Fletcher v. Wainwright

• Decision Date: 06 September 1968
• Docket Number: 25406.,No. 25405,25405
• Citation: 399 F.2d 62
• Parties: Larry FLETCHER, Appellant, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Florida, Appellee, James FLETCHER, Appellant, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

399 F.2d 62 (1968)

Larry FLETCHER, Appellant, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Florida, Appellee, James FLETCHER, Appellant, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. 25405, 25406.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

August 2, 1968.

Rehearing Denied September 6, 1968.

Larry Fletcher, pro se.

James Fletcher, pro se.

Arden M. Siegendorf, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, Fla., for appellee.

Before GEWIN and THORNBERRY, Circuit Judges, and EDENFIELD, District Judge.

THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge:

These are consolidated appeals by two brothers, Florida state prisoners, from the denial of their petitions for habeas corpus. They were convicted by a jury of breaking and entering a building to commit grand larceny and grand larceny. Direct appeal and subsequent post-conviction efforts in state courts proved unsuccessful.

Though the district court passed on the constitutional errors alleged by appellants, it also ruled that James Fletcher was not entitled to habeas relief because a detainer was outstanding against him relative to convictions in Illinois. The district court stated in its order, appellant urges in his brief, and the State does not deny that James Fletcher is presently serving his Florida sentence in Florida prison; yet the court held there was no right to habeas relief because even if he were successful in Florida he would not be released from confinement but would be returned to state prison in Illinois. The effect of foreclosing a habeas attack on the Florida sentence while it is being served is to foreclose such an attack altogether. This was not the meaning of McNally v. Hill, 1934, 293 U.S. 131, 55 S.Ct. 24, 79 L.Ed. 238.¹

As indicated by the Supreme Court's opinion in Walker v. Wainwright, 1968, 390 U.S. 335, 88 S.Ct. 962, 19 L.Ed.2d 1215; McNally v. Hill meant only that a prisoner could not employ federal habeas corpus to attack a sentence which he had not begun to serve. In Walker the district court did not allow the prisoner to attack a life sentence he was presently serving because even if successful he would not have been released but would have begun to serve a five-year sentence. The language used by the Court to explain that habeas was indeed available is controlling here:

Whatever its other functions the great and central office of the writ of habeas corpus is to test the legality of a prisoner\'s current detention. The petitioner is now serving a life sentence imposed pursuant to a conviction for murder. If, as he contends, that conviction was obtained in violation of the Constitution, then his confinement is unlawful. It is immaterial that another prison term might still await him even if he should successfully establish the unconstitutionality of his present imprisonment.

It being clear that both Fletchers are entitled to habeas relief if their constitutional arguments prevail, we proceed to their primary contention, which is that certain pieces of jewelry obtained as a result of an unlawful entry into James Fletcher's motel room should not have been admitted in evidence at the trial. The relevant facts are that on November 27, 1962 a Miami police officer began cruising in search of a red 1963 Chevrolet reportedly involved in a window-smashing incident at the Fontainebleau Hotel. He spotted such a car at a motel and was observing it when the doorman at the Fontainebleau who had reported the incident arrived and said he did not believe the car under observation was the one involved in the window smashing. Nevertheless, the officer who first spotted the car and a second officer together with the doorman went to the room believed to be occupied by the owner of the automobile. The officers' conceded purpose in going to the room was to interview the occupants about the car in the parking lot. They had neither arrest warrant, search warrant nor probable cause to arrest — they did not intend to make an arrest.

When the first officer knocked on the door and identified himself, one of the occupants replied, "Just a minute." The officer then heard what sounded like a suitcase opening or closing. He knocked again and again received the answer, "Just a minute, Officer." A third knock having produced no response, he began kicking the door down. By this time, the second policeman had gone to the rear of the hotel. When the one at the door finally got in the room, appellants had escaped through a window. They were apprehended shortly and jewelry stolen from the Fontainebleau was found on the ground below the window. It had been thrown out the window when the officer began kicking down the door.

Although the facts were obviously insufficient to constitute probable cause to enter the room, the district court held that the state court correctly refused to suppress the admission of the jewelry. This holding was predicated on the belief that there can be no violation of the fourth amendment unless there is an illegal search and seizure within a constitutionally protected area. Since the motel ground was not considered a constitutionally protected area, it was deemed irrelevant that the entry into the room was illegal. The case of Marullo v. United States, 5th Cir. 1964, 328 F.2d 361 was cited in support of this holding. There the authorities found stolen money orders under the suspect's rented cabin. Although they lacked probable cause to search, the Court upheld the seizure.

A private home is quite different from a place of business or from a motel cabin. A home owner or tenant has the exclusive enjoyment of his home, his garage, his barn or other buildings, and also the area under his home. But a

...