Flinn v. Blakeman
| Citation | 254 Ky. 416 |
| Parties | Flinn et al. v. Blakeman et al. |
| Decision Date | 01 June 1934 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (Kentucky) |
4. Adverse Possession. — One seeking to quiet title to land made out prima facie case by showing paper title and that at beginning of forfeiture proceeding parties listing land and paying taxes thereon for five years had not been in actual adverse possession for five years (Ky. Stats., sec. 4076g).
5. Quieting Title. — One claiming record title from commonwealth and actual possession may maintain action in equity to quiet title against others claiming part of land under junior title (Ky. Stats., sec. 11).
6. Pleading. — In action to quiet title, that plaintiff was owner or in possession of described land where description conflicted with description of smaller tract claimed by defendants held "negative pregnant" which admitted plaintiff's ownership and possession of all land except that claimed by defendants (Ky. Stats., sec. 11; Civil Code of Practice, sec. 126).
7. Pleading. — In action in equity to quiet title, plaintiff's allegations of ownership and actual possession are "material allegations" which must be accepted as true unless specifically traversed (Ky. Stats., sec. 11; Civil Code of Practice, sec. 126).
8. Pleading. — Provision that every material allegation of pleading must be accepted as true unless specifically traversed held mandatory (Civil Code of Practice, sec. 126).
9. Pleading. — Provision that every material allegation of pleading must be accepted as true unless specifically traversed applies to equitable as well as to ordinary actions (Ky. Stats., sec. 11; Civil Code of Practice, sec. 126).
10. Quieting Title. — One in actual possession of any part of body of land to which he has good title possesses the whole of it, and may maintain equity action to quiet title to any part of it (Ky. Stats., sec. 11).
11. Trial. — If adverse claimants to land wish to object to equity action to quiet title, they must move that action be transferred to common-law docket (Civil Code of Practice, sec. 10).
12. Judgment. — Presumption that judgment forfeiting 12,000-acre patent for failure to list it for taxation was valid must prevail, in absence of pleadings in forfeiture proceedings commenced in 1919, as against recital in deed to purchaser of failure to list land for taxation for 1901 to 1919, inclusive, and claim that in 1919 no power of forfeiture existed for failure to list land for that year (Ky. Stats., secs. 4076b-4076k).
13. Judgment. — In suit between grantees and others, judgment that deeds were void for champerty and that land was owned by grantees' adversaries held not binding on grantor in grantor's action against such adversaries to quiet title, though grantor testified in former suit for grantees (Ky. Stats., sec. 213).
14. Quieting Title. — Exact location of land deeded by plaintiff and claimed by adverse claimants in action to quiet title is immaterial where if land is within boundary claimed by adverse claimants deed is void because champertous, and if land is without such boundry adverse claimants have no interest in it.
15. Champerty and Maintenance. — Provision that owner may convey any interest in lands not in adverse possession of another held not to have prevented forfeiture of land for nonpayment of taxes and valid deed to purchaser by court commissioner even if part of land was in adverse possession of intruders (Ky. Stats., secs. 490, 4076b-4076k).
16. Judgment. — Premature entry of order of sale for failure to pay taxes in forfeiture proceedings, of which court had jurisdiction, held "clerical misprision" and erroneous, but immaterial in collateral attack on such judgment (Ky. Stats., secs. 4076e; Civil Code of Practice, sec. 517).
17. Judgment. — Where court has jurisdiction, premature entry of judgment is erroneous, but not void.
18. Judgment. — Where jurisdiction exists, orders or judgments entered in case must be attacked directly and not collaterally.
19. Taxation. — Appraisement and advertisement in forfeiture proceeding for failure to pay taxes held not subject to collateral attack where court had jurisdiction (Ky. Stats., secs. 4076b-4076k).
20. Taxation. — Deed to land in proceedings to forfeit title for nonpayment of taxes in which court had jurisdiction held invulnerable to collateral attack though purchaser had collected data regarding patent for commonwealth's attorney for use in forfeiture proceeding (Ky. Stats., secs. 4076b-4076k).
21. Adverse Possession. — Statute providing no action shall be maintained for recovery of land where claimant relies alone on any patent issued by commonwealth prior to 1820 against person claiming possession unless plaintiff has paid taxes for 20 years preceding bringing of action held unconstitutional (Ky. Stats. sec. 2377).
