Flint v. City of Belvidere

Decision Date30 June 2015
Docket NumberNo. 14–2568.,14–2568.
Citation791 F.3d 764
PartiesCandis M. FLINT, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. CITY OF BELVIDERE, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

James Joseph MacChitelli, Attorney, Schaumburg, IL, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Garrett L. Boehm, Jr., Attorney, Brian P. Gainer, Attorney, Johnson & Bell, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for DefendantsAppellees.

Before EASTERBROOK and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges, and REAGAN, Chief District Court Judge.*

Opinion

REAGAN, Chief District Judge.

In 2009, unknown assailants (or perhaps just one) shot and killed Marty Flint, who had sporadically provided intelligence to narcotics officers in the City of Belvidere, Illinois, since 2006. Marty's mother, Candis Flint (“Flint” for the purposes of this appeal—we will refer to Marty by first name where necessary), sued the City, the police chief, a sergeant, and Belvidere officers David Dammon and Leon Berry (collectively, Defendants). Flint originally brought both state tort claims and § 1983 claims alleging Defendants violated Marty's substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The constitutional claims boil down to allegations that Marty was targeted and killed in retribution for his actions as a police informant, and that Defendants are liable for failing to protect him.

The state claims fell to a statute of limitations argument, and Defendants moved for summary judgment on the § 1983 claims against Defendants Dammon and Berry (two officers who were Marty's primary contacts in the police department). It is undisputed that, absent a constitutional violation by Dammon and/or Berry, the other Defendants—municipal bodies and supervisors—are not subject to § 1983 liability. See Windle v. City of Marion, 321 F.3d 658, 663 (7th Cir.2003) (individual officers must be liable on underlying substantive claim for municipal liability to attach under either failure to train or failure to implement theory); Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. Cnty. of Madison, Ill., 746 F.3d 766, 779 n. 14 (7th Cir.2014) (no respondeat superior liability under § 1983 ).

The day Defendants moved for summary judgment—and about a month after discovery closed—Flint moved both to reopen discovery and for the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate allegations that Dammon and Berry lied throughout discovery. The magistrate judge denied both motions. Flint failed to appeal the magistrate's decision to the district judge, but did manage to respond to Defendants' summary judgment motion.

Unfortunately for Flint, her response did not comport with Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1, which guides how parties must marshal evidence at the summary judgment stage. Applying that rule, the district court deemed admitted most of Defendants' factual assertions, ignored additional facts raised in Flint's response briefing, and granted summary judgment against her.

Flint now appeals both the magistrate's discovery rulings and the district court's grant of summary judgment. We affirm. The magistrate acted within his discretion to deny Flint's tardy motions (issues Flint has forfeited anyhow), and Flint's procedural gaffe in not following Local Rule 56.1 left an evidentiary record insufficient to survive summary judgment.

I. Background

Flint's failure to follow the local rules circumscribes our review of the facts. In the Northern District of Illinois, Local Rule 56.1 controls the presentation of evidence at the summary judgment stage. See Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir.2014). In opposition to a movant's statement of material facts (itself organized into “short numbered paragraphs” and including specific cites to the record, N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(a)(3) ), the non-movant must file a concise response containing (A) correspondingly numbered paragraphs summarizing the movant's position, (B) responses to each paragraph containing “specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon,” and (C) a statement of any additional facts that require denial of summary judgment. N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(A)-(C).

This Court has consistently upheld district judges' discretion to require strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1. Petty, 754 F.3d at 420 ; Benuzzi v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 647 F.3d 652, 654–55 (7th Cir.2011) ; Koszola v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 385 F.3d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir.2004) ; Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 297 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir.2002). The district court exercised that discretion here, deeming admitted forty-two of the forty-seven enumerated paragraphs in Defendants' Rule 56.1(a) statement. Further, since Flint failed to provide a separate statement of facts, the district court declined to consider additional facts raised in her response brief.

