Flores Camilo v. Alvarez Ramirez, No. CIV. 01-2715(JP).

• Decision Date: 21 May 2003
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 01-2715(JP).
• Citation: 283 F.Supp.2d 440
• Parties: Jose FLORES CAMILO, et al., Plaintiffs v. Julio ALVAREZ RAMIREZ, in his personal and official capacities as Administrator of the Thoroughbred Horse Racing Administration, et al., Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

283 F.Supp.2d 440

Jose FLORES CAMILO, et al., Plaintiffs v. Julio ALVAREZ RAMIREZ, in his personal and official capacities as Administrator of the Thoroughbred Horse Racing Administration, et al., Defendants

No. CIV. 01-2715(JP).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

May 21, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Francisco R. González Colón, Esq., San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Zuleika Llovet Zurinaga, Esq., Ivonne Palerm-Cruz, Esq., Commonwealth Department of Justice, Federal Litigation Division, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

PIERAS, Senior District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Court has before it Defendant Julio Alvarez's Motion for Summary Judgment (docket No. 44).

Plaintiffs, who have not opposed Defendant's motion¹, bring the instant case alleging political discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

On November 4, 2000, the General Elections were held in Puerto Rico. The candidate for the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP"), Sila Calderón, won the race for governor. Calderón appointed Co-Defendant Julio Alvarez as Administrator of the Thoroughbred Horse Racing Administration of Puerto Rico (the "Administration"). Co-Defendant Modesto Estrada is the Director of the Administration. Plaintiffs are 18 former employees of the Administration. Thirteen of the Plaintiffs worked for the Administration as tenured employees under a "Contract for Services per days of race", a contract that had a six month term with an option of renewal at the end of that term. One Plaintiff worked for the Administration under a Professional Services Contract that also had a term of six months. One Plaintiff worked for the Administration as a career employee. As for the final three Plaintiffs, the parties disagree as to whether they worked for the Administration as trust employees in policymaking positions or as career employees.

The Plaintiffs allege that they were all non-policy making employees of the Administration and all members of the New Progressive Party ("NPP"). According to Plaintiffs, Defendants, who are members of the PDP, discharged them, failed to renew their contracts, or transferred them to inferior positions based on their political affiliation. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants replaced them with members of the PDP as part of a plan to eliminate all NPP employees of the Administration.

Defendant Alvarez now moves for summary judgment, alleging that 1) The Plaintiffs who worked as transitory employees do not possess a property interest in their employment; 2) three of the Plaintiffs were trust employees who do not have a property interest in their employment or a cause of action for political discrimination; 3) one employee was transferred to a position in the Administration that matched her job classification; 4) all Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for political discrimination; 5) Defendant is protected from suit by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

II. STATEMENTS OF FACTS

These uncontested facts are taken from the uncontested facts agreed to by the parties during the Initial Scheduling Conference.

1. Plaintiff José Flores-Camilo was hired as a tenured employee according to the Contract for Services Per Days of Race.

2. Plaintiff Edgardo Serrano-Canales was hired as a tenured employee according

to the Contract for Services Per Days of Race.

3. Plaintiff Victor Castro de León was hired as a tenured employee according to the Contract for Services Per Days of Race.

4. Plaintiff Alvaro Sayán was hired as a tenured employee according to the Contract for Services Per Days of Race.

5. Plaintiff William Arroyo-García was hired as a tenured employee according to the Contract for Services Per Days of Race.

6. Plaintiff Luis Abraham López was hired as a tenured employee according to the Contract for Services Per Days of Race.

7. Plaintiff Sergio Sánchez-Estrella was hired as a tenured employee according to the Contract for Services Per Days of Race.

8. Plaintiff Marco González-Fernández was hired as a tenured employee according to the Contract for Services Per Days of Race.

9. Plaintiff Bernabé Pitré was hired as a tenured employee according to the Contract for Services Per Days of Race.

10. Plaintiff Angel Rivera González was hired as a tenured employee according to the Contract for Services Per Days of Race.

