Fleetwood v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.

• Citation: 21 So.2d 696,246 Ala. 571
• Decision Date: 08 March 1945
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 236.
• Parties: FLEETWOOD v. PACIFIC MUT. LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

21 So.2d 696

246 Ala. 571

FLEETWOOD v. PACIFIC MUT. LIFE INS. CO.

6 Div. 236.

Supreme Court of Alabama

March 8, 1945

Rehearing Denied April 12, 1945.

Jackson, Rives & Pettus, of Birmingham, for appellant.

Spain Davies, Gillon, Grooms & Young and H. H. Grooms, all of Birmingham, for appellee.

The following charges were refused to plaintiff:

'D. The court charges the jury that suicide under the law of this State is a felony and the commission of suicide is a crime and that no person can be guilty of suicide unless at the time he entertained an unlawful and felonious intent to commit the crime of taking his own life.'

'3. I charge you that in order for the defendant insurance company to sustain its burden of proof in this case it must prove by such a preponderance of the evidence as to reasonably satisfy you not only that Mr. Fleetwood came to his death by his own hands, but also that he had at the time the felonious intent to take his own life.'

'5. I charge you that if you are not reasonably satisfied from all the evidence in this case Mr. Fleetwood came to his death by his own hands and with the felonious intent to take his own life, then you must return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Robbie Gray Fleetwood.'

The following charges were given at defendant's request:

'11. I charge you that if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that Harry Hill Fleetwood committed suicide, whether sane or insane, you cannot find for the plaintiff.'

'13. I charge you that the sanity or insanity of the deceased is not an issue in this case, and if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that Mr. Fleetwood, the deceased committed suicide you cannot find for the plaintiff.'

STAKELY Justice.

This is a suit brought by Robbie Gray Fleetwood (appellant) against Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company (appellee) on a policy of life insurance in the principal sum of Eight Thousand Dollars. The policy was issued by appellee on the 22nd day of June, 1940, on the life of Harry Hill Fleetwood and is payable to Robbie Gray Fleetwood, his wife, as beneficiary. The insured, Harry Hill Fleetwood, died on October 12, 1941. The defense in this case is death of the insured by suicide, with no liability under the policy by reason of the following clause contained in the policy:

'The suicide of the Insured, sane or insane, within two years from the date of issue of this Policy is a risk not assumed under this Policy. In such event, however, the Company will pay to the Beneficiary in one sum an amount equal to the premiums received hereon, without interest, and this Policy shall thereupon be terminated.'

Trial of the case resulted in a verdict and judgment for the defendant. In its oral charge the court made no reference to the presumption that a normal, sane person will not commit suicide. This presumption is often referred to as a presumption of innocence. The court refused to give a number of written charges requested by the plaintiff upon the question of presumption against suicide. Assignments of error based on these rulings will be treated together because they all involve the same principles. There is no contention in the case that the insured was insane.

We think it clear from analysis of the Alabama decisions that there are situations when the presumption is applicable and on the contrary, there are situations when the presumption his no field of operation. If the case at bar falls within the first category, then the court was in error, but if this case comes within the second class, then there was no error. To solve the problem let us briefly review the Alabama authorities on the principles involved and then make the application from a consideration of the evidence.

In the case of Sovereign Camp, W. O. W., v. Hackworth, 200 Ala. 87, 75 So. 463, the proof was direct and positive that the insured shot himself intentionally. This court held that the defendant met the burden of proof on it and since there were no conflicting inferences, the defendant was entitled to the affirmative charge.

In the case of Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Maddox, 221 Ala. 292, 128 So. 383, 384, the proof tending to show suicide was entirely circumstantial. The court charged the jury that there was a presumption against suicide. It refused a special written charge to the effect that 'such presumption is not evidence and cannot be treated as evidence by the jury in reaching a verdict.' In referring to the Hackworth case, supra, this court said:

'While this court is firmly committed to the doctrine as we have stated it in the opinion, its uniform application is such that apparently it has never been thought to create a conflict. Though such presumption may be in the 'nature of evidence,' it has been so regarded only when the evidence as to some question of fact was otherwise conflicting or where there were conflicting inferences from it, or when it was circumstantial in nature. In the Hackworth case, supra, the evidence was direct and undisputed, and no two inferences could be reasonably drawn if the jury believed it. Likewise in criminal cases it has never been held sufficient of itself to create a conflict, or conflicting inferences, when the evidence did not otherwise show such a conflict. It is merely a principle treated in the 'nature of evidence' which is material in aiding the jury to arrive at a correct conclusion from a state of the evidence to which we have referred.' Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Maddox, 221 Ala. 292, 295, 128 So. 383, 386.

