judgment of conviction for level-3 felony armed robbery. Id. at 847-49. Finally, in Part III of its opinion, the panel held that, because level-3 felony armed robbery amounted to a "crime of violence," the trial court's sentencing for that offense on remand need not count toward the aggregate statutory cap imposed by Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2. Id. at 849-50.
The State petitioned for transfer, which we granted, vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence supporting a conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses. Jackson v. State, 50 N.E.3d 767, 770 (Ind. 2016). We consider instead only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences supporting the trial court's verdict, affirming "unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. When, like here, resolution of a sufficiency claim turns on our interpretation of a statute, we're presented with a pure question of law, to which a de novo standard of review applies. Id.
We begin our decision by summarily affirming Part II.A of the Court of Appeals opinion. See App. R. 58(A)(2). Because we disagree with the panel's holding on the elevated burglary offense, we vacate that portion of its opinion (Part II.B) instructing the trial court to enter judgment of conviction for level-3 felony armed robbery. See App. R. 58(A). But because the trial court withheld judgment of conviction for that offense, there's no double-jeopardy issue for us to resolve.
We write, then, to address two issues: (I) whether the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Fix of level-2 felony burglary; and (II) whether the aggregate sentence for Fix's felony convictions (burglary, armed robbery, and theft) exceeds the sentencing cap imposed by Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2.
Indiana Code section 35-43-2-1 defines burglary, a level-5 felony, as the breaking and entering of a "building or structure of another person, with intent to commit a felony or theft in it." The offense becomes a level-2 felony if it "is committed while armed with a deadly weapon." Id. The question here centers on the scope of the phrase "committed while armed."
Fix argues that the statute's "plain language" precludes his conviction for the elevated offense "because he was not armed at the time [the] act of burglary was committed." Resp. to Pet. to Trans. at 6. According to his theory, the burglary offense was complete once he crossed the threshold of Mudd's residence, and because he wasn't armed at that precise moment, there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for the elevated offense.
The State, on the other hand, argues that burglary is "an ongoing crime" which doesn't end "until the unlawful invasion ends and the burglar exits the premises." Pet. to Trans. at 10. So, for the statutory enhancement to apply, the State submits, it makes no difference whether Fix was armed at the threshold of the premises or whether he armed himself after entering the home. In support of its argument, the State cites the language of the statute itself, its underlying goals and policies, "basic principles underlying common-law burglary," and judicial construction of similar enhancing language in other criminal statutes. Id. at 7.
When asked to interpret a statute, we start with the text of the statute itself. Study v. State, 24 N.E.3d 947, 952 (Ind. 2015). When the statute is clear and unambiguous, we avoid judicial construction by interpreting its words in their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. But when a statute permits more than one reasonable interpretation, we consider that statute ambiguous. Mi.D. v. State, 57 N.E.3d 809, 813 (Ind. 2016). And when a statute is ambiguous we...
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