Flores v. Edinburg Consol. Independ. School Dist.

• Decision Date: 07 January 1983
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. B-80-199.
• Citation: 554 F. Supp. 974
• Parties: David FLORES v. EDINBURG CONSOLIDATED INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, A Political Subdivision of the State of Texas, Jesus Cantu, Individually and in His Capacity as a Teacher Employee of Edinburg Independent School District.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

554 F. Supp. 974

David FLORES v. EDINBURG CONSOLIDATED INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, A Political Subdivision of the State of Texas, Jesus Cantu, Individually and in His Capacity as a Teacher Employee of Edinburg Independent School District.

Civ. A. No. B-80-199.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Brownsville Division.

January 7, 1983.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Larry Watts, Houston, Tex., for plaintiff.

L. Aron Pena, William J. Quakenbush, Pena McDonald, Prestia & Ibanez, Edinburg, Tex., Roy S. Dale, O'Leary, Sanchez & Benton, Brownsville, Tex., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

VELA, District Judge.

This is an action brought pursuant to § 1983 of Title 42 for the alleged violation of the Plaintiff's federal constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. It was originally filed by David Flores, a minor. He is now deceased and the action is being pursued by Aminta Flores as Administratrix of his Estate.

The Defendants are the Edinburg Independent School District, a political subdivision of the State of Texas and Jesus Cantu, a teacher employee of the school district.

Prior to bringing this action, the Plaintiff had filed a negligence action in the 93rd Judicial District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas, against the same Defendants. That Court granted Summary Judgment for Defendants because of their immunity from suit under the laws of the State of Texas. The appeal to the state appellate court was dismissed due to the Plaintiff's failure to timely file an Appeal Bond.

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is conferred on the Court by 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides federal question jurisdiction, and by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), providing original jurisdiction in civil actions to redress the deprivation under color of state law of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution.

FACTS

Taking the Plaintiff's factual allegations as true, which the Court must do when evaluating a Motion for Summary Judgment raised by the Defendant, the facts of this case are as follows:

David Flores, fourteen years old, was an eighth grade student at North Junior High School, Edinburg Independent School District. David's curriculum at North included an industrial arts woodshop class supervised by teacher Jesus Cantu. Cantu's classroom was composed of one area of student desks, and a larger area of work benches and motor-driven table saws and other equipment. Cantu's office was located within the classroom area, but was situated such that he could not view the classroom from within the office.

On January 14, 1977, the Plaintiff was in attendance at his woodshop class. He was constructing a jewelry box as a class project and needed to cut a board for that purpose. The particular table saw that he attempted to use, a Rockwell unit, was equipped on this day with several "dado heads", in addition to its regular saw blades. Cantu had previously instructed the class that no one was to change the blades on the saws other than himself. There was no safety guard on this particular saw, it having been broken approximately a month earlier. At the time the Plaintiff attempted to use the saw, Cantu was in his office and was not supervising the class. As the Plaintiff began to cut the board, moving it through the table saw, he heard his name called out. He turned his head momentarily and at that instant the "dado heads" and saw blades cut into his right hand, causing serious and permanent injuries.

This action was filed by Flores against Cantu and the Edinburg Independent School District, claiming the negligent deprivation under color of state law of rights secured him by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.

ISSUES

Both defendants have filed motions seeking Summary Judgment. The legal issues raised by the defendants may be stated as follows:

1. Has Plaintiff alleged a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for which relief may be granted?

2. Is this action barred by the applicable statute of limitations?

3. Is the summary judgment granted defendants in the related state court action binding on the Plaintiff in this case so as to constitute res judicata?

