Flanigan v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill. At Chi., 1-17-0815
| Citation | 431 Ill.Dec. 657,2018 IL App (1st) 170815,128 N.E.3d 327 |
| Decision Date | 14 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-17-0815,1-17-0815 |
| Parties | Asa FLANIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO, Timothy F. Murphy, an Individual, James W. Hall, an Individual, and Does I-X, Inclusive, Defendants (The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois at Chicago, Timothy F. Murphy, an Individual, and James W. Hall, an Individual, Defendants-Appellees). |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
George C. Pontikes, of George C. Pontikes & Associates, P.C., of Chicago, for appellant.
Norman P. Jeddeloh, of Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP, of Chicago, for appellees.
¶ 1 Plaintiff, Asa Flanigan, a medical student, was dismissed from the University of Illinois College of Medicine (College of Medicine). In response, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking an order reversing his dismissal where defendants—The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois at Chicago (Board), Timothy Murphy, and James Hall—violated his constitutional due process rights and exceeded their authority by violating the University of Illinois's (University) student disciplinary policy. The motion was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
¶ 2 On appeal, plaintiff claims that this court has jurisdiction to consider the second amended complaint. More specifically, plaintiff contends the matter is not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, but instead falls under the exception discussed in Leetaru v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois , 2015 IL 117485, 392 Ill.Dec. 275, 32 N.E.3d 583. Plaintiff additionally contends the circuit court erred in failing to draw all reasonable inferences in his favor prior to dismissing his second amended complaint. Plaintiff finally contends that disputed issues of material fact prohibit the dismissal of his second amended complaint. Based on the following, we affirm.1
¶ 4 On March 23, 2015, plaintiff filed a police report with the University of Illinois Police Department because he believed that he was "being followed by two subjects and that his phone had been cloned." On April 14, 2015, James Hall, the dean of student affairs for the College of Medicine, informed plaintiff via letter that he was being placed on a temporary suspension from clinical activities and was required to complete a fitness of duty evaluation. The letter provided that:
The letter acknowledged that Hall had learned of plaintiff's police report, which "caused serious concern about [plaintiff's] ability to function in the program." Hall instructed plaintiff to schedule an appointment for the fitness of duty evaluation with Dr. David Marder and "to report no later than April 30, 2015." The letter indicated that plaintiff would "not be allowed to return to clinical activities until [his] return has been authorized by Dr. Marder." The letter additionally stated that plaintiff's failure to timely report to Dr. Marder "may lead to action by the Student Progress and Promotion's Committee or referral of the matter to the disciplinary process."
¶ 5 In his second amended complaint, plaintiff alleged his attorney advised him to schedule a fitness of duty evaluation with an independent doctor not affiliated with the University. Plaintiff's counsel was concerned that Dr. Marder could not be objective because plaintiff had a pending lawsuit against the Board. According to his second amended complaint, plaintiff informed Hall of his decision to have the fitness of duty evaluation performed by an independent doctor, and Hall did not object. Hall allegedly asked for the name of the independent evaluator. Plaintiff alleged he was evaluated on May 1, 2015, by Jesse A. Newman, M.D. A report attached to plaintiff's second amended complaint demonstrated that Dr. Newman found plaintiff to be of "stable and capable mind and body and able to perform every and all duties" required to complete his doctorate degree.2
¶ 6 Also on May 1, 2015, Hall sent an email notification to plaintiff, indicating that plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements outlined in Hall's April 14, 2015, letter. Hall instructed plaintiff to "immediately contact" Dr. Marder and arrange for the evaluation "as required" or Hall would "report [plaintiff's] lack of compliance to the Student Progress and Promotions Committee." On the same date, Catherine Best, plaintiff's academic advisor, emailed Hall to inform him that plaintiff had completed a fitness of duty evaluation with someone other than Dr. Marder. Best inquired when plaintiff's suspension would be lifted. Then, on May 3, 2015, Best emailed plaintiff raising concerns regarding Hall's insistence that plaintiff submit to another fitness of duty evaluation with the University doctor. In her email, Best opined that plaintiff passed an "unbiased" fitness of duty evaluation.
