Fleming v. Scruggs

Decision Date03 June 2020
Docket NumberCase No. 18-cv-11573
Citation465 F.Supp.3d 720
Parties Ronnie FLEMING, Plaintiff, v. Brandon SCRUGGS, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

Gina U. Puzzuoli, Richard A. Moore, Daniel G. Romano, Romano Law PLLC, Pleasant Ridge, MI, for Plaintiff.

Rick J. Patterson, Vandeveer Garzia, P.C., Troy, MI, Robert C. Clark, Potter DeAgostino O'Dea & Patterson, Steven M. Potter, Potter, DeAgostino, O'Dea & Clark, Auburn Hills, MI, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTSMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF No. 18)

MATTHEW F. LEITMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

According to Plaintiff Ronnie Fleming, he was peacefully riding his bicycle down a street in Pontiac, Michigan, when Defendants Brandon Scruggs and Ruben Garcia, two Oakland County Sheriff's Deputies, stopped him without reasonable suspicion and used excessive force – a Taser – to effect the stop. In this action, Fleming alleges that the stop and the Tasing violated his Fourth Amendment rights and his rights under state law. He brings claims against the deputies and against Defendant Oakland County.

The Defendants counter that the deputies stopped and Tased Fleming because he (1) matched the description of a parole absconder, (2) fled from them after they identified themselves and ordered him to stop, and (3) made what appeared to be an effort to retrieve a weapon from his front pocket. The Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Fleming's claims against the deputies based upon qualified immunity and state-law immunity.

The Defendants’ motion does not take the facts in the light most favorable to Fleming. On the contrary, in several key respects the Defendants’ legal arguments rest upon a view of the facts – and inferences from the facts – that are most favorable to the deputies, not to Fleming. Under the view of the facts that is most favorable to Fleming, the deputies did unlawfully stop him and did use excessive force against him when they Tased him. But that does not mean that Fleming may proceed on all of his claims.

As explained below, the deputies are entitled to qualified immunity for their unlawful stop of Fleming because they reasonably relied upon a police bulletin and because their conclusion that they had reasonable suspicion to stop Fleming based upon his resemblance to the parole absconder described in the bulletin did not violate clearly established federal law. However, the deputies are not entitled to qualified immunity for their use of excessive force because the Tasing of Fleming violated clearly established federal law. Likewise, the deputies are not entitled to state-law immunity for the Tasing because a jury could find that they did not act in good faith. Finally, Oakland County is entitled to summary judgment on all of the claims against it.

Accordingly, the Court will DENY the Defendantsmotion for summary judgment on Fleming's Fourth Amendment claim and state-law tort claims against Deputies Scruggs and Garcia to the extent those claims are based upon the Tasing. However, the Court will GRANT the Defendantsmotion for summary judgment in all other respects.

I

On July 25, 2017, an unidentified employee of the Michigan Department of Corrections (the "MDOC") sent Sergeant Hix of the Oakland County Sheriff's Office (the "OCSO") a "be on the lookout" text message ("BOLO") about a parole absconder who had been observed on Nebraska Street in Pontiac, Michigan. (See BOLO, ECF No. 21-8, PageID.450; see also Scruggs Dep. at 30:11–34:5, ECF No. 18-5, PageID.166–167; Garcia Dep. at 14:7–15:19, ECF No. 18-6, PageID.176.) The BOLO, reproduced below, included a description and a photograph of the suspected absconder:

(BOLO, ECF No. 21-8, PageID.450.)

The BOLO did not provide the parole absconder's age, height, or weight. (See id. ; see also Scruggs Dep. at 32:10-12, ECF No. 18-5, PageID.166.) Nor did the BOLO contain any information about the nature of the absconder's conviction. And the BOLO did not identify the caller who reported the absconder's location on Nebraska Street. Notably, there is no evidence in the record that any law enforcement officer - including the MDOC employee who received that call or officers Hix, Scruggs, and Garcia - ever knew the caller's identity.

Hix forwarded the BOLO to Scruggs and Garcia the same day he received it (July 25, 2017). (See Scruggs Dep. at 33:16-34:5, ECF No. 18-5, PageID.167; Garcia Dep. at 14:4-23, ECF No. 18-6, PageID.176.) There is no evidence in this record that Scruggs and Garcia, after receiving the BOLO, made any effort to learn more about the pictured parole absconder or the nature of his conviction. As Garcia has confirmed, the only information that he and Scruggs had about the suspected absconder was the information contained in the BOLO. (See Garcia Dep. at 14:4–8, ECF No. 18-6, PageID.176.1 )

On July 26, 2017, Scruggs and Garcia were on vehicle patrol in Pontiac roughly one mile from the address on Nebraska Street at which the parole absconder had been spotted the day before. (See Scruggs Dep. at 34:8–9, ECF No. 18-5, PageID.167.) Garcia drove while Scruggs sat in the passenger seat. (See id. at 28:9–10, PageID.165.) The deputies were driving a black Impala. (See id. at 19:10–15, PageID.163.) The vehicle did not have any outside markings that identified it as a law enforcement vehicle. (See Garcia Dep. at 12:12–19, ECF No. 18-6, PageID.175.) All of the windows in the vehicle except for the front windshield were tinted, and the police lights for the vehicle were located inside the car. (See id. at 12:20–22; Scruggs Dep. at 17:4–19:13, ECF No. 18-5, PageID.163.)

