Fleming v. Yeazel

• Decision Date: 17 March 1942
• Docket Number: No. 26578,26578
• Citation: 40 N.E.2d 507,379 Ill. 343
• Parties: FLEMING et al. v. YEAZEL et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

379 Ill. 343

40 N.E.2d 507

FLEMING et al.

v.YEAZEL et al.

No. 26578

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 17, 1942.

Proceedings in the matter of the estate of Ellen Yeazel, deceased, wherein Charles W. Fleming, executor of the estate of Ellen Yeazel, deceased, filed a petition against Clark Yeazel and others, for directions as to manner of making distribution. From a judgment of the Appellate Court, 311 Ill. App. 641, 37 N.E.2d 568, reversing a judgment of the circuit court and remanding it with directions, Clark Yeazel and another appeal.

Affirmed.Appeal from Appellate Court, Third District, on Appeal from Circuit Court, Vermilion County; Ben F. Anderson, Judge.

V. W. McIntire, of Danville, for appellants.

W. T. Henderson and Francis G. Rearick, both of Danville, guardian ad litem for appellees.

STONE, Justice.

This case arose on a petition of the executor of the estate of Ellen Yeazel, deceased, for directions as to manner of making distribution. By the will, the executor, after payment of debts, was directed to reduce all the estate to cash and divide it equally among nine legatees, naming them, two of whom are appellants Clark Yeazel and Jesse Hight. Each of the latter was indebted to the testatrix at the time of her death. The executor's petition sought authority to charge these debts against the legacies of appellants Yeazel and Hight. Objection was made on the ground that the notes given to represent the debts were ‘outlawed.’ The petition was allowed by the probate court and on appeal to the circuit court of Vermilion county it was denied. On further appeal to the Appellate Court for the Third District, the decree of the circuit court was reversed and the order and judgment of the probate court were upheld. The cause is here on certificate of importance.

There is no dispute as to the facts. Appellant Yeazel, on June 2, 1924, executed and delivered to the testatrix his note in the sum of $1,186, bearing interest at the rate of five per cent per annum, due three years after date. The only payment made on the note was $118, made on June 2, 1926, as interest. Hight was likewise indebted to the testatrix on a note for $200, dated July 23, 1926, bearing interest at the rate of five per cent per annum, due one year after date. No payments of any kind were ever made on that note. The petition of the executor sought authority to deduct from the share of the appellants the amount of their notes and interest.

The question whether ‘outlawed’ debts due an estate from a beneficiary can be set off against the interest of that beneficiary has never been directly passed upon by this court. In Jeffers v. Jeffers, 139 Ill. 368, 28 N.E. 913, such a debt was sought to be set off against the interest of a party in a partition proceeding but it was held that while an executor might deduct a debt due against the estate from a legatee, even though outlawed, such could not be done in a partition proceeding. The question here was not before the court and therefore the case does not amount to a decision of that particular question.

Counsel on either side have cited numerous cases from other jurisdictions in support of their contentions. It is evident that those cases are in conflict on the question. In the early case of Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 376, this court was considering the constitutionality of a limitation law. There the argument was made that a limitation law based on possession and seven years' payment of taxes was invalid because the General Assemply had no power to take property from a citizen. The question there concerned the validity of the statute to quiet possession and confirm titles to lands. The Limitations Act was sustained on the ground that the theory of limitation laws is that they affect the remedy limiting the period within which rights may be asserted or remedies resorted to may be enforced. In other words, they bar the right to sue to recover but do not extinguish the debt or the property right. It was there held that upon no other ground can statutes of limitation be sustained, and even though the second section of the...