Flanagan v. Pierce Chevrolet, Inc., 78-29-A
Decision Date | 21 January 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 78-29-A,78-29-A |
Parties | Jeannette FLANAGAN and Susan Gagne v. PIERCE CHEVROLET, INC. ppeal. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This case arises out of an automobile accident involving the plaintiffs and Richard Silva, who operated an automobile owned by the defendant. The plaintiffs seek reversal of a judgment entered for the defendant after a jury-waived trial.
The facts pertinent to this appeal are undisputed. The defendant undertook the repair of Mr. Silva's automobile. While repairing his vehicle, defendant loaned Mr. Silva a 1960 Buick. Mr. Silva and defendant executed a written agreement setting forth the terms of the loan. As agreed, defendant affixed Mr. Silva's license plates to the borrowed vehicle for the duration of the loan.
While operating the loaned vehicle, Mr. Silva struck a vehicle owned and operated by plaintiff Susan Gagne. Plaintiff Jeannette Flanagan, a passenger in the Gagne automobile, sustained personal injuries as a result of the collision.
The defendant conceded that Mr. Silva drove his vehicle negligently. At the time of the collision, Mr. Silva was uninsured. The only question before us concerns whether defendant is liable for Mr. Silva's negligence.
The plaintiffs contend that G.L.1956 (1968 Reenactment) § 31-33-6 controls the question of defendant's liability. Section 31-33-6 sets forth generally the circumstances in which an operator of a vehicle is the imputed agent of the owner. In support of their contentions, plaintiffs cite Avedesian v. Butler Auto Sales, Inc., 93 R.I. 4, 170 A.2d 604 (1961). In Avedesian the plaintiffs sued a car dealer for injuries sustained in an accident with a dealer-owned automobile, driven by an employee of the dealer. Upon the facts of Avedesian, we determined that "(t)he defendants' liability here, if any, arises by reason of the statutory agency contemplated in (§ 31-33-6)." 1 Id. at 15, 170 A.2d at 610.
Even if we assume a sufficient similarity of operative facts, plaintiffs misplace their reliance on Avedesian. For after we decided Avedesian, the General Assembly enacted G.L.1956 (1968 Reenactment) § 31-3-20, as amended by P.L.1968, ch. 103, § 2. Section 31-3-20 addresses specifically the situation in which a dealer loans a vehicle to replace one being repaired. Section 31-3-20 provides in its second and third paragraphs:
We find the provisions of § 31-3-20 dispositive of this appeal. 2
The facts found at trial indicate that defendant complied with the requirements contained in the second paragraph of § 31-3-20. The defendant placed Mr. Silva's license plates on the loaned vehicle and executed the temporary loan agreement. The agreement states on its face, "This agreement must be carried in lieu of a Registration." It therefore served as the temporary certificate of registration required by § 31-3-20. 3
Thus defendant's liability to plaintiffs depends on the intent of the General Assembly as manifested in the second paragraph of § 31-3-20. The statute clearly sets forth two distinct circumstances with differing results. A dealer which lends an automobile in the enumerated situations has two choices: it may lend the vehicle with dealer's plates, or it may affix the license plates belonging to its customer. If the dealer lends an automobile bearing dealer's plates to an...
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