Flood v. New Hanover County, 97-1099

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
• Citation: 125 F.3d 249
• Docket Number: No. 97-1099,97-1099
• Parties: 134 Lab.Cas. P 33,594, 4 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 139 Julia FLOOD; Drake Fox; Robert Howlett; Katherine Johnson; Karen Keroack; Anthony Martin; James McLean; John McMillian; David Miller; Lora Miller; Michael Nave; Powell Phillips; Bobby Pierce; Jack Poplin; David Pritchard; Robert Pugh; John Sciales; Brian Simonson; Pamela Stewart; Ronald Wahab; Stanley G. Wardrip, Jr.; Sheila Youngblood, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and Russell Ashley, Plaintiff, v. NEW HANOVER COUNTY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Decision Date: 22 September 1997

Page 249

125 F.3d 249 134 Lab.Cas. P 33,594, 4 Wage & Hour Cas.2d
(BNA) 139 Julia FLOOD; Drake Fox; Robert Howlett; Katherine
Johnson; Karen Keroack; Anthony Martin; James McLean;
John McMillian; David Miller; Lora Miller; Michael Nave;
Powell Phillips; Bobby Pierce; Jack Poplin; David
Pritchard; Robert Pugh; John Sciales; Brian Simonson;
Pamela Stewart; Ronald Wahab; Stanley G. Wardrip, Jr.;
Sheila Youngblood, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and
Russell Ashley, Plaintiff,
v.
NEW HANOVER COUNTY, Defendant-Appellee. No. 97-1099. United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit. Argued July 15, 1997.
Decided Sept. 22, 1997.

Page 250

ARGUED: Gary Keith Shipman, Shipman & Associates, L.L.P., Wilmington, NC, for Appellants. Andrew William Olsen, Assistant County Attorney, Office of the County Attorney, Wilmington, NC, for Appellee.

Before MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge, and BUTZNER and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge MURNAGHAN wrote the opinion, in which Senior Judge BUTZNER and Senior Judge PHILLIPS joined.

OPINION

MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs-Appellants, a group of present or former full-time emergency medical service ("EMS") personnel (collectively, the "Plaintiffs"), filed suit against their employer, Defendant-Appellee New Hanover County, North Carolina (the "County") for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 210-19 (West 1965, 1985 & Supp.1997). The district court dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the district court's judgment.

I.

The Plaintiffs all work a nine-day regularly recurring cycle of 24.15 hours on-duty, 24 hours off-duty, 24.15 hours on-duty, 24 hours off-duty, 24.15 hours on-duty, followed by 96 consecutive hours offduty. Although their work schedule never changes, they work a different number of total hours each week depending upon the number of scheduled work days that fall within the week. Thus, their workweek ranges between 48.3 hours, 56.3 hours, 64.45 hours, and 72.45 hours, and their amount of overtime consequently ranges between 8.3 hours, 16.3 hours, 24.45 hours, and 32.45 hours. The County also requires the Plaintiffs to attend regularly scheduled shift meetings and continuing education seminars to maintain their EMS certifications. The County compensates the Plaintiffs for the time that they spend at the meetings and seminars, and it adds the hours

Page 251

attributable to the meetings and seminars to the Plaintiffs' regularly scheduled hours for that week.

At all relevant times, the County has compensated the Plaintiffs pursuant to a "fluctuating workweek" payment method. That method allows employers to compensate employees at a one-half time rate for overtime hours, rather than the standard one and one-half time rate, if the employment meets certain requirements. See 29 C.F.R. § 778.114 (1996). The County gave each of its employees a memorandum that clearly explained the fluctuating workweek payment method and that provided examples of how the County would calculate employees' salaries pursuant to that method. The County required each employee to sign the memorandum under a printed statement that reads, "The Fluctuating Work Week 29 C.F.R. § 778.114 of the Fair Labor Standards Act has been explained to me and I have had the opportunity to have any questions answered."

On August 5, 1996, the Plaintiffs filed suit against the County. They claimed that the County's compensation plan did not meet the requirements of the fluctuating workweek payment method. They sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, backpay for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, and attorney's fees. The County subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' suit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The district court granted the County's motion to dismiss on the ground that the County's compensation plan satisfied all of the requirements of the fluctuating workweek payment method.

II.

We review the district court's decision to grant the motion to dismiss de novo. See Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, North Carolina, 85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir.1996). We must accept the factual allegations in the Plaintiffs' complaint and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs. See Estate Constr. Co. v. Miller & Smith Holding Co., 14 F.3d 213, 217-18 (4th Cir.1994). We may affirm the district court's dismissal only if it appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim that would entitle them to relief. See Rogers v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 324, 325 (4th Cir.1989).

III.

As a general rule, the FLSA provides that an employer may not employ an employee for a workweek longer than forty hours unless it pays its employee one and one-half times the employee's "regular rate" for all hours in excess of forty. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(a)(1); Monahan v. County of Chesterfield, Virginia, 95 F.3d 1263, 1267 (4th Cir.1996). The employee's "regular rate" is the hourly rate that the employer pays the employee for the normal, nonovertime forty-hour workweek....