Flores v. Danfelser
Decision Date | 04 June 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 19,157.,19,157. |
Citation | 985 P.2d 173,127 N.M. 571 |
Parties | Maria Stella FLORES and Dan Flores, wife and husband, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Dorothy DANFELSER, individually and as Secretary of Human Services Department, Sandra Corriveau, individually and as District Manager of the Income Support Division, and New Mexico Human Services Department, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Carmen E. Garza, Joseph M. Holmes, The Personal Injury Law Clinic, Las Cruces, for Appellants.
Douglas A. Baker, Martha G. Brown, Mary T. Torres, Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A., Albuquerque, for Appellees.
{1} Plaintiffs Maria Stella Flores (hereafter Stella Flores) and Dan Flores, her husband, appeal from an order dismissing their tort claims and claims alleging a violation of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) filed against Defendants. Plaintiffs have asserted nine claims on appeal which we consolidate and discuss as follows: (1) whether Plaintiffs' tort claims are barred under the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act; and (2) whether Plaintiffs alleged viable claims against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm.
{2} Stella Flores was employed as an income support specialist with the New Mexico Human Services Department (HSD) in Doña Ana County, New Mexico. On February 13, 1996, Theodore Osborne, an individual who had been receiving food stamp allotments, went to the district office, pushed his way past the doorway of the public waiting room, and went into an area designated for staff offices. Osborne, believing that Stella Flores was responsible for reducing his benefits, entered her office and physically attacked her and stabbed her repeatedly. Stella Flores was taken to the hospital and Osborne was subsequently apprehended and criminally charged for the assault.
{3} After the attack, HSD began paying Stella Flores workers' compensation and medical benefits. On May 7, 1997, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants Dorothy Danfelser, individually, and as Secretary of HSD; Sandra Corriveau, individually, and as district manager of the Doña Ana County office of the Income Support Division; and the HSD. Plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that Defendants were "aware ... that security measures at the ... branch office ... were inadequate"; that "[d]espite having knowledge of the dangers of allowing clients and the general public access to the office area where Stella Flores ... worked, Defendants made a deliberate and intentional policy decision to allow such access"; that "[d]espite recommendations ... to implement such security measures, ... Defendants failed to take any steps to implement such security measures"; and that Defendants' actions resulted from a "deliberate and intentional policy decision ... based upon a combination of economic and philosophical considerations."
{4} Plaintiffs' complaint contained five counts: Count I, a tort claim against HSD, Danfelser, and Corriveau under the Tort Claims Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 41-4-1 to -29 (1976, as amended through 1996); Count II, against Danfelser and Corriveau, both individually and in their official capacities, alleging a violation of Stella Flores' constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Count III, a claim against HSD alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Count IV, a claim against all Defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress; and Count V, a claim by Dan Flores, Stella's husband, against Defendants for loss of consortium.
{5} On July 2, 1997, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Following a hearing, the district court granted the motion and dismissed each of the claims against Defendants.
{6} Plaintiffs assert that the district court erred in determining that the tort claims filed by Plaintiffs against Defendants were barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.
{7} In reviewing the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, an appellate court applies the same analysis as the trial court, "accept[s] as true all facts well pleaded and question only whether the plaintiff might prevail under any state of facts provable under the claim." California First Bank v. State, 111 N.M. 64, 66, 801 P.2d 646, 648 (1990) (quoting Gomez v. Board of Educ., 85 N.M. 708, 710, 516 P.2d 679, 681 (1973)).
{8} As a preliminary matter, we note that Plaintiffs contend that the district court did not treat Defendants' motion as one for a dismissal under Rule 1-012(B)(6) NMRA 1999; instead, they argue, it decided the motion as one for summary judgment and call upon this Court to therefore apply the appropriate standard of appellate review. However, upon our examination of Plaintiffs' complaint and the matters considered below, we conclude that the district court ruled based upon Plaintiffs' original complaint, not on matters outside the pleadings. See Quintana v. Los Alamos Med. Ctr., Inc., 119 N.M. 312, 312-13, 889 P.2d 1234, 1234-35 (Ct.App.1994); Rummel v. Edgemont Realty Partners, Ltd., 116 N.M. 23, 25, 859 P.2d 491, 493 (Ct.App.1993). We accordingly apply the standard of review appropriate under Rule 1-012(B)(6).
{9} Based upon our review of the pleadings and the record before us, it is clear that the district court's decision determining that Plaintiffs' tort claims were barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act was grounded upon its interpretation of NMSA 1978, § 52-1-6(C), (D), and (E) (1990, effective Jan. 1, 1992) and § 52-1-9 (1973). We discern no error in this ruling. Examination of the Workers' Compensation Act reveals several legislative provisions restricting the right of both employers and employees from pursuing other remedies involving claims arising out of work-related injuries. For example, Section 52-1-6 provides in applicable part:
Similarly, Section 52-1-9 provides in part:
Finally, in declaring the legislative intent behind the statute, NMSA 1978, § 52-5-1 (1990, effective Jan. 1, 1991), makes clear that "[t]he workers' benefit system in New Mexico is based on a mutual renunciation of common law rights and defenses by employers and employees alike."
{10} In an effort to escape the force of these statutory provisions, Plaintiffs emphasize that their complaint rests in part on allegations that "the deliberate, intentional and aggravated assault and battery visited upon Stella Flores' person by Osborne placed [her] outside the course and scope [of her employment] and was not reasonably incident to her employment with HSD."
{11} On appeal, we review a district court's dismissal of a tort claim based upon the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act as a question of law. See Gallegos v. State of N.M. Bd. of Educ., 1997-NMCA-040, ¶ 11, 123 N.M. 362, 940 P.2d 468 ( ). Applying this test to the case before us, we conclude that Plaintiffs' tort claims are barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. None of the exceptions to the exclusivity provisions contained in Section 52-1-9(C) and relied upon by Plaintiffs are applicable here. Cf. Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999-NMSC-013, ¶ 24, 127 N.M. 47, 976 P.2d 999 (1999) (); Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 120 N.M. 645, 653, 905 P.2d 185, 193 (1995) ( ); Michaels v. Anglo Am. Auto Auctions, Inc., 117 N.M. 91, 93, 869 P.2d 279, 281 (1994) ( ).
{12} The relevant inquiry here is not whether Defendant...
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