Fleck v. Gen. Motors LLC (In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig.)
| Decision Date | 15 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | 14-MC-2543 (JMF),14-MD-2543 (JMF) |
| Citation | 202 F.Supp.3d 362 |
| Parties | IN RE: GENERAL MOTORS LLC IGNITION SWITCH LITIGATION. This Document Relates To: Fleck, et al. v. General Motors LLC, 14-CV-8176. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
The next bellwether trial in this multi-district litigation ("MDL"), familiarity with which is presumed, involves claims brought by Plaintiff Stephanie Cockram against General Motors LLC (also known as "New GM") stemming from a June 28, 2011 car accident. At the time of the accident, Cockram was driving her 2006 Chevrolet Cobalt, which had been manufactured by General Motors Corporation (also known as "Old GM")—which filed for bankruptcy in 2009, a bankruptcy from which New GM emerged. New GM now moves, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for partial summary judgment, contending that Cockram's claims based on New GM's conduct alone (the only claims that could expose New GM to punitive damages in light of earlier rulings by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York) fail as a matter of law. (Docket No. 2938). For the reasons that follow, New GM's motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
On December 31, 2005, Cockram, a resident of Virginia, purchased a new 2006 Chevrolet Cobalt. (Def. New GM's Statement Undisputed Material Facts Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1 (Docket No. 2939) ¶ 2). Roughly five-and-a-half years later, in the early evening of June 28, 2011, Cockram crashed her Cobalt into a drainage ditch culvert. (Id. ¶¶ 4-6; Pl.'s Local Rule 56.1 Resp. in Opp'n New GM's Statement Undisputed Material Facts & Statement of Additional Facts (Docket No. 3016) ("Pl.'s SOF") ¶ 44). Despite the frontal impact, the frontal airbags did not deploy, and Cockram was severely injured in the crash. (Id. ¶¶ 45, 49). In this action, Cockram brings various claims under Virginia law. . More specifically, she seeks compensatory and punitive damages for her injuries resulting from the airbag nondeployment, claiming that it was caused by a defect in the ignition switch that allowed the switch to move from the "run" to the "accessory" or "off" positions. (See Pl.'s SOF ¶¶ 44-50; TAC ¶¶ 23, 421-432). Notably, she does not claim that inadvertent ignition switch rotation caused her car to veer off the road and crash—only that it caused the airbags to fail, enhancing or exacerbating her injuries.
Before turning to New GM's arguments for summary judgment, the Court briefly summarizes certain rulings by the Honorable Robert E. Gerber, former United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Southern District of New York, that bear heavily on this case. After New GM's disclosure of the ignition switch defect in early 2014, many plaintiffs filed claims against New GM—some alleging economic losses and some, including Cockram, alleging personal injuries and wrongful deaths. In April and August 2014, New GM filed motions before the Bankruptcy Court alleging that many of those claims were barred by the 2009 Sale Order through which New GM assumed many of Old GM's assets and some of its liabilities. In April 2015, Judge Gerber ruled that many of those claims brought against New GM were in fact barred by the 2009 Sale Order. See In re Motors Liquidation Co. , 529 B.R. 510 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2015). In particular, he determined that New GM could be held liable for certain assumed liabilities of Old GM (namely, products liability claims that were included in the Sale Agreement) and for "claims based solely on any wrongful conduct on its own part." Id. at 583. A later Order implementing that opinion defined claims "based solely on New GM's own, independent, post-Closing acts or conduct" as "Independent Claims." See In re Motors Liquidation Co. , 09-50026 (REG), Docket No. 13177 ¶ 4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2015).
The definition of "Independent Claims" reemerged as significant in November 2015, when Judge Gerber issued an opinion addressing the issues of punitive damages and "imputation." See In re Motors Liquidation Co. , 541 B.R. 104 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2015) ("November Decision "). In that opinion, Judge Gerber made two rulings that bear significantly on this bellwether trial. First, he determined that, as a matter of bankruptcy law, knowledge of Old GM personnel or knowledge of information contained in Old GM files could be imputed to New GM only to the extent that it could be shown, as a matter of non-bankruptcy law, that New GM actually had that knowledge (for example, through an Old GM employee who later became an employee of New GM). See id. at 108. Second, Judge Gerber ruled that claims for punitive damages could only be "based on New GM knowledge and conduct alone" because New GM did not assume liability for punitive damages under the Sale Agreement. See id. In light of Judge Gerber's decisions, it is undisputed that there are three types of damages potentially available to Cockram in this action: (1) compensatory damages for products liability claims based on Old GM conduct, liability for which was assumed by New GM; (2) compensatory damages for "Independent Claims"—that is, claims based solely on New GM conduct; and (3) punitive damages for "Independent Claims." Cockram pursues all three. (See TAC ¶¶ 421-432).1
Summary judgment is appropriate where the admissible evidence and pleadings demonstrate "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also Johnson v. Killian , 680 F.3d 234, 236 (2d Cir.2012) (per curiam). A dispute over an issue of material fact qualifies as genuine if the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a judgment for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; accord Roe v. City of Waterbury , 542 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir.2008). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "In moving for summary judgment against a party who will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, the movant's burden will be satisfied if he can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim." Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found. , 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir.1995) (citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ); accord PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca – Cola Co. , 315 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir.2002).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, all evidence must be viewed "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party," Overton v. N.Y. State Div. of Military & Naval Affairs , 373 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir.2004), and the court must "resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought," Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. , 391 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir.2004). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must advance more than a "scintilla of evidence," Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, and demonstrate more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The non-moving party "cannot defeat the motion by relying on the allegations in [its] pleading or on conclusory statements, or on mere assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible." Gottlieb v. Cnty. of Orange , 84 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir.1996) (citation omitted).
New GM moves for summary judgment only as to some of Cockram's claims. Specifically, it does not seek dismissal of her claims based on Old GM's conduct and pursued against New GM on a theory of assumed products liability.2 Instead, New GM targets Cockram's Independent Claims—that is, her claims based on New GM's own conduct, the only claims that could expose New GM to punitive damages in light of Judge Gerber's earlier rulings. More specifically, New GM moves for summary judgment with respect to Cockram's claims for negligent failure to warn or to recall (Count I), negligence per se (Count III), fraud (Count IV), and violation of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act (the "VCPA") (Count V). The Court will address each of those claims in turn.
New GM moves first to dismiss Cockram's claims for negligent failure to warn (or to recall) and negligence per se. . With respect to the first, there is no dispute that Virginia recognizes a failure-to-warn cause of action against a car supplier based on that supplier's knowledge of a latent defect in the car at the point of sale and its failure to warn the purchaser about that defect. See Featherall v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. , 219 Va. 949, 962, 252 S.E.2d 358 (1979) (); accord Baker v. Poolservice Co. , 272 Va. 677, 685, 636 S.E.2d 360 (2006). Although New GM does not quite concede that, under Virginia law, the duty to warn extends beyond the point of sale (see New GM's Mem. 8 & n.12), the weight of authority supports the conclusion that it does. See, e.g. , A.J. Buck & Son, Inc., for Use & Ben. of Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Crown Equip. Corp. , 34 F.3d 1066 (Table) (4th Cir.1994) (); ...
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Ward v. Gen. Motors LLC (In re Gen. Motors LLC)
...Co., 09-50026 (REG), Docket No. 13177 ¶ 4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2015); see, e.g., In re: Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., 202 F. Supp. 3d 362, 364-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) ("Cockram Summ. J. Op.") (discussing the definition of "Independent Claims"). Ward seeks both compensatory damages ......