Flaherty v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co.

• Decision Date: 24 January 1958
• Docket Number: Nos. 37284,37285,s. 37284
• Citation: 251 Minn. 345,87 N.W.2d 633
• Parties: Bridget T. FLAHERTY and Martin P. Flaherty, Respondents, v. The MINNEAPOLIS & ST. LOUIS RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 633

87 N.W.2d 633

251 Minn. 345

Bridget T. FLAHERTY and Martin P. Flaherty, Respondents, v. The MINNEAPOLIS & ST. LOUIS RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant.

Nos. 37284, 37285.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 24, 1958.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. If a jury is told in clear and unqualified language that, although a railroad is not an insurer of the safety of its passengers, it must exercise for their safety the highest degree of care and diligence consistent with the practical operation of its trains, it is unnecessary to add (although to do so would not be incorrect) that it is also responsible for the slightest negligence.

2. It is error to submit the res ipsa loquitur rule to a jury in a manner specifically indicative of a different standard of care than that which otherwise controls the decision upon the issue of negligence.

3. It is error to instruct the jury to disregard the argument of counsel upon the issue of damages in so far as it is based upon an illustrative evaluation of damages on a per diem basis.

Richard Musenbrock, William J. Powell, and LeRoy C. Corcoran, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Thomas K. Scallen, Minneapolis, for respondents.

MATSON, Justice.

Appeal, in each of two separate actions consolidated for trial, from an order granting plaintiffs a new trial exclusively upon the ground of errors of law occurring at the trial and upon no other ground.

These two actions, one by plaintiff Bridget T. Flaherty for damages for personal injury, the other by plaintiff Martin P. Flaherty, her husband, for special damages and for damages for loss of services, are based upon the alleged negligence of the defendant in operating its railroad train on which plaintiff Bridget was a passenger. Bridget, who was en route from Minneapolis to the village of Kilkenny, alleges that, after the train had come to a full stop at Kilkenny, and after she had left her seat and had walked down the aisle to the front of the car preparatory to getting off, the train suddenly moved forward with a jerk whereby she was thrown to the aisle floor and injured. Pursuant to plaintiffs' motion, the trial court in each action set aside a verdict for the defendant and granted a new trial exclusively for the following errors of law occurring during the trial: (1) Erroneous instruction to the jury as to the standard of care imposed on a railroad in the operation of its trains; (2) error in charging the jury to disregard plaintiffs' argument based on a hypothetical per diem loss calculation; and (3) error in overruling the plaintiffs' objection to a portion of a witness' testimony which constituted a mere conclusion.

1--2. Defendant contends that it was not prejudicial error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury that a 'railroad is liable for the slightest negligence,' because the court's charge was otherwise correct in stating the standard of care applicable to a common carrier. There would be genuine merit in defendant's contention if the rest of the charge had been correct and free of ambiguity as to the care required of a railroad for the protection of its passengers. The charge was not correct. If a jury is told in clear and unqualified language that, although a railroad is not an insurer of the safety of its passengers, it must exercise for their safety the highest degree of care and diligence consistent with the practical operation of its trains, ¹ it is unnecessary to add (although to do so would not be incorrect) that it is also responsible for the slightest negligence. ² Here, however, the charge in substance enunciated the aforesaid highest-degree-of-care standard but in a related part of the charge said that defendant as a common carrier was required to Exercise a reasonable degree of skill for the safe carriage of the plaintiff. This last phrase could easily have misled the jury into believing that the standard of the highest degree of care consistent with the operation of the train was not controlling. The impact of the misleading reference to A reasonable degree of skill was further increased when the court, in instructing the jury as to the inference that in certain cases may be drawn solely from the happening of an accident, said the accident must be one of a nature which does not happen if those who have control of the instrumentality use Ordinary care. It is error to submit the res ipsa loquitur rule to a jury in a manner specifically indicative of a different standard of care than that which otherwise controls the decision upon the issue of negligence. ³ Under the circumstances, the granting of a new trial for prejudicial error in the court's charge was imperative.

3. The trial court also granted a new trial on the ground that it had erroneously instructed the jury to disregard the argument of plaintiffs' counsel on the issue of damages in so far as it was based on a mathematical formula which purported to evaluate damages for loss of earnings and pain and suffering on a per...