Flores v. Cameron County, Tex.
| Decision Date | 06 August 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-60262,94-60262 |
| Citation | 92 F.3d 258 |
| Parties | Natalia FLORES, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant, v. CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS, et al., Defendants, Cameron County, Texas, Defendant-Appellant Cross-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Charles Willette, Jr., Mark Sossi, Willette & Trevino, Brownsville, TX, for Appellant.
Lawrence A. Walsh, Brownsville, TX, J. Patrick Wiseman, Wiseman, Durst & Tuddenham, Austin, TX, for Flores.
Lisa Powell, Atlas & Hall, McAllen, TX, for Garza, Hester, et al.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before KING, DeMOSS and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
Natalia Flores, individually and as the administratrix of the estate of Juan Manuel Castillo-Flores, sued Cameron County and other defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages for the alleged violation of Juan Manuel Castillo-Flores's constitutional rights resulting in his death while he was detained in the Cameron County Juvenile Detention Center. After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for Natalia Flores based on the verdict. Cameron County appeals the district court's judgment and Natalia Flores cross-appeals. We vacate the judgment against Cameron County and remand for a new trial.
On June 2, 1988, fourteen-year-old Juan Manuel Castillo-Flores ("Juan") was detained at the Cameron County Juvenile Detention Center (the "detention center"), having been arrested for the burglary of a building. The detention center routinely had two detention center guards on duty to supervise up to twenty-one juveniles during the day, and only one guard during the night shift. Although the maximum capacity of the detention center was twenty-one juveniles, on some occasions, including the day of Juan's death, the detention center housed more than twenty-one juveniles. 1 The male portion of the detention center consisted of a central recreation room, adjacent to which individual rooms were located.
Early in the day while confined to his cell, Juan began banging his head against the door, apparently to attract the guards' attention. The guards on duty, Porfirio Ramirez ("Ramirez") and Servando Betancourt ("Betancourt"), attempted to dissuade Juan from banging on the door. When they were unsuccessful, they obtained permission from the detention center superintendent, Thelma Sullivan, to shackle him to his bed with foot cuffs. The first shackling was uneventful, and eventually the foot cuffs were removed. That evening, Juan began banging his head against the door again, and Ramirez and Betancourt decided to restrain him again.
Ramirez knelt at the foot of Juan's bed with the foot cuffs, his back to Juan, intending to secure his feet to the bedpost. Betancourt stood in the doorway to Juan's room. Betancourt was responsible for controlling Juan while Ramirez applied the foot cuffs. Betancourt had to remain in the doorway, however, because otherwise the cell door would automatically close and lock. As Betancourt and Ramirez were the only guards at the detention center, if the cell door locked them inside Juan's cell, the other juveniles could escape from the detention center because there would be no one to enter the control room and reopen the cell door. 2 Additionally, Betancourt was responsible for observing and controlling the juveniles in the main recreation room. Therefore, he continually had to look back and forth between the recreation room and Juan's room.
While standing in the doorway, Betancourt saw Juan suddenly move forward. Fearing that Juan was reaching to strike Ramirez Betancourt lunged forward to grab Juan. In doing so, Betancourt applied his entire weight onto Juan's back, pushing his head forward and breaking his neck. The guards testified that they did not realize at the time that Juan had been injured. Ramirez then applied the foot cuffs, and the guards stood to leave. Ramirez testified that as they left Juan uttered an obscenity. Juan was found dead in his cell the next morning. Medical testimony indicated that Juan could have remained conscious for fifteen minutes to two hours before he died.
On October 21, 1988, Natalia Flores ("Flores"), Juan's mother, filed suit against the following defendants: (1) Betancourt, (2) Ramirez, (3) Amador Rodriguez, Jr. ("Rodriguez"), the Chief Juvenile Probation Officer, (4) Cameron County, (5) the County Judge and Commissioners of Cameron County, (6) the Cameron County Juvenile Probation Board (the "Juvenile Board") and (7) the individual members of the Juvenile Board. All individual defendants were sued in both their individual and their official capacities. Flores's original complaint alleged that Juan's death was caused by the defendants' use of excessive force, deliberately indifferent failure to supervise and train the detention center guards, and deliberately indifferent failure to provide medical care in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint also alleged related pendent state law claims. To remedy the violations of § 1983, the complaint sought damages for Juan's pain and suffering, analogous to Texas law survival damages, as well as for Flores's own pain and suffering and loss of support and services, analogous to Texas law wrongful death damages.
