Fleming v. Garnett

Decision Date23 August 1994
Docket NumberNo. 14700,14700
PartiesGeorge A. FLEMING III, Executor (Estate of Eileen S. Fleming) v. Stephen M. GARNETT, et al.
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court

John T. Scully, Hartford, for appellant-appellee (defendant Intern. Transport, Inc.).

Andrew W. Krevolin, with whom was Ann M. Siczewicz, Hartford, for appellee-appellant (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

PALMER, Associate Justice.

The principal issue in this appeal concerns the proper application of No. 86-338 of the 1986 Public Acts, 1 commonly referred to as "Tort Reform I," to reduce a plaintiff's verdict on the basis of collateral source payments. The plaintiff, George A. Fleming III, brought this wrongful death action on behalf of the estate of his decedent, Eileen S. Fleming, against REM Transport, Ltd., Stephen M. Garnett and International Transport, Inc. The plaintiff's claims against Garnett and REM Transport, Ltd., were settled and withdrawn before trial. Thereafter, the case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff against the remaining defendant, International Transport, Inc. (defendant). After a posttrial hearing, the court reduced the jury award pursuant to General Statutes § 52-225a, to reflect collateral source benefits received by the plaintiff, and rendered judgment for the plaintiff. The court denied the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict. The defendant appealed and the plaintiff cross appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the case to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are not in dispute. On August 10, 1987, the plaintiff's decedent was fatally injured when the car she was driving collided with a truck on Route 5 in South Windsor. The truck was operated by Garnett, an employee of REM Transport, Ltd., and carried a trailer owned by the defendant. The defendant, a carrier specializing in the transportation of oversized loads, maintained a facility for the pickup and return of trailers in South Windsor, adjacent to a facility operated by Mahr Freight Lines (Mahr Freight). Both Mahr Freight and the defendant had driveways permitting access to the southbound lanes of Route 5. The defendant's driveway, unlike that of Mahr Freight, was wide enough to allow trucks carrying oversized trailers to exit onto Route 5 without blocking both lanes of southbound traffic. The accident occurred as Garnett was exiting onto the southbound lanes of Route 5 from a driveway owned by Mahr Freight, shortly after he had picked up a trailer from the defendant's terminal. Garnett did not exit via the defendant's driveway because the driveway was blocked by another trailer. Instead, Garnett drove his trailer across a dirt path to the Mahr Freight driveway. When Garnett made a right hand turn onto Route 5, his trailer blocked both southbound lanes, leaving no room for cars to pass. The decedent, who was traveling southbound on Route 5, collided with Garnett's truck and was killed.

The plaintiff brought this wrongful death action on behalf of the decedent's estate against Garnett, REM Transport, Ltd., and the defendant. Before trial, the plaintiff settled his claims against Garnett and REM Transport, Ltd., for $825,000. The plaintiff's action against the defendant proceeded to trial, and a jury found that the amount of damages totaled $1,500,000. In allocating the comparative negligence of the parties, the jury found the defendant to be 35 percent responsible for the accident, and the plaintiff to be 25 percent contributorily negligent. 2

After a postverdict hearing pursuant to General Statutes § 52-225a, the trial court determined that the amount of the pretrial settlements, $825,000, must be deducted as a collateral source from the total amount of damages incurred, $1,500,000. Accordingly, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $315,000. 3 The court denied the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict, and this appeal followed.

On its appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly: (1) denied its motion to set aside the verdict; and (2) calculated the defendant's proportionate share of the damages. On its cross appeal, the plaintiff claims that: (1) the collateral source reduction provision of § 52-225a is unconstitutionally vague; and (2) the trial court improperly failed to offset the collateral source reduction by certain of the plaintiff's attorney's fees. We conclude that these claims are without merit.

I

The defendant asserts that the trial court improperly denied its motion to set aside the verdict because a reasonable jury could not have concluded either that the defendant: (1) had a duty to warn the driver exiting its terminal of the danger of using the Mahr Freight driveway; or (2) that its actions were the proximate cause of the injuries. We disagree.

