Flint & P.M.R. Co. v. Board of State Auditors

Decision Date20 November 1894
Citation102 Mich. 500,60 N.W. 971
PartiesFLINT & P. M. R. CO. v. BOARD OF STATE AUDITORS.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Petition for a writ of mandamus by the Flint & Pere Marquette Railroad Company against the board of state auditors. Denied.

Wm. L. Webber, for relator.

A. H Ellis, Atty. Gen., for respondent.

MONTGOMERY J.

The state, on relation of the attorney general, commenced suit in chancery against the relator for the recovery of certain lands. On appeal to the supreme court of the state, the railroad company prevailed, and a decree was entered that defendant recover costs of both courts from the state. 51 N.W. 103. This order was made in December, 1893. Before the costs were finally taxed, an appeal was taken to the supreme court of the United States on behalf of the state, which was on March 12, 1894, dismissed, and an order entered that defendant recover costs in that court. 14 S.Ct. 586. Relator filed its bill for costs with the board of state auditors and claimed to recover interest upon the amount of costs awarded in the state court from the date of judgment, and upon the costs of the United States supreme court from the date of the judgment of that court; the total charge for interest being $173.33. The interest charged was disallowed, and mandamus is asked to compel the allowance of this item. Some question is made as to whether, under the statute, the board of state auditors have any duty to perform in connection with the allowance of a claim for costs; but as both parties desire an expression of the court upon the merits, we do not pause to consider this question, except to refer to section 7757, How. Ann. St., to which further reference will be made hereafter.

The important question is whether relator is entitled to interest upon the judgment. It is conceded by counsel, and may be treated as settled by this court in Hayden v Hefferan, 99 Mich. 262, 58 N.W. 59, that in suits between individuals the prevailing party is entitled to interest upon the costs from the date of the judgment or decree. But it is contended by the attorney general that the state is not liable for interest on demands under the general provision of the statute relating to interest, and in this contention he is supported by the uniform current of authority. U.S. v. North Carolina, 136 U.S. 211, 10 S.Ct. 920; U.S. v. Sherman, 98 U.S. 567; State v. Board of Public Works, 36 Ohio St. 409; Western & A. R. Co. v. State, 14 L. R. A. 438. But it is contended by relator that the statutes in this state relating to judgment against the state render the state liable for interest on costs the same as in case of individuals. Section 8984, How. Ann. St., provides that "in all civil suits or proceedings by or in the name of the people of this state, instituted by any officer duly authorized for that purpose, and not brought on the relation, or for the use of any citizen, or upon any penal statute, the people shall be liable for costs in the same cases, and to the same extent, as if such suit or proceeding were instituted by an individual." Section 7756 provides that "every suit or proceeding in a civil cause instituted in the name of the people of this state, by any public officer duly authorized for that purpose, shall be subject to all the provisions of law respecting similar suits or proceedings, when instituted by or in the name of any citizen, except where provision is or shall be otherwise expressly made by statute; and in such suits and proceedings, the people of this state shall be liable to be nonsuited, and to have judgment of...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT