Fletcher v. State Acc. Ins. Fund
Decision Date | 13 October 1980 |
Citation | 617 P.2d 945,48 Or.App. 777 |
Parties | In the Matter of the Compensation of Giles L. FLETCHER, Claimant, Petitioner, v. STATE ACCIDENT INSURANCE FUND and Workers' Compensation Department, Respondents. WCB 79-1407; CA 16868. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Ann Morgenstern, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner.
Richard D. Barber, Jr., Certified Law Student, Salem, argued the cause for respondent State Acc. Ins. Fund. On the brief were K. R. Maloney, Chief Counsel, James A. Blevins, Chief Trial Counsel, and Darrell E. Bewley, Associate Counsel, State Acc. Ins. Fund, Salem.
No appearance made by respondent Workers' Compensation Dept.
Before GILLETTE, P. J., and ROBERTS and CAMPBELL, JJ.
This is an appeal from a Workers' Compensation Board decision interpreting ORS 656.209. 1 That statute provides:
We take the following facts as stated in the referee's Opinion and Order:
The referee concluded SAIF was not entitled to assert an offset during the months claimant did not actually receive social security benefits. The referee stated:
The Board reversed the referee, stating:
" * * * Claimant, in this case, has been paid all the compensation he is entitled to. Claimant was overpaid or 'paid in advance' his Social Security benefits. The Social Security Administration acted by withholding payment of additional benefits from July 1978 through October 1978 and made only a part payment of benefits in November 1978 to balance out what claimant had been paid with what he was entitled to. The end result was that claimant was paid for this time in advance and the Fund was entitled to treat this claim as if claimant had been paid these Social Security benefits during this period. * * * "
We reverse the Board.
We conclude the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and therefore does not require a determination of legislative intent. State v. Cooney, 36 Or.App. 217, 584 P.2d 329; School Dist. 24J v. Employment Div., 29 Or.App. 897, 565 P.2d 1102 (1977); Speck Restaurant v. OLCC, 24 Or.App. 337, 545 P.2d 601 rev. den., dismissed for want of a federal question 429 U.S. 803, 97 S.Ct. 35, 50 L.Ed.2d 64 (1976). Terms of a statute, unless defined in the statute, are to be construed in accordance with their ordinary meaning. Naumes of Ore. v. Employment Div., 23 Or.App. 57, 541 P.2d 141 (1975); Piazza v. Clackamas Water District, 21 Or.App. 469, 535 P.2d 554 (1975); Clatsop County v. Morgan, 19 Or.App. 173, 526 P.2d 1393 (1974). We hold that the words "actual receipt" means, in the context of this statute, that a person has in fact received social security benefits.
SAIF argues that this claimant did in fact receive the benefits and that therefore SAIF is entitled to an offset accordingly. We conclude, however, that as to this claimant the question is not the interpretation of the language of the statute but whether the statute operates retroactively. Generally, in the absence of any indication to the contrary legislative acts are not to be applied retroactively. Held v. Product Mfg. Co., 286 Or. 67, 592 P.2d 1005 (1979); Joseph v. Lowery, 261 Or. 545, 495 P.2d 273 (1972). We find no indication that this statute is to be applied retroactively.
In the case of injuries incurred prior to the effective date of the Act, October 4, 1977, the change in the way benefits were to be paid was effective July 1, 1978. Claimant's injuries were incurred prior to the effective date; therefore July 1, 1978 is the date the provisions of the Act are effective as to him. Claimant received overpayments from social security before the effective date of the statute allowing an offset....
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