Fletcher v. Krise, 7562.

• Decision Date: 03 March 1941
• Docket Number: No. 7562.,7562.
• Citation: 73 App. DC 266,120 F.2d 809
• Parties: FLETCHER v. KRISE.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

73 App. DC 266, 120 F.2d 809 (1941)

FLETCHER v. KRISE.

No. 7562.

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

Argued December 4, 1940.

Decided March 3, 1941.

Petition for rehearing denied April 10, 1941.

Edmond C. Fletcher, of Washington, D. C., pro se.

William Stanley and J. Edward Burroughs, both of Washington, D. C., and James S. Barron, of Norfolk, Va., for appellee.

Before GRONER, Chief Justice, and LUHRING and O'DONOGHUE, United States District Judges sitting by assignment.

GRONER, C. J.

Appellant, in 1930, was an attorney at law in practice in the city of Washington. In the latter part of that year, he and Theodore J. Wool, an attorney of Norfolk, Virginia, entered into a contract with appellee Krise, as receiver of Fidelity Land and Investment Corporation of Virginia, to prosecute on behalf of the corporation a claim against the United States for just compensation for the taking of the corporation's property in the war period of 1917. Wool and appellant agreed for a contingent fee of 50 percent of the amount recovered, to be divided equally between them, to prosecute the claim both before Congress and the courts of the United States or elsewhere and to render such other and further legal services as should be necessary. In the event of failure, the attorneys were to receive nothing for their services. The complaint alleges that pursuant to the contract appellant and Wool in 1931 instituted suits in the state and federal courts in Virginia, in which proceedings appellant prepared the pleadings and other papers, but that all such suits resulted adversely to the receiver. In 1935 appellant prepared a bill conferring jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to hear the case and sent it to Wool that it might be introduced in Congress. Appellant submitted a comprehensive memorandum in support of the bill, which was embodied in another bill and finally passed both houses, but met a pocket veto. Thereafter Wool "slightly changed the bill," which was introduced and became a law in 1938, as the result of which suit was instituted by other counsel in the Court of Claims and judgment for $82,833.42 secured. To recover one-quarter of this amount, appellant instituted this suit in the District Court.

The receiver's answer sets up two main defenses:

(1) That the services actually performed by appellant brought no benefit to the receiver; that the suits brought in the Virginia courts were lost and that the bill drawn by appellant failed of enactment; that the judgment resulted from the subsequent passage of a bill, followed by a suit in the Court of Claims, in which appellant did not and could not participate;

(2) That appellant was in 1931 disbarred from practice in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia and thereafter in 1933 was disbarred in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the United States Court of Claims, and the Supreme Court of the United States; and that after his disbarment appellee Krise no longer looked to nor recognized appellant as his attorney, but notified him that his services would be no longer required or accepted, and appellee then proceeded to employ other counsel, whose efforts resulted in the successful legislation and litigation referred to in the complaint.

The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of appellee receiver, and this appeal followed.

In the view we take of the case, the decision turns upon the question whether appellant's disbarment several years prior to the successful completion of the litigation and his consequent inability to render professional services in promoting the claim, annulled his contingent fee contract and entitled appellee to a judgment as a matter of law. We think this question must be answered in the affirmative. It is well settled that, if an attorney without justifiable cause voluntarily abandons or withdraws from a case before his services have been performed, he loses his right to compensation.¹ Disbarment prior to the completion of the case is equivalent to a voluntary and unjustified withdrawal from the case.

The leading case on the subject arose in South Dakota. Egan, an attorney engaged under contract for one-half of a contingent fee, aided in the prosecution of a case which resulted in favor of the client in the trial court. The judgment was appealed, and after a brief had been filed on behalf of the client, Egan was disbarred. The judgment was affirmed, and Egan brought suit on the contract, to recover his share of the fee, in much the same manner as here. The court held, however, that Egan's contract was annulled by his disbarment, which put him in the same position as if he had voluntarily, wrongfully, and without just cause abandoned the case. "It follows that immediately upon the entry of the decree of disbarment, every contract of employment as attorney, entered into by respondent, was annulled. Such annulment was brought about by his own wrongdoing, and was therefore as much of a voluntary annulment of his contracts of employment as attorney as though he had expressly refused to perform such contracts, or had accepted an office which disqualified him to perform his contracts." Egan v. Waggoner, 41 S.D. 239, 170 N.W. 142, 143. Upon remand, his complaint was amended, and his bankruptcy trustee sought to recover on a theory of quantum meruit and obtained a judgment for the services performed thereunder to the date of disbarment. The trial court apparently allowed recovery on the contract. On appeal, the court stated the question as follows: "Accepting the law of the case as established on the former appeal, and bearing in mind the essential nature of a contingent fee contract, the question is whether or not an attorney, who has partly, but not substantially, performed a contract for the rendition of personal services, for a compensation payable only in the event of final and successful termination, who has willfully and intentionally abandoned said contract without cause before completion, can recover for services rendered prior to such abandonment, and, if so, upon what basis?" The court then decided that as the disbarment annulled the contract, he could not recover for part performance under the joint enterprise. Davenport v. Waggoner, 49 S.D....