Flint challenges neither the district court's decision to apply Local Rule 56.1 nor its synopsis of the facts she managed to properly present. Rather, she posits that the facts that survived the Rule 56.1 purge should have sufficed to stave off summary judgment. The typical incantation—that at summary judgment all facts are construed and all inferences drawn in the light most favorable to the non-movant, Rosenbaum v. White, 692 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir.2012) —must therefore be applied in light of Flint's procedural failings. Here we consider, still in the light most favorable to Flint, only the facts (and inferences drawn from them) presented in accordance with Local Rule 56.1.

So the material facts this Court can consider are these, and these alone. Marty Flint, who had been affiliated with the Gangster Disciples street gang, was known by Belvidere police to have been involved in various gang and drug activity. In April 2006, acting on intelligence from two informants, Defendants Dammon and Berry (both narcotics officers in the Belvidere Police Department) arrested Marty and his wife Sarah. The state charged Marty with felony possession of cannabis with intent to deliver.

Marty his wife, and his mother signed agreements to become cooperating witnesses in an effort to reduce Marty's charges. (It appears Marty's mother cooperated simply to assist her son and daughter-in-law. The record does not indicate she was ever a criminal defendant.) By protocol, each cooperating witness is informed he or she may have to participate in drug buys, wear a wire, provide witness statements, and possibly be called to testify. In fulfilling their part of the agreement, the Flints phoned various drug dealers, arranged controlled buys, and wore wires during those buys. Recordings from the wires were transcribed, turned over to the state's attorney, and produced in discovery to the drug dealers' attorneys, who presumably shared the Flints' identities with their clients. In 2006 and 2007, Marty helped officers gather evidence regarding several individuals and, soon after, Marty and his wife were threatened by someone named Rosendo Moreira. Defendants arrested Moreira, who was charged with harassing a witness, unlawful communication with a witness, and reckless conduct.

In 2009, Marty was arrested again. He was fully aware his name had been disclosed as an informant to criminal defendants regarding the earlier cases. He was now a known “snitch,” and did not want to spend time in prison. So he approached Defendant Dammon and signed another cooperating agreement to gather evidence for the Belvidere Police. Marty completed his last controlled buy in August 2009.

In November 2009, while sitting inside his parked vehicle in Rockford, Illinois, Marty Flint was shot and killed. Neither Rockford police nor Defendants have any knowledge of who shot Marty or why. Rockford police have declared the murder a “cold case.”

II. Discussion

Flint challenges both the district court's summary judgment ruling and the magistrate's decision not to reopen discovery or appoint a special prosecutor. So that there is no concern that more (or different) evidence should have informed the summary judgment calculus, we turn first to the magistrate judge's denial of Flint's discovery motions.

A. Magistrate's Rulings

A month after discovery closed, Flint—alleging that Dammon and Berry lied throughout discovery—moved for an extension of the discovery deadline and the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate those allegations. The magistrate judge did not err in denying the motions.

A decision to deny reopening discovery is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Winters v. Fru–Con, Inc., 498 F.3d 734, 743 (7th Cir.2007). That discretion is considerable: case management depends on enforceable deadlines, and discovery “must have an end point.” Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880, 886 (7th Cir.2011). See also Lock Realty Corp. IX v. U.S. Health, LP, 707 F.3d 764, 772 (7th Cir.2013). In managing their caseloads, district courts are entitled to—“indeed they must—enforce deadlines.” Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 605 (7th Cir.2006) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Only if a party has failed to act “because of excusable neglect” do the Federal Rules permit a post-deadline extension. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(1)(B) ; Brosted v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 421 F.3d 459, 463–64 (7th Cir.2005). The reasons for the delay—including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant—must be considered. Raymond, 442 F.3d at 606 (quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) ). Neglect is generally not excusable when a party should have acted before the deadline, see Murphy v. Eddie Murphy Prods., Inc., 611 F.3d 322, 324 (7th Cir.2010), or when a party's lack of diligence is to blame for its failure to secure discoverable information, see Grayson v. O'Neill, 308 F.3d 808, 816 (7th Cir.2002).

Here, Flint claims Defendants Dammon and Berry engaged in discovery gamesmanship but cedes she knew they would resort to those dilatory tactics (including lying) as early as the...

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