Florek v. Vill. of Mundelein

• Decision Date: 16 August 2011
• Docket Number: No. 10–3696.,10–3696.
• Citation: 649 F.3d 594
• Parties: Linda FLOREK, Plaintiff–Appellant,v.VILLAGE OF MUNDELEIN, ILLINOIS, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

649 F.3d 594

Linda FLOREK, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.VILLAGE OF MUNDELEIN, ILLINOIS, et al., Defendants–Appellees.

No. 10–3696.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued June 1, 2011.Decided Aug. 16, 2011.

James J. DeSanto (argued), Attorney, DeSanto & Morgan, Libertyville, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.Mark F. Smolens (argued), Attorney, Inverness, IL, for Defendants–Appellees.Before FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and CONLEY, District Judge. ^*FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

When police searched her apartment and placed her under arrest during a drug raid, Linda Florek suffered a heart attack. She subsequently filed suit in federal court, naming as defendants the Village of Mundelein and several of its police officers. Donovan Hansen is the only such officer who remains in the case on appeal. Florek contends that police unreasonably seized her within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment by denying a request she made for baby aspirin and refusing to call an ambulance for her. She also maintains that police violated the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches by not giving her sufficient time to answer the door when they knocked and announced their presence prior to entering her apartment. (After waiting 15 seconds, police used a battering ram to gain entry.) On appeal, Florek contests the summary judgment ruling that eliminated one of her claims, the directed verdict ruling that eliminated the Village from the case, and the in limine ruling that barred one of her experts. We affirm.

I. Background

In the fall of 2004, Village of Mundelein police officers using a confidential informant made two controlled buys of marijuana at or in front of an apartment located at 543 North Lake Street, in Mundelein. The apartment was the residence of Linda Florek. Her son resided there, too, and the person dealing drugs appears to have been one of the son's friends. Based on the controlled buys, police obtained a search warrant for the apartment. In the late evening hours of December 7, 2004, several officers, led by then-Sergeant Donovan Hansen, set out to execute the warrant.

That night, Florek arrived home from work shortly after 10:00 p.m. and settled in for the evening. She changed into a T- shirt, retired to the living room, and lit a marijuana cigarette. The last component of her evening's activities was unfortunately timed, as illegality literally lingered in the air when police executed their search at 10:22 p.m. According to the defendants, the search commenced when one of the officers knocked on the door to Florek's apartment and announced their presence, stating, “Police department, search warrant.” The officers then waited approximately 15 seconds before breaching the door with a battering ram. Florek disputes the contention that officers announced their presence; all she heard were at least four impacts on her door before officers entered the premises.

As officers entered the apartment, Florek was standing in the middle of the living room. She was ordered to the ground and handcuffed. The apartment was redolent of marijuana and, when asked about the odor, Florek admitted that she threw a pouch of the substance behind the couch as the officers had arrived. She explained that a physician had previously advised her that she should smoke marijuana to reduce her blood pressure. Regardless of the statement's truth value, it only bolstered the probable cause police had to arrest her. See also Russell v. Harms, 397 F.3d 458, 466 (7th Cir.2005) (distinguishing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), and holding that police executing a lawful search warrant may arrest a person inside the home, so long as the arrest is founded on probable cause). During the search, which lasted over an hour, Florek remained handcuffed and was not allowed to change clothing. Florek's son was similarly restrained and brought into the living room. The son was admonished by his mother for inviting law enforcement attention by associating with a drug dealer.

Below (as on appeal), the chief dispute between the parties centered around whether police officers were unreasonable in responding to Florek's medical needs. Everyone agrees that early on during the execution of the search warrant Florek asked if she could take some baby aspirin. She made the request because roughly two years earlier she had suffered a heart attack. The paramedics who responded at that time had (among other things) given her four baby aspirins. According to Florek, the request for baby aspirin was denied outright. She then told officers that she wanted an ambulance because she was experiencing chest pains and having a heart attack. In response, she was told that an ambulance would be called if she still needed one after arriving at the police station.