In the case of New York Life Ins. Co. v. Beason, 229 Ala. 140, 155 So. 530, 532, the evidence relied upon to show self-destruction as well as that tending to disprove suicide, was wholly circumstantial and afforded conflicting inferences. This court said:

'The law presumes that a normal, sane person will not commit suicide, and this presumption, referred to in the books as a presumption of innocence, is not merely an administrative feature intended only to 'shift the burden of proceeding with the evidence' to the opposite party. It is a substantive right and not a mere 'technical incident of the trial wrought for administrative purposes.' It does not spend its force as substantive evidence until the testimony in the case is sufficient, in the judgment of the jury, to overcome it.' New York Life Ins. Co. v. Beason, 229 Ala. 140, 142, 155 So. 530.

From the foregoing cases we deduce the following: If there is direct and positive evidence of suicide and there is no conflicting inference from any evidence as to suicide, then the presumption against suicide has no field of operation. On the contrary, if there is direct and positive evidence of suicide and there is a conflicting inference from any evidence as to suicide, then the presumption against suicide has a field of operation. If the evidence is all circumstantial, then the presumption against suicide has a field of operation. We may add that inference means reasonable inference and not mere speculation or conjecture. Alabama Power Co. v. Watts, 218 Ala. 78, 117 So. 425; Sovereign Camp, W. O. W., v. Hackworth, supra.

The defendant introduced testimony tending to show that for some time prior to his death, the insured had had a nervous breakdown, was despondent and feared that he would become a burden to his wife because of his mental and physical condition. The defendant also introduced evidence tending to show the events immediately relating to the shooting. This testimony will be referred to later. The defendant also introduced proofs of loss submitted respectively to the Provident Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Philadelphia and to the Prudential Insurance Company of America. They both contained an employer's statement by O. J. Henley and a statement by Dr. J. H. Shamblin. The statements of Dr. Shamblin in each case showed that death was due to suicide, gunshot wound of the head. The period allowed by these policies for defense because of suicide had expired. The proceeds of these policies were paid to Mrs. Fleetwood.

According to Mrs. Fleetwood's testimony, on October 15th or 16th, she brought the policies, including the policy sued on, to Birmingham to Mr. Garden. He was the agent for the Provident Mutual Life Ins. Co. She was accompanied by her mother and Dr. Shamblin's wife. On October 20, 1941, in company with her daughter, Mrs. Fleetwood brought the policy sued on to the office of the General Agent of the Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. in Tuscaloosa and was given a written receipt for the policy, which showed that it was delivered for the purpose of transmittal to the Home Office, so that she could receive a check for return of the premiums paid thereon. On October 28, 1941, she was paid the premiums. The defendant next heard from the matter on April 15, 1942, when it received a letter from her attorneys, making tender of the premiums, with interest, and stating that the agent of the company had used undue influence on Mrs. Fleetwood in procuring the policy. This case was tried on the issue of suicide and not on the theory of release or accord and satisfaction. We have carefully considered the evidence and do not think it shows undue influence.

The defendant also introduced in evidence a death certificate certified by the State Registrar of Vital Statistics. The certificate is in the form provided for by §§ 25, 26 and 27, Title 22, Code of 1940. The certificate shows that the informant, who investigated the death, was S. T. Hardin. He signed the certificate, 'S. T. Hardin, Coroner.' He is the coroner of Tuscaloosa County. It showed that death of Harry H. Fleetwood was due to suicide and that the immediate cause was 'self inflicted gun shot wound (pistol) of head.' At the bottom of the certificate below the signature of S....