11. Plaintiff Ernesto Pérez-Arroyo was hired as a tenured employee according to the Contract for Services Per Days of Race.

12. Plaintiff Elvis Fred Flores-Rivera was hired as a tenured employee according to the Contract for Services Per Days of Race.

13. Plaintiff Angel Hiraldo-Morales was hired as a tenured employee according to the Contract for Services Per Days of Race.

14. Plaintiff Francisco Irlanda-Pérez was hired pursuant to a Professional Services Contract.

15. Defendant Julio Alvarez is the Administrator of the Thoroughbred Horse Racing Administration.

16. Defendant Modesto Estrada is the Director of the Thoroughbred Horse Racing Administration.

17. The Thoroughbred Horse Racing Administration is one of high public interest.

18. The parties stipulate to the language of the Plaintiffs' employment contracts.

19. Plaintiffs agreed to the terms and conditions contained in their contracts.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the entry of summary judgment where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Pagano v. Frank, 983 F.2d 343, 347 (1st Cir.1993); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 894 (1st Cir.1988). Summary judgment is appropriate where, after drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is material if, based on the substantive law at issue, it might affect the outcome of the case. Id. at 248; Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989). A material issue is "genuine" if there is sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable trier of fact to resolve the issue in the non-moving party's favor. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 24 (1st Cir.1989).

The party filing a motion for summary judgment bears the initial burden of proof to show "that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden then shifts to the non-movant to show that "sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute [exists] to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of truth at trial." See First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592-93, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968). The party opposing summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but must affirmatively show, through filing of supporting affidavits or otherwise, that there is a genuine issue for trial. See id.; see also Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1116 (1st Cir.1993). On issues where the non-movant bears the ultimate burden of proof, he must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57, 106 S.Ct. at 2514-15.

IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Failure of Transitory Employees to Allege a Cognizable Property Interest

According to the parties, the following thirteen Plaintiffs were hired as tenured employees with a "contract for services per days of race": José Flores Camilo, Edgardo Serrano-Canales, Vítor Castro de León, Alvaro Sayán, William Arroyo García, Luis A. López-Soto, Sergio Sánchez-Estrella, Marco González Fernández, Bernabé Pitré, Angel Rivera-González, Ernesto Pérez-Arroyo, Elvis Fred Flores-Rivera, Angel Hiraldo-Morales. Plaintiffs' contracts were for a six-month term with the possibility of renewal after six months. Plaintiffs allege that they had an expectation that these contracts would be continuously renewed. However, all Plaintiffs' contracts were not renewed upon their termination at various points in 2001.

The parties agree that Francisco Irlanda Pérez was hired through a "professional services contract," which also had a term of six months, and also terminated and was not renewed in 2001.

Plaintiffs allege that they had an expectancy in continued renewal of their biannual contracts and a binding obligation to be contracted according to performance and productivity. Plaintiffs allege that their contracts were not renewed due to their political affiliation. According to Plaintiffs, "the usage and custom in the agency was that there would be extension of contract if the persons performance was good" (sic). See Plaintiffs' Complaint at 15.

It is well-accepted by the First Circuit that "transitory employees generally do not have a property interest in continued employment beyond their yearly terms of appointment." See Nieves-Villanueva v. Soto-Rivera, 133 F.3d 92, 94 (1st Cir.1997). As stated in Caro v. Aponte-Roque, 878 F.2d 1,4 (1st Cir.1989),

the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has made it clear that the law of Puerto Rico does not give persons who hold `transitory' jobs, such as plaintiffs, any expectation of continued employment beyond the time their yearly appointments expire. In Department of Natural Resources v. Correa, 87 J.T.S. 35 (P.R. Sup.Ct. April 15, 1987), the Court said: "we conclude that a transitory appointment generates a job retention expectancy only during the term of the appointment ... a transitory employee is not entitled to a permanent status nor does he have a...