Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Tallahassee

• Decision Date: 06 April 2021
• Docket Number: No. 1D20-2193,1D20-2193
• Citation: 314 So.3d 796
• Parties: FLORIDA POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., John Doe 1 and John Doe 2, Appellants, v. CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

314 So.3d 796

FLORIDA POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., John Doe 1 and John Doe 2, Appellants,

v.CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D20-2193

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 6, 2021

Luke Newman of Luke Newman, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellants.

Philip J. Padovano and Joseph T. Eagleton of Brannock Humphries & Berman, Tallahassee for Appellee.

Carol Jean LoCicero and Mark R. Caramanica of Thomas & LoCicero PL, Tampa; and Daniela B. Abratt, Fort Lauderdale, for Intervenor News Media.

Edward L. Birk of Marks Gray, P.A., Jacksonville, attorney for Amici Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and Brechner Center for Freedom of Information, Amicus Curiae.

Rowe, J.

In two separate encounters, crime suspects threatened Tallahassee police officers with deadly force. Faced with the imminent threat of harm, the officers responded in kind, resulting in fatalities. Following the encounters, the City of Tallahassee revealed its intent to disclose the identities of the police officers to the public. The officers and their registered bargaining representative, the Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (collectively, Appellants), opposed public disclosure of the officers' identities and sought a declaration from the trial court that the officers were entitled to the protections granted crime victims under article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution.¹ Appellants also asked the court to enjoin the City from disclosing any personal information that could be used to identify or locate the officers. But the trial court determined that the protections afforded crime victims under article I, section 16 were unavailable to law enforcement officers even when a crime suspect threatened an officer with deadly force. And the court found that even if the officers were crime victims, their names were not entitled to confidential treatment. Appellants challenge the trial court's ruling. We reverse.

I. Background

The Tallahassee Police Department employs two police officers who were involved in separate encounters with crime suspects that ended with fatalities. The first encounter occurred after the police officer responded to a report of an aggravated battery. The battery victim reported that the suspect was armed with knives, which he brandished during the attack on the victim. When the officer arrived on the scene, he saw the suspect hiding behind bushes. The suspect, who was standing between ten and fifteen feet away from the officer, threatened to kill the officer, waved a large hunting-style knife at the officer, and then rushed toward him. In response to the imminent threat, the officer shot the suspect while trying to retreat. The suspect died from the gunshot wounds.

The second encounter occurred when the police officer responded to a report of a stabbing in which the suspect fled the scene with a gun and a knife. The officer encountered the suspect leaning into the passenger window of a parked SUV. A woman then leapt from the SUV toward another police vehicle, pleading for help. Next, the suspect moved toward the officer, assumed a shooting stance, and pointed a gun at the officer. Fearing for his life, the officer exited his vehicle and shot the suspect. The suspect continued to reach for his gun. Right after the shooting, bystanders began threatening the officer, causing him to fear for his safety. The suspect later died from the gunshot wounds.

Following the two encounters, Appellants asserted that the officers were crime victims entitled to the protections granted under article I, section 16. Appellants asked the City not to release to the public any information that could be used to identify or locate the two officers. At first the City committed that it would not release the name of a police officer who became a victim of a criminal offense and who requested confidentiality. But then, the City changed course and asserted that law enforcement officers were excluded from the protections granted crime victims under article 1, section 16.

Appellants then sued in circuit court, seeking a declaratory judgment, a writ of mandamus, and an injunction. They asked for a declaration that the officers were entitled to the protections afforded victims under article I, section 16. Appellants also asked for a writ of mandamus directing the City to show cause why the officers were not entitled to declaratory relief, and for an order enjoining the City from releasing personal identifying information, including the officers' names.

The News Media² then intervened, asserting that the Tallahassee Police Department failed to respond to their public records requests seeking records identifying the two officers involved in the shootings. The City and the News Media (collectively, Appellees) argued that the records identifying the officers' names were subject to disclosure as public records under article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution. They argued that the officers were not entitled to the protections afforded crime victims under article I, section 16 because law enforcement officers acting in their official capacities cannot be victims under that law.

