Fletcher v. Yates, Civil Action No. 15-206 (ES)
| Decision Date | 15 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 15-206 (ES) |
| Parties | KEITH FLETCHER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SHERRY YATES, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiffs Keith Fletcher, Michael Ridley, Kevin Williams, William Von Bosse, Leon Swift and Robert Dase (collectively "Plaintiffs") are involuntarily civilly committed pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24, et seq., at the Special Treatment Unit ("STU") in Avenel, New Jersey. Plaintiffs seek to bring this civil rights action in forma pauperis. Based on their affidavits of indigence, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' applications to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and orders the Clerk of the Court to file the Complaint. (See D.E. No. 1).
At this time, the Court must review Plaintiffs' Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the Complaint should be dismissed in part with prejudice and in part without prejudice.
Plaintiffs bring this civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants Sherry Yates, Administrator of the STU; Jennifer Velez, Commissioner of the Department of Human Services ("DHS"); Gary Lanigan, Commissioner of the Department of Corrections ("DOC"); and Dr. Merrel Main, Director of the STU (collectively "Defendants"). The following factual allegations are taken from the Complaint, and are accepted for purposes of this screening only. The Court has made no findings as to the veracity of Plaintiffs' allegations.
Plaintiffs allege that on March 11, 2014, Administrator Yates and Dr. Main changed the STU's policy of permitting residents to hang curtains across the doors of their cells. . Prior to the policy change, residents could have curtains "below the food port in their cells." (Id. ¶ 14). The new policy only permits curtains to be used when the resident is changing or when using sanitary facilities within the cell. (Id. ¶ 13). Residents are told that if they want privacy, they can "lock in" their cells. (Id. ¶ 16). If a resident is locked in his cell after breakfast around 6:30 a.m. until 7:30 a.m., his cell will not be opened until after count, 12:30 P.M. four to five hours later. (Id.).
Plaintiffs next allege that, in 2014, Defendant Yates implemented a policy which allows STU officials to "monitor and record" residents' conversations with their families, friends and attorneys without a warrant. (Id. ¶ 22). Plaintiffs also allege that the STU does not have a gymnasium or any indoor recreation, even though every other prison in New Jersey, as well as another sex offender facility (the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center), all have such areas available. (Id. ¶¶ 24-26). Finally, Plaintiffs allege that over thirty cells in the STU lost electrical power in May 2014 and as of November 2014, the power had not yet been restored. (Id. ¶ 35).
Plaintiffs are seeking declaratory judgment and monetary relief. (Id. ¶¶ 41-48).
District courts must review complaints in those civil actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim with respect to prison conditions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1997e. District courts must sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiffs seek to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
According to the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, "a pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim1, the complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant isliable for the misconduct alleged." Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (italics added).
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
As an initial matter, the Court notes that to be liable within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a defendant must be a "person." The Supreme Court held in Will v. Michigan Dep't. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), that a State, a State entity, or an official of a State acting in his or her official capacity is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983. However, state officials and those acting under color of law sued in their individual capacities are considered "persons" for purposes of § 1983 liability. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991). Even so, a plaintiffmust show that an individual official's conduct caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). More particularly, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant was personally involved in the deprivation. See West, 487 U.S. at 48. This is to say that § 1983 liability cannot be premised solely on a theory of respondeat superior. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).
Here, Plaintiffs do not specify as to whether they are bringing their Complaint against Defendants in their official capacities, individual capacities, or both. To the extent Plaintiffs meant to bring the Complaint against Defendants in their official capacities, all four defendants are immune from suit because they are all officials of either the Department of Corrections, the Department of Human Services, or the STU, all of which are considered arms of the State of New Jersey. See Will, 491 U.S. at 70; Endl v. New Jersey, 5 F.Supp.3d 689 (D.N.J. 2014); Lopez v. Harris, No. 10-4023, 2010 WL 3312274, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 19, 2010); Walsh v. Corzine, No. 06-6075, 2008 WL 2277098, at *2 (D.N.J. June 2, 2008). Therefore, Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants in their official capacities are dismissed with prejudice. The Court will now turn to Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants in their individual capacities.
Plaintiffs first argue that Defendants Yates and Main "changed the policy of permitting residents to hang curtains across the doors of their cells." (Compl. at 4). Plaintiffs aver that "the new policy . . . only permits curtains to be used when the resident is changing or when using sanitary facilities within the cell." (Id.) Plaintiffs continue to argue that this policy violates inmates' right to privacy under N.J.A.C. 10:36A-2.3(1), the New Jersey State Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Id. at 12).
First, Sexually Violent Predators ("SVP's") do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy within their cells. See Anderson v. DaCosta, No. 10-5835, 2011 WL 2223713, at *9 (D.N.J. June 1, 2011) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984)); see also Deavers v. Santiago, 243 F. App'x 719, 721 (3d Cir. 2007). Though it has been held that inmates, and by extension SVPs, retain the right to "not be viewed naked by a member of the opposite sex," Johnson v. Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections, 661 F. Supp. 425, 430 (W.D. Pa. 1987), Plaintiffs here concede that the policy at issue allows privacy while changing or using the bathroom. (See Compl. at 4). Indeed, it is true that SVPs do not lose all constitutional protections by reason of their commitment. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982). Nevertheless, an SVP's constitutional rights are limited by the fact of his placement and by balancing their liberty interests against "legitimate government objectives and not tantamount to punishment." Id. at 320 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979)).
Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged any reason that their interest in remaining behind a curtain at all times outweighs the legitimate government interests of "maintaining jail security and effective management...
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