Flora v. State
| Decision Date | 19 January 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 2004-KA-00634-SCT.,2004-KA-00634-SCT. |
| Parties | Milton FLORA, Jr. a/k/a Milton Hayes v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Virginia Lynn Watkins, Thomas M. Fortner, Jackson, for appellant.
Office of the Attorney General, by Jeffrey A. Klingfuss, Jackson, for appellee.
EN BANC.
¶ 1. This is an appeal by Milton Flora, Jr., from the Hinds County Circuit Court where he was convicted of murder under the provisions of Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19 and sentenced to life in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections.
¶ 2. Around midnight on September 10, 2001, Flora and his cousin, Roger Johnson, went to the apartment of Flora's former girlfriend, Subrenda Levy. There was contradictory evidence as to whether Flora knocked on the door or whether the door was kicked in by either Flora or Johnson, and as to which one was actually carrying a gun. Once the door was opened, Flora and Johnson were met by Ray Spann and an altercation followed between Flora and Spann in which shots were fired. Following the confrontation, Spann left the apartment and was soon found dead in a nearby vacant lot. An autopsy revealed the cause of Spann's death was a gunshot wound from a .32 caliber pistol.
¶ 3. Flora and Johnson left Levy's apartment and were later found by police in the apartment of Johnson's mother, Sebrina Johnson. Upon arriving at Sebrina Johnson's apartment, the police awakened Flora, who was asleep on a sofa, wearing blood stained clothing. When told to stand up, he did so, and the police recovered two weapons from where he had been sleeping: the .32 caliber pistol later identified as the murder weapon, and a .380 caliber pistol. At that point, the officers asked Flora his name without first informing him of his Miranda rights. He gave the officers a false name and was subsequently arrested. A gunshot residue test revealed that Flora had residue on both of his hands and DNA test results showed that the blood on his clothing was that of Spann.
¶ 4. Flora testified in his own defense. Aggrieved by his conviction and sentence, he now appeals, raising nine issues: 1) denial of motions for mistrial; 2) denial of requests for handwriting exemplars and for authentication of exculpatory documents by the Mississippi crime lab; 3) exclusion of the handwritten statement of a co-defendant; 4) overruling of repeated objections to prosecutorial misconduct; 5) denial of introduction of a weapon other than the murder weapon; 6) speedy trial violations; 7) denial of names of arresting officers and criminal histories of the victim and witnesses; 8) denial of questions regarding a blood test of the victim; and 9) denial of motions for directed verdict, peremptory instruction, and J.N.O.V. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
¶ 5. The standard of review for the denial of a mistrial is abuse of discretion. Spann v. State, 771 So.2d 883, 889 (Miss.2000). This Court has held that a trial judge is best suited to determine the prejudicial effect of an objectionable remark and is given considerable discretion in deciding whether the remark is so prejudicial as to merit a mistrial. Roundtree v. State, 568 So.2d 1173, 1177 (Miss.1990). Unless "serious and irreparable damage" results from an improper comment, the judge should "admonish the jury then and there to disregard the improper comment." Johnson v. State, 477 So.2d 196, 210 (Miss.1985). While deference is given to the decisions of trial judges, each case must stand on its own facts in order to determine whether a particular decision constitutes reversible error. Henderson v. State, 403 So.2d 139, 140 (Miss.1981).
¶ 6. During the direct examination of Officer Dexter McLaurin, the State questioned him about a conversation he had with Subrenda Levy, who was an eyewitness to the events. Flora objected to the question, "did you ask her to identify the shooter?" The trial court initially overruled that objection, and, when the State re-asked the question, Officer McLaurin stated: Flora again objected to this statement on the basis of hearsay, and moved for a mistrial. The trial court sustained the objection; instructed the jury to disregard the statement; and denied the motion for a mistrial.
