Fleet National Bank v. Nazareth

• Decision Date: 01 April 2003
• Docket Number: (AC 22610).
• Citation: 75 Conn. App. 791,818 A.2d 69
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: FLEET NATIONAL BANK v. VIJAY J. NAZARETH ET AL.

75 Conn. App. 791

818 A.2d 69

FLEET NATIONAL BANK v. VIJAY J. NAZARETH ET AL.

(AC 22610).

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Submitted on briefs September 16, 2002.

Officially released April 1, 2003.

Mihalakos, Flynn and Hennessy, Js.

Paul H. D. Stoughton filed a brief for the appellants (named defendant et al.).

Neil Paul and Michael J. Auger filed a brief for the appellee (substitute plaintiff).

Opinion

MIHALAKOS, J.

In this foreclosure action, the defendants Vijay J. Nazareth and Charmaine G. Nazareth¹ appeal from the judgment of foreclosure by sale rendered by the trial court in favor of the substitute plaintiff, R. I. Waterman Properties, Inc. (plaintiff).² On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly (1) found an identity of interest between Fleet National Bank (Fleet National) and the plaintiff, and (2) found that the plaintiff had standing to foreclose the mortgage at issue.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendants' appeal. On October 14, 1994, the defendants executed a $184,000 promissory note and mortgage to Shawmut Mortgage Company (Shawmut). Prior to the commencement of this action, Shawmut merged with, and became, Fleet Mortgage Corporation (Fleet Mortgage). Fleet Mortgage assigned its interest in the defendants' mortgage, but not in the note, to Fleet National, which in turn assigned the mortgage to the plaintiff, a wholly owned subsidiary of Fleet National, which handles Fleet National's foreclosure accounts.

Fleet National initiated this foreclosure action due to the defendants' alleged failure to make required payments when they became due. The plaintiff then was substituted as party plaintiff. The parties agreed to a bifurcated trial, with the issue of liability to be tried first, and then, if the plaintiff prevailed, a hearing would be held to determine the debt and law days. The court found in favor of the plaintiff as to liability and subsequently held a hearing to determine the debt and law days. This appeal followed.

"We begin our analysis by underscoring that a party must have standing to assert a claim in order for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.. . . Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy. . . . [Our Supreme Court] has often stated that the question of subject matter jurisdiction, because it addresses the basic competency of the court, can be raised by any of the parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time.... [T]he court has a duty to dismiss, even on its own initiative, any appeal that it lacks jurisdiction to hear. . . . Moreover, [t]he parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, either by waiver or by consent. . . . Standing [however] is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Webster Bank v. Zak, 259 Conn. 766, 774, 792 A.2d 66 (2002). "Where a party is found to lack standing, the court is consequently without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blakeney v. Commissioner of Correction, 47 Conn. App. 568, 574, 706 A.2d 989, cert. denied, 244 Conn. 913, 713 A.2d 830 (1998).

It is undisputed that Fleet Mortgage is the holder of the note, while the plaintiff is the holder of the mortgage. The plaintiff contends that it had standing to foreclose on the mortgage. In support of its claim, the plaintiff relies on New England Savings Bank v. Bedford Realty Corp., 238 Conn. 745, 680 A.2d 301 (1996), rev'd after remand, 246 Conn. 594, 717 A.2d 713 (1998), and Connecticut National Bank v. Marland, 45 Conn. App. 352, 696 A.2d 374, cert. denied, 243 Conn. 907, 701 A.2d 328 (1997). The plaintiff's reliance, however, is misplaced. In both cases, there was evidence presented that the party seeking foreclosure had an interest in the note and...