As the deputies were driving eastbound on South Boulevard to assist another deputy who had initiated an unrelated traffic stop, they saw Fleming biking the opposite direction – toward them – on South Boulevard toward Woodward Avenue. (See Garcia Dep. at 13:2–3, ECF No. 18-6, PageID.176; Scruggs Dep. at 14:4–6, ECF No. 18-5, PageID.162.) The dashcam video in their patrol vehicle recorded Fleming as he rode past on his bike. (See Dashcam Video at 00:02, ECF No. 18-4.)

As the deputies saw Fleming ride by, they concluded that Fleming resembled the BOLO's description of the parole absconder. The deputies thought Fleming matched the BOLO in the following respects:

• Both Fleming and the parole absconder were African American men.
• Fleming was wearing a ball cap, and the parole absconder had been observed wearing a ball cap the day before.
• Both Fleming and the parole absconder had facial hair.
• Fleming was riding a bicycle, and the parole absconder had been observed riding a bicycle the day before.
• Fleming was located within a mile of the area in which the absconder had been observed the day before.

(See Garcia Dep. at 14:4–15:1, ECF No. 18-6, PageID.176.)

The deputies decided to stop Fleming. (See Scruggs Dep. at 30:9–13, ECF No. 18-5, PageID.166.) The "sole basis for the stop" was the officers’ belief that Fleming matched the BOLO's description of the parole absconder in the five ways described above. (Garcia Dep. at 14:9–10, ECF No. 18-6, PageID.176.)

But there were several notable differences between Fleming's appearance on the date of the incident and the description of the parole absconder. First, Fleming was wearing shorts, not blue jeans. (See Dashcam Video, ECF No. 18-4; Fleming Photographs, ECF No. 21-7; BOLO, ECF No. 21-8, PageID.450.) Second, Fleming was not wearing a chain around his neck, much less a prominent "big neck chain." (See id. ) Third, Fleming's facial hair was a graying goatee, whereas the absconder had a dark-black beard. (See id. ) Fourth, Fleming was roughly a mile away from where the absconder had been seen a day earlier. (See Scruggs Dep. at 34:8–9, ECF No. 18-5, PageID.167.)

After deciding to stop Fleming, the officers turned their vehicle around and started following Fleming. (See id. at 12:1–5, PageID.161; Dashcam Video at 00:02–00:23, ECF No. 18-4.) Fleming looked back and saw the deputies’ vehicle following him, but since the vehicle was unmarked, he was unable to identify it as a police vehicle. (See Fleming Dep. at 62:8–64:6, ECF No. 21-2, PageID.283–285.) Moreover, he could not see the uniformed deputies through the vehicle's tinted windows. (See id. at 56:22–57:2, PageID.277–278.)

Fleming headed into a McDonald's parking lot, and the deputies followed him into that lot. Fleming then biked out of the McDonald's lot and into the parking lot of the Motor City Burger next door, and the deputies again followed. (See Scruggs Dep. at 14:13–17:3, ECF No. 18-5, PageID.162–63; Dashcam Video at 00:35–01:06, ECF No. 18-4.) Finally, Fleming exited the Motor City Burger lot and began cycling down Earlmoor Boulevard, and the deputies sped up to follow him. (See Scruggs Dep. at 15:24–25, 22:3–24:25, ECF No. 18-5, PageID.162, 164; Dashcam Video at 01:06–01:40, ECF No. 18-4.) Throughout the time that the deputies followed Fleming, they remained approximately 10 to 15 yards away from him. (See Scruggs Dep. at 16:6, ECF No. 18-5, PageID.162.) Fleming did not speed up his pedaling at any point while the deputies were following him. (See Fleming Dep. at 61:22–62:3, ECF No. 21-2, PageID.282–283; Dwayne Hunter Dep. at 14:21–22, ECF No. 21-5, PageID.380; Malcolm Watkins Dep. at 9:9–18, ECF No. 21-6, PageID.420.)

At no point while the officers were following Fleming did they identify themselves. (See Fleming Dep. at 52:12–53:13, ECF No. 21-2, PageID.273–274.) Likewise, they did not order Fleming to stop, and they did not activate their police lights or siren. (See id. ; Scruggs Dep. at 17:21–25, ECF No. 18-5, PageID.163.) In fact, they "never gave [Fleming] a command of any kind." (Fleming Dep. at 69:13, ECF No. 21-2, PageID.290.)

As Fleming was riding his bike down Earlmoor Boulevard, he looked back at the deputies’ vehicle and moved his left hand toward the left pocket of his shorts. (See Dashcam...

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3 cases
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    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan
    • December 6, 2021
    ...495 (U.S. Mar. 30, 2020). Fleming v. Scruggs, 465 F.Supp.3d 720, 732 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (alterations in original) (footnote omitted). In Fleming v. Scruggs, Judge Matthew F. concluded that one of the reasons why officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop an individual named Ronnie Fl......
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    ...law, the Court cannot infer that Officer Kandt plausibly intended to cause emotional injury to Plaintiff. See Fleming v. Scruggs, 465 F. Supp. 3d 720, 748 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (granting summary judgment because no evidence showed that the defendant intentionally caused emotional distress). In ......
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