The trial court held a hearing. After considering legal arguments from the parties, the court denied Appellants' requests for relief. The court observed that the facts were undisputed—the parties stipulated that the suspects in the two encounters threatened the officers with deadly weapons. Appellees did not object to Appellants' assertion that the officers had a well-founded fear that violence against their persons was imminent. But even though those facts suggested that the officers were crime victims, the trial court found that a law enforcement officer acting in his official capacity could not be a victim under article I, section 16 :

The Court finds that the explicit language of Marsy's Law was not intended to apply to law enforcement officers when acting in their official capacity. Marsy's Law provides "victims" certain rights such as the "right to due process and to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim's dignity," the right "within the judicial process, to be reasonably protected from the accused" and the right "to have the safety and welfare of the victim and the victim's family considered when setting bail, including setting pretrial release conditions." Art. 1, § 16(b)(1), (3), (4), Fla. Const.

In the case at hand, Petitioner seeks to treat officers Doe 1 and Doe 2 as victims; however, the would-be accuseds are dead, killed by the officers in the line of duty. The officers do not seek protection from the would-be accuseds, instead they apparently seek protection from possible retribution for their on-duty actions from unknown persons in the community. This type of protection is outside the scope of Marsy's Law and is inconsistent with the express purpose and language of the amendment. This Court cannot interpret Marsy's Law to shield police officers from public scrutiny of their official actions.

In reaching its conclusions, the trial court pointed out that article I, section 24(a) grants the public a broad right to inspect and copy records of any state or local agency. The court determined it was necessary to balance crime victims' rights under article I, section 16 against the public's right to hold government accountable under article I, section 24(a). The court observed that "[t]his case presents a situation in which law enforcement seeks to enforce its interpretation of a specific constitutional provision which has the practical effect of removing their actions from public scrutiny," and that this is "inconsistent with the expressed purpose of Marsy's Law."

The court then suggested that the protections of article I, section 16 are available to crime victims only when a criminal proceeding begins. And finally, the court found that even if the officers were crime victims, records that would reveal their names were not entitled to confidential treatment and were not exempt from public disclosure.

For those reasons, the trial court denied Appellants' requests for relief. The trial court also ordered that the City "disclose the requested public records in a form that identifies the names of officers." Appellants immediately sought review of the trial court's order. The order is stayed pending this appeal.

II. Analysis

Appellants argue that the trial court misconstrued article I, section 16 and article I, section 24(a) when it determined that the officers were not entitled to the protections granted crime victims under article I, section 16.

We review the trial court's interpretation of the constitutional text de novo. Benjamin v. Tandem Healthcare, Inc. , 998 So. 2d 566, 570 (Fla. 2008). And we begin with the plain language of the text. Ervin v. Collins , 85 So. 2d 852, 855 (Fla. 1956) ("We are called on to construe the terms of the Constitution, an instrument from the people, and we are to effectuate their purpose from the words employed in the document."). "The words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means." Advisory Op. to the Governor Re: Implementation of Amend. 4 , 288 So. 3d 1070, 1078 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012)). And so, "[w]here the language of the Constitution ‘is clear, unambiguous, and addresses the matter in issue, then it must be enforced as written.’ " Israel v. DeSantis , 269 So. 3d 491, 495 (Fla. 2019) (quoting Fla. Soc'y of Ophthalmology v. Fla. Optometric Ass'n , 489 So. 2d 1118, 1119 (Fla. 1986) ). Applying these interpretive principles, we hold that the trial court misconstrued article I, section 16 by ignoring its plain language and then limiting the class of victims entitled to protection under the law.

A. Article I, section 16 and article I, section 24(a) do not conflict.

Appellants asked the trial court for a judgment under section 86.011, Florida...