Flanagan v. Cook Cnty. Adult Prob. Dep't
| Decision Date | 28 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 11-cv-8849 |
| Parties | KIMBERLY FLANAGAN, Plaintiff, v. COOK COUNTY ADULT PROBATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS; DONNA VAUGHAN; and PHIL LOIZON Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Plaintiff Kimberly Flanagan ("Flanagan") brings this suit against her employer, Cook Count Adult Probation Department ("APD"), an agency administered through the Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Illinois ("OCJ") (entity collectively referred to as "Defendant"), alleging racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et. seq. ("Title VII") and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("1981") based on a panoply of incidents that occurred between March 2008 and May 2012.1 Before the court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) ("motion"). For the reasons discussed in detail below, Defendant's motion is granted.
Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires a party moving for summary judgment to submit "a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue andthat entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law." Cracco v. Vitran Express, Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing L.R. 56.1(a)(3)). Under Local Rule 56.1(b)(3), the nonmoving party then must submit a "concise response" to each statement of fact, "including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon." L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B). The nonmoving party may also present a separate statement of additional facts "consisting of short numbered paragraphs," with citations to the record, that require the denial of summary judgment. See L.R. 56.1 (b)(3)(C); see also Ciomber v. Cooperative Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 643-44 (7th Cir. 2008).
Defendant filed a motion to strike and deem admitted portions of Flanagan's response to its statement of facts and to strike portions of Flanagan's statement of additional facts. [Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 129.] The motion mostly rehashes the arguments made by Defendant in its response to Flanagan's statement of additional facts. Moreover, the court is capable of determining which facts are relevant to the present motion and disregarding extraneous or improper factual statements. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Northern Building. Co., 891 F.Supp.2d 1019, 1025 (N.D. Ill. 2012). Defendant's motion to strike is therefore unnecessary. However, some of Flanagan's statements of additional facts and some of her responses to Defendant's statement of facts are so deficient, yet so intertwined with her underlying claims, that they need to be addressed.
As an initial matter, it is improper to characterize undisputed facts as disputed to provide an opportunity to present legal arguments. Cardoso v. Cellco P'ship, No. 13 C 2696, 2014 WL 6705282, at * (N.D. Ill. Nov. 26, 2014). Likewise, bald denials with no citations to the record in support are ineffective. L.R. 56.1(b) ). Therefore, the court will deem admitted all facts stated by Defendant to the extent that they are supported by the record and improperly denied by Flanagan.2 As the court notes below, the instances of discrimination and/or retaliation, as alleged in Flanagan's statement of additional facts, are almost too numerous to count. Many are easily dismissed as not being supported by competent evidence.3 However, one allegation in particular must be addressed as it is of great importance to Flanagan's claims.
Flanagan claims that in March 2008, her co-workers engaged in a "conspiracy to take her life." [Pl. Resp. at 1, ECF No. 121.] According to Flanagan, a former co-worker named Cheryl Anderson ("Anderson") informed Flanagan of a conversation she overheard between Phil Loizon ("Loizon"), a Deputy Chief at APD, and Donna Vaughan ("Vaughan"), the Director of Human Resources at APD. The exact date of this conversation has been a moving target in this litigation. According to Anderson's deposition testimony, the conversation took place in 2006 or 2007. [Def. SOF ¶ 23, Tab D (Anderson), 63:24-64:4, ECF No. 99.] However, Flanagan submitted a document allegedy written by Anderson in May 2008 in which Anderson states that the conversation between Vaughan and Loizon took place on March 11, 2008.4 According toAnderson, Vaughan told Loizon that she wanted "to bring some bodily harm to Kim Flanagan" and that Loizon responded by saying he "was going to do it." [Def. SOF ¶ 23, ECF No. 99.] After hearing this conversation between Vaughan and Loizon, Anderson testified in her deposition that she alerted Flanagan that she could "be in grave harm" and to "be careful around the workplace." [Id. ¶ 24.] Flanagan goes on to describe an elaborate plot by which Vaughan and Loizon would have her murdered by a probationer named Catrina Bonner on March 13, 2008. The court need not detail Flaganan's allegations that she narrowly escaped death by foiling her co-workers' plot. It is undisputed that the sole basis for Flanagan's belief that she was going to be murdered by her co-workers is the "warning" given to her by Anderson. Setting aside the issues concerning the veracity and truthfulness of Anderson's statements due to her inconsistent recollection of the conversation in question, Flanagan cannot overcome the hearsay problems that plague Anderson's statements. There are two levels of hearsay that Flanagan has failed to address. First, Flanagan has failed to explain how the conversation between Loizon and Vaughan fits into any of the exceptions to hearsay. Similarly, Flanagan fails to identify a hearsay exception for Anderson's statements to Flanagan.5 Therefore, both statements are inadmissible. These hearsay problems prove fatal to Flanagan's claim.