¶ 7 On May 18, 2015, Hall informed plaintiff via letter that the Student Progress and Promotions Committee (SPPC) had met and unanimously agreed that his "consistent disregard for and failure to comply with the directives of the College administration violate[d] the Standards of Professional Behavior as provided in the Student Academic Policies and Professional Standards." Hall invited plaintiff to attend the next SPPC meeting on June 10, 2015, where the committee would be considering whether to recommend plaintiff's dismissal from the medical program. Hall advised plaintiff that he could bring an advisor or an attorney with him to the meeting. Plaintiff was instructed that, if he chose to bring an attorney to the meeting, notice was required three days prior thereto in order for the University to arrange representation. Finally, Hall informed plaintiff that the recommendation of the SPPC would be forwarded to the College Committee on Student Promotions (CCSP) to be considered at its meeting on June 23, 2015.
¶ 8 On June 8, 2015, at 8:30 p.m., plaintiff sent an email with an attached letter, notifying Hall that he would attend the June 10, 2015, meeting with his attorney and Best. Plaintiff requested the time and location of the meeting. In addition, plaintiff's counsel sent a letter to Hall dated June 8, 2015, stating that plaintiff had been examined by Dr. Newman, a Pennsylvania physician, and plaintiff was found fit for duty. On June 9, 2015, at 7 p.m., Hall informed plaintiff, plaintiff's attorney, and Best via email that the meeting would be held the following day at 3:30 p.m. in Urbana, Illinois. Plaintiff's attorney responded via email that he could not appear in Urbana on such short notice. Plaintiff's attorney requested that the meeting be relocated to a Chicago facility or rescheduled for a different date. Plaintiff also responded to Hall via email additionally expressing his inability to attend the meeting in Urbana on short notice. Plaintiff stated that he had learned Hall and other administrators were in Chicago on June 9, 2015. In light of that information, plaintiff asked why the meeting could not be relocated to Chicago.
¶ 9 The June 10, 2015, SPPC meeting was held as planned in Urbana. Hall contacted3 plaintiff, advising that, as a result of the meeting, the SPPC would be recommending plaintiff's dismissal for "unprofessional behavior" to the CCSP. The CCSP would consider that recommendation at its June 26, 2015, meeting, which was to be held via video conference, thus allowing plaintiff to attend in Urbana or Chicago. The correspondence alerted plaintiff to his rights in relation to the CCSP meeting, such that he could provide additional materials and bring an advisor or faculty member to speak on his behalf. The correspondence also informed plaintiff of his right to have an attorney present, but that the attorney could not speak on his behalf.
¶ 10 In a letter dated June 15, 2015, Timothy Murphy, the chair for the CCSP, further advised plaintiff of the procedures for the upcoming CCSP meeting. Initially, the CCSP would consider the SPPC's recommendation to dismiss plaintiff for unprofessional behavior. If the CCSP agreed that plaintiff should be dismissed, plaintiff could appeal that decision in writing or in person during the course of the same meeting. If plaintiff chose to appeal in person, he would be invited to offer an opening statement then the committee would engage in a question and answer session with him. Plaintiff also would have the opportunity to provide a closing statement. On June 22 and June 24, 2015, Murphy emailed plaintiff to inquire whether he was available for the June 26, 2015, meeting. In his second amended complaint, plaintiff stated that neither he nor his attorney appeared at the June 26, 2015, CCSP meeting "because the process to date was so biased and prejudiced, that there was no point in he [sic ] or his [c]ounsel appearing at the hearing."
¶ 11 On June 26, 2015, the CCSP held its scheduled meeting and voted to accept the recommendation of the SPPC, thereby dismissing plaintiff from the College of Medicine for unprofessional behavior. In a letter dated June 27, 2015, Murphy informed plaintiff that the CCSP reviewed the SPPC's recommendation and the relevant materials "in light of various components of your educational record, and in light of the College's Academic Policies and Professional Standards." The letter informed plaintiff that the CCSP voted to accept the SPPC's recommendation to dismiss plaintiff. The letter further stated that, despite having...
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