Fletcher v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 10 November 2020
• Docket Number: Record No. 1736-19-2
• Citation: 72 Va.App. 493,849 S.E.2d 594
• Parties: Ruebin Clifton FLETCHER v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals

72 Va.App. 493

849 S.E.2d 594

Ruebin Clifton FLETCHER

v.COMMONWEALTH of Virginia

Record No. 1736-19-2

Court of Appeals of Virginia.

NOVEMBER 10, 2020

Kevin E. Calhoun (Charles C. Cosby, Jr. ; The Law Office of Charles C. Cosby, Jr., P.C., on brief), Richmond, for appellant.

Sharon M. Carr, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Present: Judges Beales, Huff and O'Brien

OPINION BY JUDGE MARY GRACE O'BRIEN

Following a bench trial, Ruebin Clifton Fletcher ("appellant") was convicted of carjacking, in violation of Code § 18.2-58.1 ; attempted malicious wounding, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-26 and 18.2-51 ; abduction, in violation of Code § 18.2-47 ; felony destruction of property, in violation of Code § 18.2-137 ; and assault, in violation of Code § 18.2-57. The court granted appellant's motion to strike a charge of attempted rape, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-26 and 18.2-61.

The court imposed a total sentence of forty-five years and eleven months of incarceration, with thirty years suspended. The court's sentence included twenty years of incarceration, with fourteen years suspended, on the abduction conviction.

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his carjacking and attempted malicious wounding convictions. He also asserts that the court erred in sentencing him in excess of the statutory maximum on the abduction conviction.

BACKGROUND

At approximately midnight on July 17, 2018, the victim, who was driving home after visiting a friend, stopped to inflate her tires at a gas station. Appellant, who was driving a white sedan, stopped nearby, rolled down his window, and offered to help. The victim declined. Appellant then parked and approached her on foot. He reiterated his offer to help, told her his name, and asked for her name. Because she was uncomfortable, the victim gave a false name. Appellant invited the victim to "hang out" and "smoke some weed," but she declined.

Appellant continued attempting to engage the victim in conversation and repeatedly asked if she wanted to "hang out." The victim ignored him, finished inflating her tires, and left the gas station parking lot. Appellant drove out "right behind" her and began following her. Concerned, the victim texted her friend and turned onto a rural two-lane road which she thought was "more of a highway." Appellant followed and began to drive closer to the victim's car.

The victim called 911 and reported that she was being followed. Meanwhile, appellant pulled up close behind her car, crossed into the oncoming traffic lane, and accelerated past her. Appellant returned to the victim's lane and "slammed on his brakes," forcing the victim to stop abruptly. The 911 dispatcher told the victim to turn around. However, while attempting to do so, the victim backed her car into a ditch; the front of her car remained on the road, obstructing a traffic lane. Appellant backed up his car until it was perpendicular to the victim's vehicle, forming a "T" shape and blocking the victim's vehicle so that she could not drive forward, even if she exited the ditch.

Appellant got out of his car, wearing gloves and carrying a long metal object that witnesses described as a "tire iron." He approached the victim's driver's side window and demanded that she get out and follow him. The victim refused. Appellant responded by trying to smash the window with the tire iron. He hit the window three times, leaving scratches, but the window did not break.

At that time, the victim saw another car approach in the lane blocked by her car. Appellant returned to his car to move it out of the way, still yelling at the victim to follow him. The victim then flashed her lights and rolled her window down, calling for help. The approaching car pulled over, and two men got out and ran toward the victim's car. According to one of the men, the victim's car was angled "almost like in a T-bone[.] ... [Y]ou could tell that [it] couldn't really move until [appellant's] car moved."

Appellant parked near the victim's car and got back out, still wearing gloves and carrying the tire iron. As the two men approached, he retreated to his car, where he remained for a minute with his high beams on before driving away. He returned a short time later and stayed for "maybe thirty seconds" before leaving again. The 911 dispatcher recorded the entire incident.