The court will contemporaneously address Defendant's other evidentiary objections throughout the opinion and therefore denies Defendant's motion to strike as moot. Accordingly, the facts recited by the court are taken from the parties' Local Rule 56.1 Statements of Facts("SOFs"), only to the extent that they are supported by admissible evidence and relevant to the issues raised in the motion.
The APD operates under the OCJ and administers a wide range of programs covering both standard and specialized probation supervision and pretrial and presentence services. At the APD, the chain of command starting from the highest position is as follows: Chief Probation Officer, Assistant Chief Probation Officer, Deputy Chief Probation Officers, Supervisors, and Probation Officers. Flanagan is a Probation Officer in the APD's Home Confinement Unit, a position she has held since 1999. The Home Confinement Unit monitors curfews of individuals on probation and pretrial supervision through filed visits, telephone calls, and electronic monitoring.
This is the third lawsuit filed by Flanagan against her employer. In December 2002, Flanagan filed a complaint against her employer alleging race and sex discrimination. Flanagan v. OCJ, No. 02 C 9190 (N.D. Ill.). Ultimately, summary judgment was granted in favor of OCJ on the race discrimination claim, leaving the sex discrimination count as Flanagan's only claim. In March 2006, Flanagan filed a second lawsuit against her employer, alleging unlawful retaliation based on the 2002 lawsuit. Flanagan v. OCJ, No. 06 C 1462 (N.D. Ill.).6 The two cases were consolidated ("Consolidated Lawsuits"). In January 2007, a jury trial was held, resulting in a verdict for OCJ on Flanagan's sex discrimination claim. Flanagan, however, prevailed on her retaliation claim and was awarded $205,000 in damages. OCJ appealed theruling, and, while the appeal was pending, Flanagan settled the Consolidated Lawsuits with OCJ. The settlement agreement was signed on June 5, 2009.
According to Flanagan, a series of unfortunate events, which she describes as discriminatory and retaliatory in nature, unfolded after she succeeded on her retaliation claim against the OCJ in 2007. The instances of discrimination and/or retaliation, as alleged in Flanagan's statement of additional facts, are almost too numerous to count. Included in her complaints of race discrimination are the following:7 (1) a parking lot confrontation between Flanagan and Loizon in May 2008; (2) Defendant's alleged failure to properly investigate the May 2008 incident; (3) Flanagan's failure to secure the 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. work shift in April 2009; (4) Flanagan's receipt of a red-light ticket in October 2009; (5) Flanagan not being allowed to park in a certain parking lot in May 2010; (6) Defendant allegedly intentionally exposing Flanagan to Hepatitis C in May 2011; (7) Defendant assigning a coach and counselor to Flanagan in December 2011 following a dispute with a civilian; and (8) Defendant's failure to promote Flanagan to Deputy Chief sometime in 2011. Flanagan alleges that all eight of these instances are also examples of retaliation in addition to two other instances:8 (9) Loizon publicly complaining about lawsuits filed against Defendant in May 2008 and (10) Defendant stamping Flanagan's time sheet in May 2012. What follows is the court's attempt to corral all of these events together in some coherent manner, a feat which escaped both Flanagan and Defendant in their respective briefs and statements of facts.
On May 14, 2008, Flanagan was approved for two hours of FMLA9 leave to care for her uncle who was dying from brain cancer. [Pl. ...
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