Florence v. Carr
Decision Date | 30 March 1933 |
Docket Number | 6 Div. 273. |
Citation | 148 So. 148,226 Ala. 654 |
Parties | FLORENCE et al. v. CARR et al. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied May 25, 1933.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; Joe C. Hail, Judge.
Action of ejectment by Virgel Obey Florence and Eunace Mae Florence suing by their next friend, J. L. Ramsey, against W. W. Carr Sallie Caldwell, Signal Land & Investment Company, and Effie Florence. From a judgment granting defendants' (other than Effie Florence) motion for a new trial, plaintiffs appeal.
Affirmed.
Roy McCullough, of Birmingham, for appellants.
Smyer Smyer & Bainbridge, of Birmingham, for appellees.
The assignment of errors presents the action of the trial court in setting aside the verdict of the jury and granting the defendants a new trial.
The important question of fact was whether Mrs. Caldwell was chargeable with constructive notice, at the time of making a loan secured by a mortgage on the property in question, of an unrecorded deed to said property held by appellants.
There are certain questions of law and fact that enter into a determination of the foregoing question: (1) The authorities are collected in Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v Gunn, 221 Ala. 654, 130 So. 180, to the effect that knowledge acquired by an agent prior to the commencement of his agency does not constitute notice to such subsequent principal. In Gunn v. Palatine Ins. Co., 217 Ala. 89, 114 So. 690, there was one phase passed upon which is here material. In Marx & Co. v. Bankers' Credit Life Ins. Co., 224 Ala. 249, 258, 139 So. 421, the recent authorities are collected, and it was there held that the managing officer of the collecting bank was not chargeable with knowledge of all details of a bank transaction, such as the presentation of a check; that the drawer's treasurer signing the check as the drawer's managing officer acquired knowledge of the method of presentment, and gave such information as "rebuttable presumption." Lawrence v. Tennessee Valley Bank, 224 Ala. 692, 695, 141 So. 664; Traders' Insurance Co. v. Letcher,
143 Ala. 400, 39 So. 271; Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Joseph, 125 Ala. 313, 28 So. 35; Home Insurance Co. of N.Y. v. W. C. Scharnagel (Ala. Sup.) 148 So. 596. (2) The facts of which the agent has notice must be within the scope of the agency, so that it becomes his duty to act upon them or to communicate to his principal. Lawrence v. Tennessee Valley Bank, supra; Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Gunn, supra; Cooper & Sons Motor Co. v. Klepsig, 223 Ala. 2, 135 So. 430; Hall & Brown Woodworking Mach. Co. v. Haley Furniture & Mfg. Co., 174 Ala. 190, 56 So. 726, L. R. A. 1918B, 924; Robertson Banking Co. v. Brasfield, 202 Ala. 167, 79 So. 651; McCormick & Richardson v. Joseph & Anderson, 83 Ala. 401, 3 So. 796; Wiggins v. Stewart Bros., 215 Ala. 9, 109 So. 101; Alabama West. R. R. Co. v. Bush, 182 Ala. 113, 62 So. 89; Mundine v. Pitts' Adm'r, 14 Ala. 84; Pepper & Co. v. George, 51 Ala. 190; Scotch Lumber Co. v. Sage, 132 Ala. 598, 32 So. 607, 90 Am. St. Rep. 932; 2 C.J. p. 867, (3). (3) Where an agent occupies a dual relation, notice acquired by him in such other agency is not binding on the principal-this is sound in principle and necessary to a right conduct of the agency and fidelity to the respective principals. Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Gunn, 221 Ala. 654, 661, 130 So. 180; Morris v. First National Bank of Samson, 162 Ala. 301, 50 So. 137; Wiggins v. Stewart Bros., 215 Ala. 9, 109 So. 101; Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Joseph, 125 Ala. 313, 28 So. 35; Florence, Trustee, etc., v. De Beaumont, 101 Wash. 356, 172 P. 340, 4 A. L. R. 1565, 1568, 1608, and authorities. (4) The reason for these rules and exceptions thereto are stated in Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 23 Ala. App. 561, 563, 129 So. 300, 301, as follows:
The issue is whether Mrs. Caldwell had constructive notice of appellants' unrecorded deed of date of 1921, at the time the mortgage was made on May 12, 1927, or at the time of the extension of the mortgage on May 12, 1930, to May 12, 1933. The deed was filed for record on March 11, 1931.
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Home Indem. Co. of N.Y. v. State Bank of Fort Dodge, 45977.
...the check was made to a fictitious payee. Robertson Banking Co. v. Brasfield, 202 Ala. 167, 79 So. 651;Florence et al. v. Carr et al., 226 Ala. 654, 148 So. 148; 99 A.L.R. 440, 442 notes.” Appellee also argues that since the payees were not entitled to the money directed to be paid them as ......
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