Fletcher v. City of New Haven

• Decision Date: 27 March 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:11-cv-00708-AWT
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: JEFFREY FLETCHER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN and CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF NEW HAVEN, Defendants.

JEFFREY FLETCHER, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF NEW HAVEN and CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF NEW HAVEN, Defendants.

Case No. 3:11-cv-00708-AWT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

DATED: March 27, 2012

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff New Haven Police Department ("NHPD") officer Jeremy Fletcher ("Fletcher") brings this action against defendants City of New Haven and the Civil Service Commission of the City of New Haven (collectively, the "City")¹ . The plaintiff brings claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his rights to procedural and substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The plaintiff also brings state law claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of the plaintiff's rights to procedural and substantive due process under the Connecticut Constitution. The defendants have moved to dismiss all claims. For the reasons setforth below, the defendants' motion is being granted.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Fletcher is a patrol officer with the NHPD. In 2008, Fletcher decided to take the 2009 promotional examination for promotion to the rank of sergeant. Fletcher spent considerable time and expense preparing for the promotional examination.

The City established an open bidding process to select a private third party to establish, administer and score the promotional examination. Resource Management Associates ("RMA") won the bid, and on November 25, 2008, the City entered into a contract with RMA for the administration of the promotional examination. The expiration date for the contract was April 13, 2009.²

RMA administered the promotional exam in two parts: a written examination and an oral examination. The plaintiff alleges that RMA administered the written examination on April 8, 2009, and administered the oral examination on April 18, 2009, five days after the date on which the contract expired. Fletcher took both parts of the promotional examination.

On April 14, 2009, a "Special Civil Service Meeting" was

held. (Objection and Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. D (Doc. No. 16-4)). At the meeting, the City considered appeals from candidates who had missed certain deadlines and consequently had been denied entrance to the oral examination. The City granted these candidates' appeals and allowed them to sit for the oral examination on April 18, 2009. The meeting was held without notice to the public or to the other candidates for promotion, including Fletcher.

On July 14, 2009, the City informed Fletcher that he had not passed the promotional examination. Fletcher claims that the defendants forced him to compete against people who were ineligible to take the oral examination, causing him loss of income, promotional benefits, emotional distress and humiliation.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and must draw inferences in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Although a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . , a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 545, 555 (2007), citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286(1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation."). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. (citations omitted). However, the plaintiff must plead "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "The function of a motion to dismiss is 'merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.' " Mytych v. May Dep't Store Co., 34 F. Supp. 2d 130, 131 (D. Conn. 1999) (quoting Ryder Energy Distrib. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir. 1984)). "The issue is not whether plaintiff will prevail, but whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claims." United States v. Yale New Haven Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 784, 786 (D. Conn. 1990) (citing Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 232).

In its review of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court may consider "only the facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the pleadings and matters of which judicial noticemay be taken." Samuels v. Air Transp. Local 504, 992 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1993).

III. DISCUSSION

Fletcher brings federal procedural and substantive due process claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Fletcher also brings procedural and substantive due process claims under the Connecticut Constitution and common law claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

A. Section 1983 Procedural Due Process Claim (Count III)

Fletcher claims that the City deliberately implemented a void contract by allowing RMA to hold the oral examination after the expiration of the contract, and deliberately expanded the class of candidates eligible for the oral examination by granting the appeal of candidates who were originally denied admission to the oral examination. Fletcher further alleges that these actions by the City violated his right to procedural due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ³

Fletcher claims that as a direct and proximate consequence of this violation, he was unable to protect his rights, and was forced to compete against other persons outside the class of proper candidates for the oral examination, which resulted in aloss of income, promotional benefits, emotional distress and humiliation.

In order to sustain a claim for deprivation of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment--that is, a lack of adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard--a plaintiff must "first identify a property right, second show that the state has deprived him of that right, and third show that the deprivation was effected without due process." Mehta v. Surles, 905 F.2d 595, 598 (2d Cir. 1990). Therefore, the court must first determine whether Fletcher has identified a protectable property interest.

Property interests that are protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are defined by "existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." Bd. Of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Id.

While state law defines the underlying property interest, "federal constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the level of a 'legitimate claim of entitlement' protected by the Due Process Clause." Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at577). In particular, not every contractual benefit rises to the level of a constitutionally protected property interest. "It is neither workable nor within the intent of section 1983 to convert every breach of contract claim against a state [actor] into a federal claim." San Bernardino Physicians' Servs. Med. Grp. v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 825 F.2d 1404, 1408 (9th Cir. 1987). See also Costello v. Town of Fairfield, 811 F.2d 782, 784 (2d Cir. 1987) (a simple contract dispute does not give rise to a cause of action under § 1983); Brown v. Brienen, 722 F.2d 360, 364 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[T]here is no rule that every breach of a public employment contract is a deprivation of property within the meaning of the due process clause.").

Generally, there is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a promotion, and therefore no protectable property interest in a promotional opportunity or examination. See McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 286-88 (2d Cir. 2001) (Rochester firefighter did not have property interest in promotion, competitive examination, or being considered for promotion); Bridgeport Firebird Soc'y v. City of Bridgeport, 686 F. Supp. 53, 58 (D. Conn. 1983) (firefighters on Bridgeport's promotion eligibility list for the rank of Lieutenant had "only . . . a mere expectation of promotion, which does not rise to the level of a legally protected interest, . . . ."). See also Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 104-05 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 499 U.S.893 (1980) (plaintiff's claim that state promotion procedures were not followed does not constitute a due process claim where there was no property interest in the promotion); Kielczynski v. Village of LaGrange, 19 F. Supp. 2d 877 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (police officer has no protectable property or liberty interest in her promotional opportunities and cannot allege a due process violation when barred from competing for sergeant's position).

The Second Circuit has only recognized a protected property interest in a promotion under extraordinary circumstances. In Ezekwo v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 940 F.2d 775, 782-83 (2d Cir. 1991), the Second Circuit concluded that a physician had a protected property interest in the position of Chief Resident where the hospital had an established policy and practice of awarding the position to all third-year residents on a rotating basis. Also, the hospital had verbally advised the plaintiff that she would...