On January 23, 1989, the district court dismissed Flores's claims against the following defendants: (1) the Juvenile Board on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity; (2) the members of the Juvenile Board in their official capacity because of the dismissal of the Juvenile Board and in their individual capacity on the basis of legislative immunity; (3) Rodriguez because Flores's complaint did not meet the heightened pleading required in cases against individuals protected by qualified immunity; and (4) the County Judge and Commissioners of Cameron County in their official capacities because those claims were duplicative of the claims against the County and in their individual capacities based on legislative immunity. Although the court granted Flores's motion to reconsider the dismissal of the Juvenile Board, it again dismissed the Juvenile Board on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds in an order dated May 1, 1989.
Flores filed an amended complaint on October 29, 1989, raising the same claims as the original complaint against Cameron County, Rodriguez, Thelma Gonzalez Sullivan ("Sullivan"), the superintendent of the detention center, Betancourt, and Ramirez. On August 25, 1992, the district court granted summary judgment to Rodriguez and Sullivan in their individual capacities on qualified immunity grounds, and dismissed the claims against them in their official capacities as redundant with the claims against Cameron County.
Thus, by the time of trial, the district court had dismissed all defendants except for Betancourt, Ramirez, and Cameron County. 3 After a seven-day trial, the jury returned its verdict on February 23, 1994. The jury found that (1) Betancourt's use of excessive force proximately caused Juan's death, and (2) Cameron County's policy of failing to adequately train its juvenile detention officers proximately caused Juan's death. The jury found no liability for Ramirez. The jury awarded damages of $250,000 for Juan's pain and suffering, $50,000 for lost support and services, and $350,000 for Flores's mental pain and suffering. On April 5, 1994, the district court ordered the payment of attorneys' fees to Flores's counsel and entered final judgment on the jury's verdict. Both Cameron County and Flores filed notices of appeal.
On appeal, Cameron County raises the following ten points of error: (1) the district court erred in instructing the jury that Rodriguez and the Juvenile Board are the policymakers for Cameron County; (2) the district court erred in instructing the jury on the standard for use of excessive force on a pretrial detainee; (3) the district court erred in refusing to submit Cameron County's proposed interrogatory concerning county liability; (4) the district court erred in submitting an interrogatory to the jury requesting damages for Flores's personal injuries; (5) the Texas statute of limitations bars Flores's claims on behalf of Juan's estate; (6) the district court erred by testifying from the bench and making prejudicial remarks to the jury; (7) the district court erred in admitting evidence of a prior sexual assault on Juan; (8) insufficient evidence exists to show that Cameron County acted with deliberate indifference; (9) insufficient evidence exists to show that any failure to train by Cameron County caused Juan's death; and (10) the district court erred in denying the County's motion for remittitur because the jury verdict was excessive.
Flores raises two points of error on cross-appeal 4: (1) the district court erred in calculating the award of attorneys' fees at the rate of $125 per hour; and (2) if we conclude that the district court erred in instructing the jury that the Juvenile Board was the policymaker for the County, then it also erred in dismissing the Juvenile Board on the grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
We begin by addressing Cameron County's argument that the district court erred in instructing the jury that the Juvenile Board and Rodriguez are policymakers for Cameron County. Because we conclude that the policymaker instruction is reversible error, we will only address further the issues which are likely to come up again upon retrial. 5
Cameron County raises four challenges to the district court's jury instructions. Specifically, the County contends that the district court erred by: (1) instructing the jury that Rodriguez and the Juvenile Board are the policymakers for Cameron County; (2) instructing the jury on an incorrect standard for the excessive force claim; (3) refusing to submit to the jury the County's proposed interrogatory Number 4; and (4)...
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