Flavell v. Int'l Bank for Reconstruction & Dev.
| Decision Date | 07 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 20-623 (CKK) |
| Parties | SARA GONZÁLEZ FLAVELL, Plaintiff v. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Plaintiff Sara González Flavell, proceeding pro se filed this action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia seeking reimbursement for certain employment benefits allegedly owed to her by Defendant International Bank for Reconstruction & Development (“IBRD”). IBRD subsequently removed this action to federal court and then moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint.[1] Plaintiff moved to remand the action to state court.
The Court denied without prejudice Plaintiff's first motion to remand. In so doing, the Court concluded that IBRD had not carried its burden of demonstrating that removal was proper pursuant to the International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945 (“IOIA”), 22 U.S.C. § 288a, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C § 1330(a), or the Bretton Woods Act of 1945, 22 U.S.C. § 286g. However, in assessing IBRD's argument that the Court had “general federal question” jurisdiction over Plaintiff's action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Court observed that IBRD had failed to address whether this action fits within the narrow category of cases in which state-law claims raise a substantial federal issue, as articulated by the Supreme Court in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308 (2005).
Accordingly, in furtherance of its obligation to ensure its own jurisdiction, the Court ordered Plaintiff to re-file her motion to remand to allow the parties to address this issue.
Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff's [41] Second Motion to Remand. Upon review of the pleadings, [2] the relevant legal authority and the record as a whole, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff's Second Motion to Remand. However, the Court shall DENY Plaintiff's request for fees and costs associated with removal.
On February 6, 2020, Plaintiff filed a civil action against IBRD in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (“D.C. Superior Court”). See Compl. at 1, ECF No. 1-1. Therein, Plaintiff alleged that she had been an employee of IBRD from October 1988 until December 2017. See Id. ¶ A. In December 2017, however, IBRD allegedly terminated Plaintiff “due to redundancy.” Id. ¶ E. IBRD then withheld $74, 101.90 in employee benefits from Plaintiff, allegedly owed to her upon termination. See Id. ¶ P. According to Plaintiff, IBRD's refusal to pay out these benefits violated IBRD's own “rules, ” as well as “DC law.” Id. ¶ E. On the basis of these withholdings, Plaintiff asserted a single “breach of contract” claim against IBRD in her complaint before the D.C. Superior Court. See Id. at 13 (identifying “nature of suit”).
On March 3, 2020, IBRD removed Plaintiff's action from D.C. Superior Court to this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). To support removal, IBRD explained that it is a “public international organization” under the International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945 (“IOIA”), Not. of Removal ¶ 5, ECF No. 1, and, therefore, receives “the same privileges and immunities as foreign nations conferred by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), ” id. at ¶ 6. IBRD contended that because “the Court must apply the intricacies of federal case law interpreting the FSIA at the outset of any suit against an international organization, Plaintiff's claims arise under a federal question.” Id. In sum, IBRD asserted that “[t]his Court has original jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the IOIA, 22 U.S.C. § 288a, the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a), . . . and because it raises a question arising under federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” Id. ¶ 7.
One week after its removal under § 1441(a), IBRD filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's breach of contract claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 7. IBRD's motion acknowledged that Plaintiff's complaint “checked the ‘Breach of Contract' box when indicating the nature of her suit.” Id. at 9 n.1. Nonetheless, IBRD argued that this Court lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims because IBRD “is immune from suit and legal process pursuant to its Articles of Agreement and the [IOIA].” Id. at 1. In particular, IBRD explained that “having to defend against a lawsuit based on Plaintiff's employment-related allegations interferes with the pursuit of [IBRD's] chartered objectives” and “would contravene the express language of Article VII section 1” of its Articles of Agreement. Id. at 6 (quotation omitted). Accordingly, IBRD maintained that this Court “lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and the Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.” Id. at 5.
