Flaherty v. O'Connor

• Decision Date: 23 January 1903
• Parties: FLAHERTY v. O'CONNOR.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

54 A. 376

24 R.I. 587

FLAHERTY

v. O'CONNOR.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Jan. 23, 1903.

Action by Mary Flaherty against Jeremiah J. O'Connor. A Judgment was rendered for defendant, and plaintiff applies for a new trial. Granted.

Argued before STINESS, C. J., and TILLINGHAST and ROGERS, JJ.

C. J. Farnsworth and Joseph A. Hughes, for plaintiff.

Charles E. Gorman, for defendant.

STINESS, C. J. The plaintiff received the sum of $439 upon a policy of insurance on the life of a daughter, made payable to the plaintiff. The plaintiff handed the money over to the defendant, as claimed on her side, to pay the funeral expenses and bills of the daughter, and to return the balance to her. The defendant claims that she gave the money to him to pay the bills, and to use the rest for the interest of the daughter's children. Before he had completed the payment of the bills, the plaintiff demanded the balance in his hands, which he refused to pay to her, and thereupon she brought this suit. The jury gave a verdict for the defendant.

The plaintiff requested the court to instruct the jury (1) that the plaintiff had the right to revoke the gift at any time up to the time of delivery of the money or the completion of the direction of the plaintiff as to the disposition of the same; (2) that no trust was created under the circumstances of the transaction; (3) that, to make a gift inter vivos, there must have been a delivery of the money to the children, and that the defendant's duty was to hand it over to her on demand; and (4) that the defendant was the agent of the plaintiff, whose agency could be revoked before the completion of what he was called upon to do. The requests were denied, and exceptions taken.

Nine persons were present when the money was turned over. Of these, three—the plaintiff and Mr. and Mrs. Maher, the plaintiff's daughter and her husband—testified that the balance was to be returned to the plaintiff with the receipts for bills paid. The defendant and the other five state the directions differently from the plaintiff's witnesses, and in most cases differently from each other.

Gifts may be regarded as of five kinds: (1) Absolute to the donee; (2) to one for delivery to another; (3) to one as a trustee; (4) inter vivos; and (5) causa mortis. There is no claim in this case that there was an absolute gift to the defendant, nor that there was a gift causa mortis.

We will first consider whether it was a gift in trust. The defendant testified that the words were, as he understood them, "Take that money, and pay the bills, and use it for the interest of the children." Mrs. Casey states it in the same way. These words would constitute a discretionary trust, but not necessarily for all the children or for any particular child; for the defendant might think that those earning money did not need it, and that "the interests of the children" required its expenditure for the younger ones, who were dependent. Mr. Quigley's statement was: To "be divided between the young ones, and placed to their credit in the bank." This would be a definite trust, if we take "young ones" to mean all the children; but he is the only one who states it in this way. Mr. Kenney and Miss O'Connor said: "Divide the rest with the children." This would be a delivery of the money to the defendant to be delivered to others, the real donees. Mrs. Patnaud said: "Pay the bills, and you can do whatever you wish with the rest of it." This would amount to an absolute gift of the balance to the defendant. From this conflict of testimony among the defendant's own witnesses, it does not appear that there is any trust which could be enforced by any one or more of the children. A trust should be sufficiently definite to be...