Two sheriff's deputies responded to the scene. One deputy obtained a DMV photograph of appellant based on his car's license plate number and showed it to the victim. The victim identified appellant from the photo.

A third officer who was driving nearby heard the dispatcher's description of appellant's vehicle, and he saw a white car speed past him. He pursued the car for a short distance but was unable to catch up; he estimated it was traveling between 100 and 120 miles per hour. He subsequently identified the white car as appellant's vehicle from a photograph taken from surveillance footage at the gas station.

Appellant was arrested on July 26, 2018. The tire iron was never recovered.

ANALYSIS

In his first two assignments of error, appellant contests the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for carjacking and attempted malicious wounding. First, he contends that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he seized or seized control of the victim's vehicle, which is an element of carjacking under Code § 18.2-58.1. Second, he argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he had a specific intent to maliciously wound the victim, as required by Code § 18.2-51.

When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, an appellate court reviews the facts "in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial." Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472, 813 S.E.2d 722 (2018) (quoting Scott v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 380, 381, 789 S.E.2d 608 (2016) ). In doing so, an appellate court "discard[s] the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard[s] as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom." Kelley v. Commonwealth, 289 Va. 463, 467-68, 771 S.E.2d 672 (2015) (quoting Parks v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498, 270 S.E.2d 755 (1980) ).

"The judgment of a trial court sitting without a jury is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict and will not be set aside unless it appears from the evidence that the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it." Wood v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 286, 292, 701 S.E.2d 810 (2010) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415 (1987) ); see Code § 8.01-680. In reviewing the court's verdict, an appellate court "does not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228, 819 S.E.2d 234 (2018) (quoting Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512, 808 S.E.2d 408 (2017) ). "Rather, the relevant question is, upon review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (quoting Pijor, 294 Va. at 512, 808 S.E.2d 408 ). Further, "[t]he credibility of a witness, the weight accorded the testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from proven facts are matters solely for the fact finder's determination." Crawley v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 372, 375, 512 S.E.2d 169 (1999).

Issues of statutory construction are questions of law which are reviewed de novo. Hilton v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 293, 299, 797 S.E.2d 781 (2017).

A. Carjacking

Appellant was convicted of carjacking in violation of Code § 18.2-58.1, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

As used in this section, "carjacking" means the intentional seizure or seizure of control of a motor vehicle of another with intent to permanently or temporarily deprive another in possession or control of the vehicle of that possession or control by means of partial strangulation, or suffocation, or by striking or beating, or by other violence to the person, or by assault or otherwise putting a person in fear of serious bodily harm, or by the threat or presenting of firearms, or other deadly weapon or instrumentality whatsoever.

(Emphasis added).

Thus, the Commonwealth may prove a violation of the carjacking statute in one of two ways: either by establishing that the defendant "seiz[ed]" the vehicle or by proving that the defendant "seiz[ed] ... control" of the vehicle. See id.; see also Hilton, 293 Va. at 299, 797 S.E.2d 781. Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he seized or seized control of the victim's car.¹

In Hilton, the Supreme Court distinguished between "seizure" and "seizure of control" as used in Code § 18.2-58.1. See 293 Va. at 299, 797 S.E.2d 781. There, the defendant robbed the victim at gunpoint while both individuals were standing outside of the victim's pickup truck. Id. at 297, 797 S.E.2d 781. The defendant took the victim's cash and keys and ordered the victim to get in the truck; the victim complied. Id. As the defendant walked away with the cash and keys, the victim got out of the truck with a shotgun and chased him. Id. The defendant was convicted of carjacking. Id.

In affirming his conviction, the Supreme Court defined "seizure" under the carjacking statute as "taking possession of [the victim's vehicle], as occurs, for example, where the perpetrator actually enters the victim's vehicle and drives away." Id. at 299, 797 S.E.2d 781 (citing then quoting Seize, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining "seize" as "[t]o forcibly take possession (of a person or property)")). In contrast, the Supreme Court defined "seizure of control" as merely " ‘exercis[ing] power’ over [the victim's vehicle]." Id. (quoting Control, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining "control" a...