Fleet Bank, N.A. v. Galluzzo

• Decision Date: 14 April 1994
• Docket Number: No. 11895,11895
• Citation: 33 Conn.App. 662,637 A.2d 803
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: FLEET BANK, N.A. v. Gianfranco GALLUZZO et al.

Page 803

637 A.2d 803

33 Conn.App. 662

FLEET BANK, N.A. v. Gianfranco GALLUZZO et al.

No. 11895.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 5, 1993.

Decided March 1, 1994.

Certification Denied April 14, 1994.

Richard P. Weinstein, West Hartford, for the appellant (defendant Richard S. Whitehouse).

David C. Bloomberg, with whom, on the brief, was Kirk D. Tavtigian, Jr., Hartford, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Before FOTI, LAVERY and LANDAU, JJ.

LANDAU, Judge.

In this action in contract, the defendant Richard Whitehouse, ¹ appeals from the judgment of the trial court (1) granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and (2) awarding interest pursuant to General Statutes § 52-192a, ² the offer of judgment statute. The principal issue on appeal is whether Whitehouse produced sufficient evidence as to the existence of an agreement and such partial performance so as to survive the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment under General Statutes § 52-550. ³

The following facts are relevant to this appeal. On May 22, 1989, 44-52 Cedar Street Associates, a general partnership, executed a promissory note in favor of United Bank and Trust Company, the predecessor of the plaintiff, Fleet Bank, N.A., in the amount of $350,000. The note was secured by real property located in Hartford. The general partners, the named defendant, Gianfranco Galluzzo, and the defendant Richard Whitehouse signed guarantee agreements. Following the defendants' default, under the terms of the note, the plaintiff initiated this action to recover on the defendants' guarantees.

On October 17, 1991, the plaintiff filed an offer for judgment, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-192a, in the amount of $325,000 against Whitehouse. Whitehouse did not accept the offer of judgment.

On December 12, 1991, Whitehouse filed an answer, special defenses and a three count counterclaim. In his special defense, Whitehouse contended, inter alia, that the plaintiff breached an alleged agreement to accept the deed to property securing the note in full satisfaction of the debt. ⁴ On March 11, 1992, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that the defendant, as a guarantor, was liable on a certain note and was in breach of his agreement of guaranty.

Addressing the significance of the parties' telephone conversations, the trial court found: "This language [of the parties] is merely an expression of preliminary acts on which to predicate a future contract. It does not allege present agreement or even present agreement to contract.... Without an agreement there is no basis for finding that the party seeking enforcement, in reasonable reliance on the contract, has so changed his position that injustice can be avoided.... Even if an agreement could be found, the acts of the part performance must be of such a character that they can be naturally and reasonably accounted for in no other way than by the existence of some contract in relation to the subject matter in dispute." (Citations omitted.)

"The standards governing our review of a trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment are clear. Practice Book § 384 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Carriage Lane Associates, 219 Conn. 772, 780-81, 595 A.2d 334 (1991); Lees v. Middlesex Ins. Co. 219 Conn. 644, 650, 594 A.2d 952 (1991); Trotta v. Branford, 26 Conn.App. 407, 409, 601 A.2d 1036 (1992). While the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact is on the party seeking summary judgment; see D.H.R. Construction Co. v. Donnelly, 180 Conn. 430, 434, 429 A.2d 908 (1980); the party opposing [summary judgment] must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue.... Bassin v. Stamford, 26 Conn.App. 534, 537, 602 A.2d 1044 (1992). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc., 193 Conn. 313, 317, 477 A.2d 1005 (1984). The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts. Trotta v. Branford, supra, 26 Conn.App. at 410, 601 A.2d 1036." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cortes v. Cotton, 31 Conn.App. 569, 572-73, 626 A.2d 1306 (1993).

"Equally well settled is that the trial court does not sit as the trier of fact when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Lomangino v. LaChance Farms, Inc., 17 Conn.App. 436, 438, 553 A.2d 197 (1989) (in granting summary judgment, court's function is not to decide issues of material fact)." Sharp v. Wyatt, Inc., 31 Conn.App. 824, 844, 627 A.2d 1347 (1993). "[T]he trial court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist. Telesco v. Telesco, 187 Conn. 715, 718, 447 A.2d 752 (1982)." Cortes v. Cotton, supra, 31 Conn.App. at 575, 626 A.2d 1306.

"[A]cts of part performance ... must be such as are done by the party seeking to enforce the contract, in pursuance of the contract, and with the design of carrying the same into execution, and must also be done with the assent, express or implied, or knowledge of the other party, and be such acts as alter the relations of the parties. Andrew v. Babcock, 63 Conn. 109, 120, 26 A. 715 [1893]. The acts also must be of such a character that they can be naturally and reasonably accounted for in no other way than by the existence of some contract in relation to the subject matter in dispute...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ubysz v. DiPietro, 185 Conn. 47, 54, 440 A.2d 830 (1981). The determination of whether any acts by Whitehouse occurred that amounted to part performance requires a...