Fletcher v. Amax, Inc.
| Citation | 160 Ga.App. 692,288 S.E.2d 49 |
| Decision Date | 24 November 1981 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 62613,62614,s. 62613 |
| Parties | FLETCHER v. AMAX, INC. et al.; and vice versa. |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Georgia) |
Harry W. Bassler, Atlanta, for appellant.
A. Lee Parks, Jr., Stan Kreimer, Jr., Robert N. Meals, Atlanta, for appellees.
Employment Rights. The appellee (and cross-appellant) Amax, Inc., a New York corporation, purchased Dayton Fly Ash, Inc. prior to 1974. The president of Dayton Fly Ash, Barton Thomas, was installed as the president of the new corporation assuming Dayton's business, Amax Resource Recovery Systems Inc. (ARRS). Effective May 1, 1974, the appellant Fletcher was hired as a salesman for ARRS. Fletcher ultimately was assigned duties for ARRS, in Atlanta as a multi-state district manager. Late in 1978, Amax elected to sell ARRS to appellee Monier Resources Inc. The vice-president of ARRS (the appellee Cordiano) in February, 1979, announced to all ARRS employees that the sale of ARRS to Monier had been accomplished. Fletcher not wishing to continue his employment with Monier submitted a letter of resignation. Efforts were made to persuade him to change his mind and he was offered a new position at the home office of ARRS in Texas with additional responsibility and increased pay. Alternatively, Fletcher was offered a job as salesman in the Atlanta area but this would have been tantamount to a demotion. Fletcher persisted in his decision to leave Monier and seek employment with another company in a related business. Fletcher sought two months severance pay amounting to approximately $10,000. ARRS and Amax refused to pay severance pay contending that there was no valid or binding contract of employment and further that Fletcher had voluntarily resigned. Fletcher then brought the present action maintaining a failure by ARRS to pay him severance pay; wrongfully conspiring to deprive him of his severance pay and penalties based upon stubborn and litigious denial of his severance benefits. Each of the appellees (employers) filed a motion for summary judgment which was originally denied. Upon motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment actions, the trial court treated the motion for reconsideration as a new motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of each of the appellees. In Case No. 62613 Fletcher brings his appeal enumerating as error the grant of the motions for summary judgment. In Case No. 62614 the appellees-cross appellants (employers Cordiano, Amax, Monier, and ARRS) filed a cross appeal urging error in certain assumptions by the trial court in its grant of their summary judgment. Held :
The essence of each appeal concerns itself with whether a valid employment contract existed between Fletcher and ARRS-Monier, and whether Fletcher's resignation was voluntary or at the convenience of ARRS.
Appellees (employers) argue strenuously that there was no written contract of employment and therefore Fletcher as an employee could be terminated at will. Their contention is that in the absence of a contract, there could be no recovery for employment rights. This statement of law is essentially correct. American Standard v. Jessee, 150 Ga.App. 663, 258 S.E.2d 240. Appellee-employers cite several other cases standing for this same principle. However as we view the issue before us, these cases are not in point. Each of those cases dealt with an employee who had been involuntarily terminated and was suing for lost wages based upon the breach of an employment contract. In this case, there is no issue as to a violation by the employer of Fletcher's employment status. In this case Fletcher seeks severance pay following an amicable termination of his status with ARRS. Thus, rather than dealing with a breach of an employment contract, we are concerned with internal policies of ARRS set forth in a "Procedures and Policy Manual" issued by ARRS with the advice and consent of the parent company, Amax.
As pertinent, the Procedures and Policy Manual declared its purpose to be ...
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Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.
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