Fletcher v. Soto
| Decision Date | 01 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-57054,No. 13-56958,13-56958,13-57054 |
| Parties | MATTHEW FLETCHER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. J. SOTO, Warden, Respondent-Appellee. JENNIFER FLETCHER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. VELDA DOBSON-DAVIS, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
CD Cal., Los Angeles
ORDERCD Cal., Los Angeles
Before: REINHARDT, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
The Memorandum and partial dissent filed April 4, 2017, are withdrawn and replaced by the Amended Memorandum and concurrence filed concurrently with this order.
With these changes, the petitions for panel rehearing are DENIED. The petitions for rehearing en banc have been circulated to the full court and no judge of the court has requested a vote on en banc rehearing. The petitions for rehearing en banc are DENIED. See Fed. R. App. P. 35(f). No further petitions for panel or en banc rehearing will be entertained.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
AMENDED MEMORANDUM*
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Central District of California
Argued and Submitted March 8, 2017 Pasadena, CaliforniaBefore: REINHARDT, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Matthew and Jennifer Fletcher, husband and wife, and co-defendants below, appeal from the district court's denial of their separate 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petitions. Exercising our jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, we affirm.
Matthew and Jennifer Fletcher were jointly convicted of murdering Jennifer's ex-husband, Joel Shanbrom. After unsuccessful direct appeals and state habeas proceedings, Matthew and Jennifer each filed a § 2254 petition in federal district court. The district court denied the petitions and these appeals followed.
With respect to Matthew's appeal, this Court issued a certificate of appealability ("COA") on a single issue: "whether the prosecutor committed misconduct by asking Detective McCartin whether he believed [Matthew] and Jennifer Fletcher's story." We also issued a COA to Jennifer on a related issue: namely, "whether [Jennifer's] 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition included a claim that the prosecutor committed misconduct by asking Detective McCartin whether hebelieved [Jennifer] and Matthew Fletcher's story, and if so, whether [Jennifer] is entitled to relief on this claim."1
A district court's decision to deny a § 2254 habeas petition is reviewed de novo. See Visciotti v. Martel, 839 F.3d 845, 856 (9th Cir. 2016). And, while this Court normally affords AEDPA deference to state court judgments, see, e.g.,Sexton v. Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2012), where, as here, "the state court has not decided an issue, we review that question de novo." Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 860 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006)).
The certified issue concerns the following exchange during the prosecutor's re-direct examination of Detective McCartin following Matthew's pro se cross-examination:
Assuming, without deciding, that we are not barred from reviewing this question by any procedural bar, see Lambrix v. Singletary 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997) (), we reject Appellants' argument on the merits. "A habeas petition will be granted for prosecutorial misconduct only when the misconduct 'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.'" Sassounian v. Roe, 230 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986)). Here, Appellants' certified claim rests entirely on the prosecutor's questioning of a single witness, Detective McCartin. The challenged exchange arose only after Matthew, acting as his own counsel during cross-examination, opened the door for the government to solicit Detective McCartin's views as to the veracity of the individuals he interviewed during hisinvestigation, including both witnesses to and targets of that investigation. See United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 160 F.3d 511, 522 (9th Cir. 1998) ().
Accordingly, Appellants have failed to carry their burden to show that a constitutional violation occurred. We therefore reject their claim of prosecutorial misconduct and affirm the district court's denial of their § 2254 petitions.
In both appeals, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.Reinhardt, Circuit Judge, concurring:
While I agree with my colleagues that the petitioners failed to establish that a constitutional violation occurred with respect to the certified claim, although not necessarily for the reason given, I have decided not to exercise my right to expand the certificate of appealability to include the uncertified claim. I do so because it is apparent to me that my colleagues, having read the record and the briefs with respect to that issue, are persuaded that the claim does not have merit. It would therefore be an idle act to require the state to brief the issue, which could serve only to confirm my colleagues' views. I would note, however, that my own analysis of the uncertified claim is to the contrary. I believe it to be meritorious. Under the circumstances, I think that it is my obligation to record my reasons for that belief.
In Holmes v. South Carolina, the Supreme Court established that criminal defendants have a right to present evidence of third-party guilt as long as that evidence has more than "only a very weak logical connection to the central issues" at trial. 547 U.S. 319, 330 (2006). If a state's third-party evidence rule, or that rule's application in a particular case, prevents criminal defendants from putting on evidence central to their defense, the application is "arbitrary" and "violates acriminal defendant's right to have 'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.'" Id. at 331 (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)).
The application of California's third-party guilt rule in the Fletchers' criminal trial clearly violated the defendants' right to put on evidence central to their defense, and thus constituted an unreasonable application of well-established Supreme Court law. Under California law, "evidence of mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime . . . without more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt: there must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime." People v. Hall, 41 718 P.2d 99, 104 (Cal. 1986). We need not consider whether that statute is on its face constitutional because in the present case, there was more. The California court excluded evidence that was central to the Fletchers' defense and had a strong logical connection to that defense. The exclusion of that evidence, therefore, constituted an unreasonable application of well-established Supreme Court law. See Holmes, 547 U.S. at 330-31; Crane, 476 U.S. at 690. The Fletchers provided direct evidence of both motive and opportunity of a third party to commit the crime in question, as well as strong circumstantial evidence linking that person - Donald Moffett - to the crime. The Fletchers were prepared to present evidence from eight to ten witnesses at trial consistent with their version of the facts that Moffett and his uncle entered the Shanbrom home for the purpose of committing a robbery and shot Joel Shanbrom when they encountered him. This evidence included testimony that Moffett and hisuncle were on the Shanbroms' street that afternoon purportedly installing a security system in a neighborhood home; that Moffett and his uncle were members of the East Coast Crips, a gang that was committing home robberies around the time of the shooting; that some of these robberies were committed by Crip members pretending to be security or police officers by wearing clothing that said "Police" or "Security"...
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