Flemmer v. Tammany Elementary School Dist. No. 343
| Citation | 774 P.2d 914,116 Idaho 204 |
| Decision Date | 02 June 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 343,No. 17274,343,17274 |
| Parties | , 54 Ed. Law Rep. 325 Betty Jane FLEMMER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TAMMANY ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 343, Nez Perce County, Idaho, the Board of Trustees of Tammany Elementary School District, and Lori Root, William Neumayer, and Al Peterson, the members of the Board of Trustees, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Neil D. McFeeley (Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & Gillespie), Boise, for plaintiff-appellant.
Thomas P. Baskin and James B. Lynch (Imhoff & Lynch) and Cumer L. Green (Green & Nyman, Law Offices, Ctd.), Boise, for defendants-respondents. James B. Lynch, argued.
This case arises from a contract dispute between a teacher and a school district. The issues are (1) whether the district's exercise of discretion under the contract is subject to judicial review; (2) whether the district timely honored the plaintiff's right to serve as a substitute teacher during the 1985-86 school year; and (3) whether the district deprived the plaintiff of her right to fill an allegedly "open" position as a regular teacher during the 1986-87 school year. The trial court entered summary judgment for the district on each of the plaintiff's claims. Today, for reasons explained below, we affirm the judgment in part, vacate it in part, and remand the case.
The background facts may be summarized briefly. In 1984, the plaintiff, Betty Jane Flemmer, was employed by the Tammany Elementary School District as a teacher. Due to a reduction in force, she lost her job. The district placed her in a special employment pool as provided by a collective bargaining agreement. The agreement required the district to hire regular and substitute teachers on a first priority basis from this employment pool. At times pertinent to the instant case, the plaintiff was the only individual in the pool.
During the 1985-86 school year, one of the district's regular and tenured teachers, Georgia Wallace, became seriously ill. Ms. Wallace was absent from work approximately 84 days, comprising most of the second semester. Although the plaintiff had a first priority right to substitute for Ms. Wallace, the district did not hire her for that position until several weeks had elapsed. Consequently, the plaintiff substituted for Ms. Wallace on just 43 of the 84 available days.
In March, 1986, a physician informed the district that Ms. Wallace could "resume her teaching activities with the fall semester of 1986." The district sent Ms. Wallace a contract for the 1986-87 school year, which she signed and returned. Unfortunately, her illness continued and she was unable to work at all during 1986-87. The plaintiff again was hired as Ms. Wallace's substitute, serving in that capacity throughout the school year.
In January, 1987, the physician informed the district that Ms. Wallace's "prognosis [was] good for recovery" and that "she might return to teaching the fall semester of 1987." The district sent Ms. Wallace a contract for the 1987-88 school year, but--apparently concluding that her health would not enable her to work--Ms. Wallace returned the contract unsigned. The district then declared her position "open" and hired the plaintiff to fill it.
In the meantime, however, the plaintiff filed the instant suit against the district. She alleged that she had not been timely hired as a substitute teacher in 1985-86 and that she should have been hired as a regular teacher, rather than as a substitute, in 1986-87. She sought a mandatory injunction compelling the district to hire her as a regular teacher, and she requested damages for loss of pay and benefits. Although the injunction question became moot when the district hired her as a regular teacher for the 1987-88 school year, the damage claims remained. Upon the district's motion, the trial court entered summary judgment against each claim, holding that the district had not violated the plaintiff's rights under the collective bargaining agreement. This appeal followed.
Before examining the merits of each claim, we pause to consider a threshold issue interposed by the district. The collective bargaining agreement does not specify the procedures by which an individual in the employment pool must be notified of an opportunity to work as a substitute teacher. Neither does the agreement prescribe any standards by which the district must determine whether a regular teaching position has become "open." Accordingly, the district urges in its brief that these are matters of administrative discretion. At oral argument, the district stated its position in more extreme terms--asserting that the constitutional powers of school districts somehow immunize them from judicial review of their compliance with employment contracts.
The immunity argument is easily answered. Contract disputes are justiciable regardless of whether the parties are public or private. In Grant Construction Co. v. Burns, 92 Idaho 408, 412-13, 443 P.2d 1005, 1009-1010 (1968), our Supreme Court stated:
[W]here the legislature has ... authorized the state to enter into certain contracts, the state upon entering into such a contract thereby consents to be sued if it breaches.... To deny the right to sue ... would be to deprive the damaged ... party of property without due process of law....
By parity of reasoning, the courts are empowered to decide whether a school district has breached a contract with one of its employees, and to provide a remedy where appropriate.
However, we accept the district's less extreme argument--that discretion exists where a contract fails to establish standards governing certain personnel actions, and such actions are not otherwise regulated by law. Nevertheless, administrative discretion is not a talisman from which all judicial authority retreats. Discretion narrows, but does not eliminate, judicial review. As noted later in this opinion, the exercise of administrative discretion remains subject to review for arbitrariness or lack of good faith.
We now turn to the plaintiff's claim that the district violated the collective bargaining agreement by failing to hire her promptly as a substitute teacher during the 1985-86 school year. Particularly, she has alleged that the district did not make reasonable efforts to notify her immediately of the opportunity to substitute for Ms. Wallace. The district does not deny that it impliedly had such a duty under the agreement. Rather, the district takes the position that its duty was discharged by an unsuccessful attempt to notify the plaintiff.
The sole factual basis for this position is contained in an affidavit of the district superintendent, averring as follows:
The principal at Tammany Elementary School had the responsibility to hire substitute teachers when the regular teacher was absent. At the time Georgia Wallace became ill, the principal ... attempted to contact plaintiff to employ her as a substitute. Your affiant does not have specific knowledge as to the circumstances surrounding why the principal was unable to contact plaintiff. [Emphasis added.]
On its face, this language reveals that the superintendent did not have personal knowledge of the efforts assertedly made by the school principal to contact the plaintiff. An affidavit asserting narrative facts must be based upon personal knowledge. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Tapper Chevrolet Company v. Hansen, 95 Idaho 436, 510 P.2d...
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Farm Bureau Ins. Co. Of Idaho v. Kinsey
...on appeal is equivalent to the standard of clear error prescribed by I.R.C.P. 52(a). Flemmer v. Tammany Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 343, 116 Idaho 204, 207 n. 2, 774 P.2d 914, 917 n. 2 (Ct.App.1989). Thus, we examine the record to determine whether the trial court's decision is supported by s......