Flinn v. Hartley
| Decision Date | 31 March 1933 |
| Docket Number | 14,845 |
| Parties | FLINN v. HARTLEY |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
From Industrial Board.
Proceeding under Workmen's Compensation Act by Roy E. Flinn employee, opposed by Will H. Hartley, employer. From the award of the Full Industrial Board, the claimant appealed.
Affirmed.
H. N Hipskind, for appellant.
Herman L. McCray, Edward J. Boleman, Burrell Wright, and Jacob S White, for appellee.
This is an appeal from an award of the full Industrial Board of Indiana.
The undisputed facts are that the appellant, Roy E. Flinn, while working for the appellee, Will H. Hartley, suffered personal injuries as the result of an accident occurring in the course of his employment on June 12, 1930; that after the injury the parties entered into an agreement for the payment of compensation by which the appellee was to pay and by which appellant agreed to accept compensation at the rate of $ 16.50 per week during total disability, not exceeding the period fixed by law. This agreement was on the form prescribed by the Industrial Board and was filed with and duly approved by the Board on June 30, 1930. Under this agreement compensation was paid to the appellant until April 28, 1932, at which time the appellant and appellee disagreed as to the extent of the permanent impairment sustained by appellant from his injuries. On May 2, 1932, the appellee filed with the Board an application for a review on the form prescribed by the Board, alleging therein that the appellant's injuries had resulted in a permanent partial impairment. On June 17, 1932, a hearing was held on this application before a single member of the Industrial Board who entered a finding and award that appellant had suffered a 50% impairment of his right arm below the elbow, and awarded the appellant 100 weeks compensation, subject to a credit for the payments made by appellee during the period of appellant's total disability. The appellant filed an application for a review by the full board of said award, and on October 17, 1932, the full board found that as a result of the injuries suffered by appellant he had sustained a 20% permanent impairment as a man and awarded him 100 weeks compensation, with credit to the appellee for payments made during the period of appellant's temporary total disability. It is from this finding and award of the full Industrial Board that appellant has prosecuted this appeal.
The errors relied upon by appellant for reversal are as follows:
The error assigned that the award of the full board is contrary to law is a sufficient assignment of error to present all questions sought to be presented in this appeal. See § 61 Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act, Acts 1929, p. 537.
Section 60 of the compensation act, supra, provides that upon review by the full Industrial Board, said Board "shall review the evidence, or if deemed advisable, hear the parties at issue, their representatives and witnesses. . . ." In interpreting the above quoted provision of the law this court has held that it is a matter within the sound discretion of the Board as to whether, upon the showing made, it will permit the introduction of further evidence, and its action in that regard is not subject to review by this Court unless the record shows an abuse of this discretion. This, we think, is the correct construction to be placed on the law. See Riley v. Hunt et al. (1927), 85 Ind.App. 647, 155 N.E. 523; Bimel Spoke, etc., Company v. Loper (1917), 65 Ind.App. 479, 117 N.E. 527; Consumers Company v. Ceislik (1919), 69 Ind.App. 333, 121 N.E. 832.
We have examined the record in connection with the showing made by the appellant as to the additional evidence sought to be introduced by him before the full board and we are of the opinion that the sound discretion of the board was not abused. The evidence sought to be introduced was cumulative.
The appellant complains next of the finding of the board that the appellant "has...
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