4. Is the defendant Cantu entitled to good faith immunity?

5. Is defendant Edinburg Independent School District entitled to government immunity?

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

NEGLIGENCE and § 1983

The Defendants initially claim that the Plaintiff has not alleged a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that a negligent act cannot be the basis for such an action. The Supreme Court has recently rejected this contention, noting that neither the language of § 1983 itself¹ nor its legislative history² contain a state of mind requirement. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 534, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). Rather than focusing on the state of mind of the defendant to determine the viability of a particular § 1983 action, the Supreme Court stated that the initial inquiry should be to determine if two essential elements are present:

"(1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Id., at 535, 101 S.Ct. at 1912.

In Parratt, an inmate of a Nebraska penitentiary filed a § 1983 action against prison officials who negligently lost a hobby kit that he had ordered through the mail. The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff met the two requirements stated above: "Unquestionably, respondent's claim satisfies three prerequisites of a valid due process claim: The petitioners acted under color of state law; the hobby kit falls within the definition of property; and the alleged loss even though negligently caused, amounted to a deprivation." Id., at 536-37, 101 S.Ct. at 1913. The Court concluded, however, that the deprivation of property was not "without due process of law" since the tort remedies provided by the State of Nebraska were sufficient to insure the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard regarding his loss. Id., at 543-44, 101 S.Ct. at 1916-17.

In order to provide further assistance to the lower courts in adjudicating claims of this type, the Court in Parratt approved the analysis of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the case of Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.1975), modified en banc, 545 F.2d 565 (1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932, 98 S.Ct. 1507, 55 L.Ed.2d 529 (1978), as the proper manner in which to approach a case such as this. In Bonner the Court elucidated:

"It seems to us that there is an important difference between a challenge to an established state procedure as lacking in due process and a property damage claim arising out of the misconduct of state officers. In the former situation the facts satisfy the most literal reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition against `State' deprivations of property; in the latter situation, however, even though there is action `under color of' state law sufficient to bring the amendment into play, the state action is not necessarily complete. For in a case such as this, the law of Illinois provides, in substance, that the plaintiff is entitled to be made whole for any loss of property occasioned by the unauthorized conduct of the prison guards. We may reasonably conclude, therefore, that the existence of an adequate state remedy to redress property damage inflicted by state officers avoids the conclusion that there has been any constitutional deprivation of property without due process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." 517 F.2d at 1319.

Using this analysis, it is at first obvious that the Plaintiff in this case is not challenging an established state procedure as lacking in due process. As in Parratt v. Taylor and Bonner v. Coughlin, supra, the Plaintiff is claiming damages caused by the misconduct or unauthorized acts of a state officer. Parratt teaches that, in these instances, constitutional due process can be satisfied by the availability of a post deprivation remedy.

"In such a case, the loss is not a result of some established state procedure and the State can not predict precisely when the loss will occur. It is difficult to perceive of how the State could provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation takes place. The loss ..., although attributable to the State as action under `color of law,' is in almost all cases beyond the control of the State. Indeed, in most cases, it is not only impracticable, but impossible to provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation." 451 U.S. at 541, 101 S.Ct. at 1915-16.

The only apparent difference between this case and Parratt is that the Plaintiff in Parratt had available a post deprivation remedy sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process. In this case no such remedy exists. The Texas Tort Claims Act, Article 6252-19, V.A.T.S., abrogates the common law immunity of state governmental units under certain circumstances. Section 19A of that act, however, maintains the immunity of school districts from tort liability except in cases involving motor vehicles.³ Furthermore, the Texas Education Code, § 21.912(b), provides personal immunity for teachers in connection with acts within the scope of their employment "and which acts involve the exercise of judgment or discretion."⁴ Liability is provided for in cases involving motor vehicles. V.T.C.A., Education Code § 21.912(c).⁵ No remedy is therefore available for the Plaintiff under State law.⁶

The Court in Parratt strongly implied that but for the Nebraska tort claim remedy the Plaintiff in that case would have had a valid Fourteenth Amendment Claim. The facts in this case are no less egregious than those presented in Parratt and undoubtedly satisfy the three prerequisites which were "unquestionably" present in Parratt. See, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 536-37, 101 S.Ct. at 1913. The alleged negligence was committed...