22. Adverse Possession. — To start running of statute of limitations in his favor, disseizor must have actual, notorious, exclusive, and hostile possession, under claim of ownership, of definite piece of land.
23. Adverse Possession. — Disseizor's title is perfected only after actual, notorious, exclusive, and hostile possession, under claim of ownership, of definite piece of land has continuously existed for 15 years.
24. Adverse Possession. — One claiming title by adverse possession must clearly prove all essential facts.
25. Adverse Possession. — One with good title has constructive possession and need not take notice of subsequent deeds or patents, whether recorded or not, acquired by others from strangers.
26. Adverse Possession. — "Constructive possession" is that constant possession of every part of the land which the law imputes to its true owner.
27. Adverse Possession. — "Disseizors" are settled trespassers on the land of another, because they oust or destroy his possession, and his title also, if such disseizin continuously exists for 15 years.
28. Adverse Possession. — One's adverse possession ceased as to part of land conveyed to another, but grantee and those claiming under him could rely on their own and grantor's adverse possession in contest with owner.
29. Adverse Possession. — In equity action to quiet title, patents to land previously patented by Virginia were void, but conferred color of title if actual possession was taken (Ky. Stats., sec. 11).
30. Adverse Possession. — Disseizor in possession of one tract could not stretch his possession to include another by means of claim of ownerhip without actual possession.
31. Adverse Possession. — Continuous cultivation obviates necessity of inclosure of land by disseizor, but boundary is lost if in any year uninclosed land is not cultivated.
32. Adverse Possession. — Where plots cultivated by disseizor were not definitely shown, they must be regarded as without definite boundary and not on part of land to which disseizor had color of title.
33. Adverse Possession. — Mere claim to some 2,000 to 2,500 acres and cultivation for short periods of plots not definitely located and construction of some houses thereon while in possession of another tract held insufficient to show "adverse possession," particularly for time required by statute.
34. Adverse Possession. — Mere looking after land for purchaser from disseizor by one not living thereon held not "adverse possession."
35. Adverse Possession. — Possession of land through tenant living thereon by parties claiming under disseizor held "adverse," but insufficient as against true owner where it lasted less than 14 years before purchaser under judgment of forfeiture dated December 19, 1919, instituted action to quiet title (Ky. Stats., secs. 2505, 4076g).
36. Taxation. — Where 12,000-acre patent lay in two counties, forfeiture proceeding for failure to list for taxation held properly brought in one of them (Ky. Stats., sec. 4076d).
37. Quieting Title. — Where land lay in two counties, action in equity to quiet title could be brought in either (Ky. Stats., sec. 11).
Appeal from Knox Circuit Court.
MARTIN T. KELLY for appellants.
H.H. OWENS and G.M. MANNING for appellees.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY DRURY, COMMISSIONER.Affirming.
Robert L. Blakeman, by petition, filed March 30, 1929, asked to have his title quieted to 12,000 acres of land, he was accorded that relief and James H. Flinn and Mary F. Stevens have appealed.
Blakeman made the appellees James H. Flinn, Mary F. Stevens, Elisha Vaughn, Granville Delph, and Martha Delph defendants. Granville Delph in his answer disclaimed any interest in the land except that he declared he occupied it as tenant of Flinn and Stevens. Flinn and Stevens filed seven paragraphs of answer. The first is a traverse of the petition, the second is a plea of ownership in themselves of 2,400 acres of land or thereabouts which they described with particularity and to which they asserted title by adverse possession, and by counterclaim sought judgment establishing their title to it. The third paragraph was an attack upon the forfeiture proceedings through which plaintiff derived his title. The fourth paragraph was a denial that the 12,000-acre tract included the tract to which Flinn and Stevens asserted title. The fifth paragraph was a plea of champerty. The sixth paragraph was simply the third paragraph stated in different language, and the seventh paragraph was a defense under section 4076g, Ky. Stats. They asked that the petition be dismissed and that they be declared the owners of the...
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Sanford v. Alabama Power Co.
...back, but they have never pushed him off. To disseise the title holder, they must push him off and keep him off. See Plinn v. Blakeman, 254 Ky. 416, 71 S.W.2d 961. They could have no actual possession until they had a potential possession, and they have never had any potential possession of......