Fletcher v. Collins
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Citation | Fletcher v. Collins, 218 N.C. 1, 9 S.E.2d 606 (N.C. 1940) |
| Decision Date | 19 June 1940 |
| Docket Number | 103. |
| Parties | FLETCHER et al. v. COLLINS et al. |
Plaintiff on behalf of himself and other taxpayers of Sand Hill Consolidated School District of Buncombe County like situated, brought this action against the Board of County Commissioners for Buncombe County to restrain the issue of certain bonds by the defendants in behalf of the school district named.
The case was heard before Judge Warlick, without the intervention of a jury, upon an agreed statement of facts, as follows:
The statute referred to is too long for detailed quotation. In substance it provides that upon a petition of not less than ten per cent of the qualified voters of the territory affected such territory shall be created into a school district and that bonds or notes shall be issued under the provisions of the Act, payable exclusively out of the taxes levied in the district, for the purpose of erecting a school building therein.
Upon pertinent findings of fact, the trial court concluded that the pertinent statute, Chapter 279, Public-Local and Private Laws of North Carolina, Session of 1937, is in conflict with the provisions of Article II, Section 29 of the Constitution of North Carolina, prohibiting the General Assembly from passing "any local, private, or special act or resolution *** establishing or changing the lines of school districts" and is, therefore, void and constitutes no authority for issuing the proposed bonds.
Judgment was therefore rendered, permanently restraining the defendants from issuing the bonds and from levying the necessary tax to pay the principal and interest thereon. From this judgment the defendants appealed.
Brandon P. Hodges and Claude L. Love, both of Asheville, for defendants, appellants.
W. A. Egerton, of Enka, and Zebulon Weaver, Jr., of Asheville, for plaintiffs, appellees.
Joseph C. Whisnant, of Shelby, for County Board of Education of Cleveland County, and Masslich & Mitchell, of New York City, as amici curiae.
The School Machinery Act of 1933, Pub. Acts 1933, c. 562, abolished all existing special tax districts in the State, including special charter districts, and automatically deprived all school districts of the power to issue bonds or create debt. Such districts were continued only as tax-collecting districts for the liquidation of debts already incurred. Subsequently, the debts of many of these districts were taken over by the counties, under powers expressly conferred by law or under decisions of the Court approving such action as lawful. The effect of this legislation was to leave the several counties solely responsible for furnishing school buildings and certain other school facilities.
Mears v. Board of Education, 214 N.C. 89, 197 S.E. 752, illustrates the inadequacy of existing general laws to meet this requirement, and the inability of communities in need of school facilities to procure relief under them by court action, however great the emergency.
The difficulty and delay thus experienced were enhanced by the widespread financial distress which made some of the counties unable and others, perhaps, unwilling to exercise a discretion favorable to the erection of school buildings. Several counties of the State, perhaps eleven in number, secured legislation similar to the Act under consideration, permitting the communities within such counties to proceed on the principle of self-help. Many thousands of dollars in bonds have been issued and sold under such laws and school buildings have been erected. The machinery in all the acts is strikingly similar.
While, of course, the primary purpose of the Act under consideration was to create a taxing district so that necessary facilities for conducting the schools might be provided by the community itself, at its own expense, there is no need to evade the fact that school districts are thus created, or may be created under the law, anywhere in the county upon compliance with the conditions named in the Act.
We do not think it necessary here to go more minutely into distinctions between laws that are general and uniform as to all parts of the State and those which are special, local, or private. The field is controversial and it will be found that in many instances laws are general, special, or local merely by way of contrast. The law applying to a whole county in which numerous school districts might be created cannot be classed as private or special. As to whether a law may be called local is often to be determined by the "facts and circumstances of each particular case." In re Harris, 183 N.C. 633, 112 S.E. 425. Some laws, which must of necessity apply to all persons of the particular class selected throughout the State at the risk of offending against the constitutional provisions against discrimination, have been pronounced local because they applied to only a few counties in the State. State v. Dixon, 215 N.C. 161, 1 S.E.2d 521. Since, however, a county must be considered a unit, so far as its responsibility for furnishing school facilities is concerned, as well as for the purpose of division into school districts, it may well be questioned whether an act providing for the creation, not of one particular school district within the county, but the creation of any number of them, under its machinery, could properly be called "local". In re Harris, supra.
The question presented is one of first impression, since the decisions of this Court striking down legislation purporting to establish school districts as in opposition to Article II, Section 29 of the Constitution, have applied to the attempted creation of a single or special district. Robinson v. Com'rs, 182 N.C. 590, 109 S.E. 855; Galloway v. Board of Education, 184 N.C. 245, 114 S.E. 165; Board of Trustees v. Mutual Loan & Trust Co., 181 N.C. 306, 107 S.E. 130; Sechrist v. Com'rs, 181 N.C. 511, 107 S.E. 503, 504. The precise question involved here is different. However the Act is labeled, it is our opinion that the constitutional provision cited does not prevent or forbid the creation of school districts by the method set out in the Act applicable to any district which may be so created in the county.
It will be observed that the act in question prescribes a method whereby school districts or special bond tax units may be uniformly established throughout the county. The act itself deals only with the mechanics of establishing or changing the lines of school districts or special bond tax units, and does not, ex proprio vigore, undertake to establish or to change any such lines. These are matters which, in terms, are committed to the sound discretion of the county board of education. The constitutional prohibition as respects the matter now in hand is against direct action on the part of the General Assembly and not against the establishment of machinery for the accomplishment of these ends.
In Board of Trustees v. Mutual Loan & Trust Co., supra, and again in Sechrist v. Com'rs, supra, it was inadvertently stated that this constitutional inhibition was directed against the passage of any local, private or special act "relating to *** establishing or changing the lines of school districts". The word "relating" is used seven times in the section. It...
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