Flannery v. McNamara

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Writing for the Court: IRELAND, J.
• Citation: Flannery v. McNamara, 432 Mass. 665, 738 N.E.2d 739 (Mass. 2000)
• Decision Date: 07 September 2000
• Parties: HELEN M. FLANNERY & another v. PAUL J. McNAMARA, administrator, & others.

432 Mass. 665

738 NE 2d 739

HELEN M. FLANNERY & another¹ v. PAUL J. McNAMARA, administrator,² & others.³

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

September 7, 2000.

November 21, 2000.

Present: ABRAMS, GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, & SOSMAN, JJ.

George A. Page, Jr. (Andrea C. Dow with him) for the plaintiffs.

Thomas J. Ford (Peter G. Cary with him) for Lorraine M. Daley & others.

IRELAND, J.

The plaintiffs, Helen M. Flannery and Margaret M. Moran (Flannerys), filed a complaint against the defendants, Paul J. McNamara, administrator of the estate of William H. White, Jr. (decedent), and the decedent's heirs, the Daleys and the Whites (heirs), seeking declaratory relief and reformation of the decedent's will. The Flannerys alleged that they, and not the heirs, are the rightful beneficiaries under the will. The heirs filed motions to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. By agreement of the parties, the judge subsequently treated the rule 12 (b) (6) motions as motions for summary judgment, under Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (e), 365 Mass. 824 (1974).

The judge granted the heirs' motions for summary judgment, ruling that, because the will was unambiguous on its face, extrinsic evidence of the decedent's alleged intent was inadmissible. Moreover, she held that, because the will did not provide for disposition of the decedent's property in the event his wife predeceased him, his property passed to the heirs by way of intestacy.

Subsequently, the Flannerys appealed from the Probate Court's grant of summary judgment for the heirs. We granted their application for direct appellate review. The Flannerys argue that the Probate Court judge erred by holding inadmissible extrinsic evidence that might persuade the court to (1) construe or (2) reform a poorly drawn will, albeit unambiguous on its face, to reflect the decedent's intent, thereby avoiding unjust enrichment.

This appeal presents the question whether we should overrule (1) the so-called "plain meaning" rule that prohibits the admission of extrinsic evidence to construe unambiguous wills; and (2) the rule prohibiting the reformation of wills.⁴ We decline to do so, and thus, affirm the Probate Court's decision.

1. Statement of Facts.

On September 30, 1995, the decedent died in Arlington. The decedent's will, dated January 20, 1973, left his entire estate to his wife, Katherine M. White (Katherine). The relevant part of the will provides that:

"I give, devise, and bequeath all of the property of which I die possessed real, personal, and mixed of whatsoever nature and wheresoever located to my beloved wife, Katherine M. White."

The decedent's will failed to name a contingent beneficiary and it did not contain a residuary clause.

Katherine died October 14, 1993, survived by the decedent and her two sisters, the Flannerys. The couple had no children. McNamara, the decedent's attorney, repeatedly advised the decedent to let him review the will, but the decedent never showed the will to McNamara. The decedent died survived by his intestate heirs who were discovered through a genealogical search. The heirs are the decedent's first cousins, once removed.

The Flannerys make the following allegations. For almost five decades, they had a close relationship with the decedent. Moreover, after Katherine's death, the decedent relied heavily on the Flannerys for advice and assistance with daily matters. After the decedent died, he was buried in the Flannerys' family plot. On several occasions, the decedent told members of the Flannerys' family that his Arlington residence and its contents "will be [theirs] some day." Additionally, the decedent informed McNamara that he understood that, if Katherine were to predecease him, his will provided for his property to go to the Flannerys. In contrast, the decedent did not have a close relationship with the heirs.

After the decedent died in 1995, McNamara was appointed administrator of the decedent's estate. He received the decedent's will for probate and was preparing to distribute the estate to the heirs by way of intestate succession, when the Flannerys filed for declaratory relief and reformation of the will on November 25, 1997.

2. Discussion.

The Flannerys claim that, although the decedent's will made no mention of them, he intended to pass his estate to them in the event that Katherine predeceased him. Specifically, the Flannerys contend that the portion of the will that reads, "all ... to my beloved wife, Katherine M. White," should be either construed or reformed to read, "all ... to my beloved wife, Katherine M. White, if she survives me, but if not, then to her sisters who survive me," namely, the Flannerys. We disagree.

a. Construction. "The fundamental object in the construction of a will is to ascertain the testator's intention from the whole instrument, attributing due weight to all its language, considered

in light of the circumstances known to the testator at the time of its execution, and to give effect to that intent unless some positive rule of law forbids." Putnam v. Putnam, 366 Mass. 261, 266 (1974). See Fitts v. Powell, 307 Mass. 449, 454 (1940); Best v. Berry, 189 Mass. 510, 512 (1905).