"Directed verdicts are not favored. Puro v. Henry, 188 Conn. 301, 303, 449 A.2d 176 (1982)." Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 244, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986). Consequently, "[o]ur review of a trial court's refusal to direct a verdict or to render a judgment notwithstanding the verdict takes place within carefully defined parameters. We must consider the evidence, including reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the parties who were successful at trial ... giving particular weight to the concurrence of the judgments of the judge and the jury, who saw the witnesses and heard the testimony.... The verdict will be set aside and judgment directed only if we find that the jury could not reasonably and legally have reached their conclusion...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) John T. Brady & Co. v. Stamford, 220 Conn. 432, 440-41, 599 A.2d 370 (1991); Iseli Co. v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 211 Conn. 133, 140, 558 A.2d 966 (1989).

With respect to the defendant's claim that it had no duty to warn Garnett of the danger of utilizing the Mahr Freight driveway, the defendant does not dispute that the trial court properly instructed the jury on the law concerning its duty to warn. In substance, the trial court charged that a possessor of land has a duty to conduct its business operations in a manner that does not create an unreasonable risk of physical harm to those outside of the premises; 2 Restatement (Second), Torts § 371 (1965); W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts (5th Ed.1984) § 57; and that this duty may include the duty to warn invitees 4 of conditions that pose reasonably foreseeable dangers to the public. W. Prosser & W. Keeton, supra, § 33, pp. 197-99; 2 Restatement (Second), Torts §§ 290, 302, 343 (1965). The duty to warn, however, does not arise if an invitee already has actual knowledge of the dangerous condition. Kaminski v. Fairfield, 216 Conn. 29, 38, 578 A.2d 1048 (1990); Warren v. Stancliff, 157 Conn. 216, 220, 251 A.2d 74 (1968); see also 2 Restatement (Second), Torts § 343A (1965). We note, further, that when "there [is] room for reasonable disagreement as to whether the plaintiff was or should have been aware of the [dangerous] condition ... the jury and not the trial judge should [determine] whether the defendant had a duty to warn the plaintiff of the ... condition...." (Citations omitted.) Warren v. Stancliff, supra, at 220-21, 251 A.2d 74.

The defendant argues, however, that the jury could not reasonably have concluded that the defendant had a duty to warn Garnett of the danger posed by his use of the Mahr Freight driveway because the evidence indisputably reflected Garnett's awareness of the unsafe risk. Contrary to the defendant's assertion, Garnett testified that he had been unaware (1) of the extent to which he would be required to block both lanes of traffic until he already had begun to turn onto Route 5, and (2) that it would have been unsafe for him to have backed up at that point. Garnett also testified that he had never before operated a truck in the defendant's terminal and that he had believed that the Mahr Freight driveway was part of that terminal.

The jury was entitled to credit Garnett's testimony. Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786, 821, 614 A.2d 414 (1992); State v. Henning, 220 Conn. 417, 420, 599 A.2d 1065 (1991). Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to permit a jury reasonably to conclude that Garnett was unaware of the full extent of the danger that his use of the Mahr Freight driveway would pose to traffic on Route 5. It was proper, therefore, for the trial court to have left the resolution of this disputed issue to the jury. See John T. Brady & Co. v. Stamford, supra, 220 Conn. at 441, 599 A.2d 370.

The defendant also asserts that the evidence was insufficient to permit a jury to conclude that the defendant's failure to prevent the use of the Mahr Freight driveway was a proximate cause of the injuries. 5 Specifically, the defendant claims that the Mahr Freight driveway was safe for the use of trucks and, therefore, that it was not a substantial cause of the accident. We disagree.

In order to prevail in a negligence action, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's actions were the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Doe v. Manheimer, 212 Conn. 748, 757-59, 563 A.2d 699 (1989); Wu v. Fairfield, 204 Conn. 435, 438, 528 A.2d 364 (1987). 6 The fact that Garnett's negligent actions may have also been a proximate cause of the accident does not relieve the defendant of its responsibility; 2 Restatement (Second), Torts § 302A (1965); as "[m]ore than one proximate cause may result in any harm suffered." Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 186 Conn. 370, 383, 441 A.2d 620 (1982). When there is an intervening force between the defendant's action and the plaintiff's injuries, the test for determining proximate cause is...

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