In view of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court issued an order on March 10, 2020, pursuant to Fox v. Strickland, 837 F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1988), notifying Plaintiff of her obligation to respond to IBRD's dispositive motion. See Order at 1, ECF No. 8. The Court also “order[ed] Plaintiff to include in her response to [IBRD's] Motion to Dismiss either an Amended Complaint, or a precise statement of the nature of the claims she [wa]s making in her Complaint and the legal grounds in order to assist the Court and parties in determining her claims.” Id. The Court then required Plaintiff to submit her opposition and her amended pleadings by April 10, 2020. See id.
In response, on March 17, 2020, Plaintiff promptly filed a motion to remand her complaint back to the D.C. Superior Court. See Pl.'s 1st Mot. to Remand at 1, ECF No. 10. In that motion, Plaintiff contended that her “claim [was] based on state law, ” id. at 19, and that IBRD's notice of removal included “no plausible case [for] federal question jurisdiction[, ]” id. at 16. As such, Plaintiff requested that this Court “remand [her] case to state court in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).” Id. at 19. In turn, IBRD filed an opposition on March 31, 2020, which again argued that “[p]ursuant to the IOIA, international organizations enjoy the same privileges and immunities as foreign nations under the FSIA, so this action may be removed to federal court.” Def.'s Opp'n to Pl.'s 1st Mot. to Remand at 3, ECF No. 13. Additionally, IBRD's opposition brief asserted, for the first time, that the Court alternatively “has original jurisdiction pursuant to Section 10 of the Bretton Woods Act of 1945.” Id. (citing 22 U.S.C. § 286g).
In June 2020, after moving for remand, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Plaintiff made clear that her amended complaint was filed specifically to comply with what “the Court ordered . . . in its Order of March 10, 2020.” Pl.'s Mot. to Am. at 1, ECF No. 22. Plaintiff's amended complaint reiterated, in greater detail, her allegations that IBRD had wrongfully withheld benefit payments contractually owed to Plaintiff upon her termination in December 2017. See Am. Compl. at 1-12, ECF No. 22-2. In her amended complaint, Plaintiff set forth eight common-law causes of action, for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Conversion; (3) Misappropriation and/or Detinue; (4) Unjust Enrichment and/or Restitution; (5) Fraud and Deceit; (6) Misrepresentation; (7) Nonfeasance and/or Malfeasance; and (8) Tortious Interference with Contract. See Id. at 55- 103. In light of this amended pleading, the Court denied IBRD's original motion to dismiss without prejudice and ordered IBRD to respond to Plaintiff's amended complaint by June 26, 2020. See Order, at 1, ECF No. 23. IBRD subsequently filed a renewed motion to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint, again arguing that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims because IBRD is “immune from suit and legal process pursuant to its Articles of Agreement and the [IOIA].” Def.'s Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of 2d Mot. to Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 24-1.
On March 25, 2021, the Court denied without prejudice Plaintiff's (First) Motion to Remand. See Flavell v. Int'l Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., Civil Action No. 20-623 (CKK), 2021 WL 1146301 (D.D.C. Mar. 25, 2021). The Court was not persuaded by IBRD's arguments that the IOIA, FSIA, or Bretton Woods Act support removal jurisdiction over Plaintiff's lawsuit. Id. at *3-5. The Court was also unpersuaded that IBRD had properly invoked federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because its arguments were based on its “own potential federal immunity to Plaintiff's action, ” and it is well-established that the presence of a federal question is governed by the “well-pleaded complaint rule.” Id. at *5-6 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
However, the Court noted that “there does exist a narrow exception to the traditional ‘well-pleaded complaint' rule, ” articulated by the Supreme Court in Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005). See Flavell, 2021 WL 1146301, at *7. Specifically, “a purely state-law claim may still trigger federal question jurisdiction, where it ‘necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.'” Id. (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013)).
The Court further observed that Plaintiff had filed a parallel action against several IBRD officers and employees for alleged wrongdoing related to her termination. See Compl. ¶¶ 1-10, Gonzalez Flavell v. Kim et al., 21-cv-115-CKK (D.D.C. 2021), ECF No. 1-3. As with this action, the defendants in Kim removed Plaintiff's original complaint from D.C. Superior Court and were litigating Plaintiff's pending motion to...
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