The defendants tell it differently. According to Hansen, Florek did indeed ask for baby aspirin. He denied the request, following the Village police department's general orders which require physicians to administer medication. The relevant order also direct officers to summon paramedics in the event of an emergency. Hansen says he complied with the order, telling Florek in response to her request for aspirin that he would call for paramedics if she needed medical assistance. At that point, Florek responded, “This is bullshit,” but did not request an ambulance or let officers know she was having chest pains. Hansen also says that Florek did not appear to be under any more distress than would have been expected under the circumstances. And although she complained of shortness of breath at one point, the problem was resolved when she complied with Hansen's admonition that she slow down her breathing.

The search was completed shortly after 11:30 p.m. At around that time, Florek was allowed to get dressed, and she and her son were transported to the Village's police station. The transport vehicle was a Chevy cargo van equipped with interior partitions to separate prisoners. While being placed in the van, Florek says she pleaded, “Please don't put me in that cage. I am having a heart attack. I am claustrophobic.” The defendants concede only that Florek protested the officers' choice of vehicle, telling her that she would be transported in the vehicle despite her displeasure. The defendants say that it was only after being placed in the van that Florek informed officers of her chest pains. One of the police officers, who was also a paramedic, spoke with Florek while she was in the van. The officer relayed what he learned to Hansen, the vehicle's driver. Hansen immediately radioed to have an ambulance meet them at the station. The rendezvous occurred within minutes.

The night's conclusion is subject to no real dispute. The paramedics treated Florek. Then, after administering baby aspirin and nitroglycerine and running an intravenous line, the paramedics took her to the hospital. Hansen learned shortly thereafter that Florek had suffered a heart attack. He dispatched two officers to the hospital to complete Florek's processing, which consisted of fingerprinting and the posting of a recognizance bond. (Hansen directed the officers to consult with Florek's treating physician to learn if there was a medical reason not to finish the processing.) Florek was charged with possessing less than 2.5 grams of marijuana. She received supervision and paid a fine.

In November 2005, Florek filed suit in federal court. The case was referred to a magistrate judge for all purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The Village, Hansen, and several police officers were named as defendants, but Hansen is the only officer who remains. Just as the appeal has brought into focus which parties are critical in the case, it has winnowed the once-numerous claims. The ones that matter for our purposes are Florek's claims that (1) Hansen and the Village unreasonably seized her by denying her request for baby aspirin; (2) Hansen unreasonably seized her by refusing to call an ambulance when she first complained of chest pains; and (3) Hansen effected an unreasonable search when the officers he led failed properly to knock and announce their presence and did not wait a reasonable time before entering the apartment.

Hansen and the Village moved for summary judgment. The magistrate judge denied summary judgment on Florek's claim that Hansen unreasonably searched her apartment because of his team's alleged failure to properly knock and announce its presence. The magistrate judge noted that there were simply disputed facts about whether police knocked, announced, and then waited a reasonable time before entering. As to Florek's claims that the defendants unreasonably seized her by not responding reasonably to her medical needs, the magistrate judge considered the claims separately. On the aspirin-based claim, the magistrate judge granted summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, reasoning that there was no clearly established right to over-the-counter drugs during an arrest. Granting judgment to the Village on that basis was not appropriate, see Owen v. City of Independence, Missouri, 445 U.S. 622, 638, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) (holding that a “municipality may not assert the good faith of its officers or agents as a defense to liability under § 1983”), but Florek has not raised the error. (And we shall see that the error was harmless, because there was no constitutional violation.) In any event, the magistrate judge denied summary judgment on the ambulance-based claim. That claim proceeded to trial, along with the knock-and-announce claim.

After the close of Florek's case, the magistrate judge granted the Village's motion for a directed verdict, reasoning that Florek had not offered evidence sufficient to impute liability to the Village under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). The jury considered only the two...