Here, the Flannerys assert that the decedent intended to name them as the beneficiaries of his estate in the event that his wife predeceased him. To prove this, the Flannerys seek to introduce extrinsic evidence of their relationship with the decedent and the decedent's statements concerning his intent.

Under current Massachusetts law, however, "[i]f a will is not ambiguous, extrinsic evidence to explain its terms is inadmissible... even where the language involved has a legal consequence either not likely to have been understood by the testator ... or contrary to his intention expressed orally" (citations omitted). Putnam v. Putnam, supra. See Gustafson v. Svenson, 373 Mass. 273, 275 (1977) (extrinsic evidence of testatrices' alleged intent inadmissible where will, in particular the phrase "his heirs per stirpes," unambiguous). Thus, extrinsic evidence of the decedent's alleged intent is only admissible if his will is ambiguous. See Mahoney v. Grainger, 283 Mass. 189, 192 (1933) ("It is only where the testamentary language is not clear in its application to the facts that evidence may be introduced as to the circumstances under which the testator used that language in order to throw light upon its meaning"); Moffatt v. Heon, 242 Mass. 201, 205 (1922); Best v. Berry, supra. The will before us is not ambiguous.

First, the decedent's will contains no patent ambiguities. A patent ambiguity is one created by obvious conflicts in the language of the will itself. Treadwell v. Cordis, 5 Gray 341, 357 (1855). See Smith, The Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence in Will Interpretation Cases, 64 Mass. L. Rev. 123, 124 (1979). The decedent's will unequivocally states "all ... to my beloved wife, Katherine M. White." No conflict or inconsistency arises from such clear and plain language.

Second, the will contains no latent ambiguities. A latent ambiguity emerges when the words of a will appear to be unambiguous on their face, but certain extrinsic facts render their meaning uncertain. Phipps v. Barbera, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 3 n.3 (1986), citing Smith, supra. There are two types of latent ambiguities. "The first type occurs when a will clearly describes a person or thing, and two or more persons or things exactly fit that description. The second type of latent ambiguity exists when no person or thing exactly fits the description, but two or more persons or things partially fit." Phipps v. Barbera, supra. Neither type of ambiguity exists here. Indeed, there is only one person fitting the description of "my beloved wife, Katherine M. White," namely, the decedent's wife, Katherine. Moreover, Katherine alone fit that description exactly. Neither the fact that she predeceased the decedent, nor the absence of a residuary clause or a contingent beneficiary provision, makes the will ambiguous. Long before the decedent's execution of his will in 1973, it was settled law that, when a beneficiary predeceases the testator, the legacy lapses and falls into residue if there is one; otherwise it must pass as intestate property. See Bray v. Bray, 359 Mass. 439, 441 (1971); Worcester Trust Co. v. Turner, 210 Mass. 115, 121 (1911); Dresel v. King, 198 Mass. 546 (1908). See also 2 G. Newhall, Settlement of Estates § 33:51 (5th ed. 1997). As such, the will contains no latent ambiguity.

The Flannerys, however, argue that extrinsic evidence is admissible to create a latent ambiguity. The Flannerys seek to show, through extrinsic evidence, that the decedent had a "personal usage" of the will's language that differed from its plain, commonly accepted usage, and that the will should be construed consistently with this usage. They specifically want to demonstrate that the plain language of the will, "to my beloved wife," was actually intended and understood by the decedent to mean, "to my wife if she survives me, but if not, then to her sisters who survive me."

Generally, we have flatly rejected the idea that extrinsic evidence may be used to create an ambiguity where the language of the will is otherwise plain and unambiguous. See Pagliarulo v. National Shawmut Bank, 353 Mass. 449, 450 (1968); Whitbeck v. Aldrich, 341 Mass. 326, 329 (1960); Keith v. Worcester County Trust Co., 338 Mass. 41, 43 (1958) ("Extraneous matters cannot be used to create an ambiguity not manifest in the document being construed"). See also Smith, supra. Indeed, "[i]t is not an aid to interpretation to resort to testimony as to what may have been in the testator's mind in order to create an ambiguity not evident from the language of the will." Pagliarulo v. National Shawmut Bank, supra. Furthermore, we have traditionally rejected this type of "personal usage"...