¶ 7. Flora correctly argues that the statement in question was hearsay, but the issue to be addressed here is whether the trial court should have granted Flora's motion for a mistrial based on the jury hearing the improper comment. Flora maintains this Court's holding in Snelson v. State, 704 So.2d 452 (Miss.1997), should apply in this case. In Snelson, prosecutors elicited testimony in violation of a motion in limine, to show that the defendant had told the testifying witness the victim was the "third or fourth" person he had killed. The defense objected and moved for a mistrial; the trial court sustained the objection, denied the motion for mistrial, and instructed the jury to disregard the statement. Snelson was convicted and sentenced to death. On appeal, this Court reversed, finding the trial court's admonition to the jury was insufficient, and such improper testimony could "inflame or improperly influence the jury" and the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial. Id. at 458.
¶ 8. However, Snelson is clearly distinguishable because it involved improper evidence which informed the jury that the defendant may have committed as many as three other murders — violent crimes similar to the one for which he was on trial. This testimony in Snelson was no doubt highly prejudicial to his case.
¶ 9. While the statement made by Officer McLaurin was improper, it certainly did not rise to the level of resulting prejudice as did the statement made in Snelson. Quite simply, the comparison of the Snelson statement to the statement in question in the present case is inapposite. The Snelson statement was highly prejudicial, and, in reality, could not be disregarded by a reasonable jury.
¶ 10. When a trial judge sustains an objection to testimony and directs the jury to disregard the statement, "it is presumed, unless otherwise shown, that the jury followed the directions of the trial judge to disregard such comment or testimony." Holifield v. State, 275 So.2d 851, 856 (Miss.1973) (emphasis added). Flora failed to show the improper testimony was not disregarded or could not have been disregarded by the jury. The statement of Subrenda Levy to Officer McLaurin was far from being the only piece of evidence linking Flora to the murder scene, the victim and the murder weapon. After McLaurin's testimony, the statement was not mentioned again. Proper action was taken in sustaining Flora's objection and instructing the jury to disregard the statement. We must presume the jury followed the directions of the trial judge. The denial of Flora's motion for mistrial was not an abuse of discretion.
¶ 11. The standard of review of the trial court's denial of expert assistance is whether an abuse of discretion occurred such that the defendant was denied due process whereby the trial was fundamentally unfair. Richardson v. State, 767 So.2d 195, 197 (Miss.2000) (citing Coleman v. State, 697 So.2d 777, 780 (Miss.1997)). "The State does not have a constitutional obligation to provide indigent defendants with the costs of expert assistance upon every demand." Townsend v. State, 847 So.2d 825, 829 (Miss.2003) (citing Johnson v. State, 476 So.2d 1195, 1202 (Miss.1985)). "Mississippi case law states expert assistance should be granted upon showing of substantial need." King v. State, 784 So.2d 884, 888, (Miss.2001) (citing Holland v. State, 705 So.2d 307, 333 (Miss.1997)).
¶ 12. Flora requested the trial court to order Roger Johnson (Flora's cousin and co-defendant) and Derrick Jones to submit to handwriting exemplars, in order to authenticate two statements allegedly written by Johnson and Jones. These statements suggested Johnson was the person who actually shot Ray Spann, and thus could be exculpatory evidence for Flora. The State opposed the motion, arguing that the statements were neither signed nor dated, that forcing a co-defendant to submit to a handwriting exemplar would violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and that they were blatant hearsay. The trial court denied the motion, but Flora renewed it at a subsequent hearing. The trial court again denied Flora's motion and allowed the statements to be marked for identification purposes only.
¶ 13. Rule 901 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence governs the authentication of documents in Mississippi trial courts. Flora sought to have the exemplars and the statements in question authenticated by an expert witness under Rule 901(b)(3), which provides that a document may be authenticated by "comparison by the trier of fact or by expert witness with specimens which have been authenticated." M.R.E. 901(b)(3). While this is an acceptable form of authentication, it is certainly not the only form.
¶ 14. A handwritten document may be authenticated by someone who is familiar with the handwriting of the purported writer of the document. M.R.E. 901(b)(2). This rule of evidence is well-established in Mississippi case law. "A witness who in the course of official business or in any other way has acquired by experience a knowledge of a person's handwriting, may state his opinion as to whether a particular writing was made by such person." Wiggins v. State, 224 Miss. 414, 80 So.2d 17, 19 (1955). In Wiggins, a criminal d...
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