Flores v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 24 July 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. CV 85–4544 DMG (AGRx)
• Citation: 212 F.Supp.3d 864
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: Jenny L. FLORES, et al. v. Jeh JOHNSON, et al.

212 F.Supp.3d 864

Jenny L. FLORES, et al.

v.Jeh JOHNSON, et al.

Case No. CV 85–4544 DMG (AGRx)

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Filed July 24, 2015

Annette D. Kirkham, Kyra Kazantzis, Katherine H. Manning, Law Foundation of Silicon Valley, San Jose, CA, Carlos Holguin, Peter A. Schey, Marchela Iahdjian, Center For Human Rights & Constitutional Law, Los Angeles, CA, Elena Garcia, Orrick Herrington and Sutcliffe LLP, Irvine, CA, Jennifer Kelleher Cloyd, Legal Advocates for Children and Youth, San Jose, CA, Katina Ancar, National Center For Youth Law, Oakland, CA, Michael S. Sorgen, La Raza Legal Inc., San Francisco, CA, Steven H. Schulman, Latham and Watkins, Washington, DC, Virginia Elizabeth Corrigan, Alice Bussiere, Youth Law Center, San Francisco, CA, Holly S Cooper, UC Davis School of Law Immigration Law, Davis, CA, Thomas Wayne Harman, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for plaintiff(s)

John E. Nordin, II Office of US Attorney, Los Angeles, CA Peter D. Keisler, Sarah B. Fabian, William Charles Silvis, US Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Carlton F. Sheffield, Christina Parascandola, Colin A. Kisor, Yamileth G. Davila, Vinita Andrapalliyal, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Leon Fresco, Holland & Knight LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant(s)

Proceedings: IN CHAMBERS—ORDER RE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT OF CLASS ACTION AND DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AMEND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT [100, 120]

Present: The Honorable DOLLY M. GEE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I.INTRODUCTION

The original complaint in this action was filed on July 11, 1985. [Doc. # 1.] On January 28, 1997, the Court approved a class-wide settlement of this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. (See Plaintiffs' First Set of Exhibits in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement ("Ps' First Set"), Exh. 1 ("Agreement").)

Plaintiffs Jenny L. Flores and other class members filed a motion to enforce the Agreement on February 2, 2015.¹ [Doc. # 100.] On February 27, 2015, Defendants Jeh Johnson and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") and its subordinate entities, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") and U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP"), filed an opposition to Plaintiffs' motion.² [Doc. # 121.] On March 13, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a reply. [Doc. # 127.]

On February 27, 2015, Defendants filed a motion to amend the Agreement. [Doc. # 120.] On March 6, 2015, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. [Doc. # 122.] On March 13, 2015, Defendants filed a reply. [Doc. # 126.]

A hearing on the motions was held on April 24, 2015.

Having duly considered the respective positions of the parties as presented in their briefs and at oral argument, the Court now renders its decision.

II.MOTION TO ENFORCE

Beginning in the summer of 2014, in response to a "surge" of Central Americans arriving at the U.S.–Mexico border, ICE adopted a blanket policy to detain all female-headed families, including children, in secure,³ unlicensed facilities for the duration of the proceedings that determine whether they are entitled to remain in the United States. (Mot. to Enforce at 2; see Ps' First Set, Exh. 9 ("U.S. Immigrations & Customs Enforcement, News Release, November 18, 2014"); Ps' First Set, Exh. 10 (Declaration of Bridget Cambria ("Cambria Decl.")) ¶¶ 3–5 ("Since June, ICE has begun detaining all Central American families without the possibility of release on bond, recognizance, supervision or parole if it believes that those families arrived in the United States as part of the ‘surge’ of unauthorized entrants—mostly children—that purportedly began in the summer of 2014.").)

Plaintiffs argue that this "no-release" policy violates the Agreement. More specifically, Plaintiffs challenge the following policies and practices: (1) ICE's no-release policy, which Plaintiffs argue breaches the Agreement's requirements that Defendants must minimize the detention of children and must consider releasing class members to available custodians in the order of preference specified in the Agreement; (2) ICE's practice of confining children in secure, unlicensed facilities; and (3) ICE's practice of exposing children in Border Patrol custody to "harsh, substandard" conditions and treatment. (Mot. to Enforce at 5–21.)

A. Legal Standard

This Court has the inherent power to enforce the terms of the Agreement because, with certain exceptions not relevant here, the Agreement "provides for the enforcement, in this District Court, of the provisions of this Agreement...." (See Agreement ¶ 37; Ps' First Set, Exh. 2 ("Order Approving Settlement of Class Action, January 28, 1997").) See also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 380–81, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) ; Dacanay v. Mendoza , 573 F.2d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1978). "[T]he construction and enforcement of settlement agreements are governed by principles of local law which apply to interpretation of contracts generally." O'Neil v. Bunge Corp. , 365 F.3d 820, 822 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting United Commercial Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Paymaster Corp. , 962 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1992) ).

Moreover, the parties agree that the Agreement is a consent decree. "Consent decrees have the attributes of both contracts and judicial acts," and in interpreting consent decrees, courts use contract principles, specifically the contract law of the situs state. Thompson v. Enomoto , 915 F.2d 1383, 1388 (9th Cir. 1990). Under California law, a court must interpret a contract with the goal of giving effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting. Cal. Civ. Code § 1636. "It is the outward expression of the agreement, rather than a party's unexpressed intention, which the court will enforce." Winet v. Price , 4 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1166, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (1992). Where the parties dispute the meaning of specific contract language, "the court must decide whether the language is ‘reasonably susceptible’ to the interpretations urged by the parties." Badie v. Bank of Am. , 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 798, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 273 (1998). Where the contract is clear, the plain language of the contract governs. Bank of the West v. Superior Court , 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1264, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538, 833 P.2d 545 (1992).

The Court must construe the contract as a whole, being sure "to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other." Pinel v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC , 814 F.Supp.2d 930, 943 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 1641 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Courts must interpret contractual language in a manner that gives force and effect to every provision, and not in a way that renders some clauses nugatory, inoperative or meaningless." Id. When necessary, a court can look to the subsequent conduct of the parties as evidence of their intent. See Crestview Cemetery Assn. v. Dieden , 54 Cal.2d 744, 754, 8 Cal.Rptr. 427, 356 P.2d 171 (1960). Finally, "[i]n cases of uncertainty not removed by the preceding rules, the language of a contract should be interpreted most strongly against the party who caused the uncertainty to exist." Cal. Civ. Code § 1654.

B. Discussion

1. "Preference for Release" Provision

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants' no-release policy—i.e. , the policy of detaining all female-headed families, including children, for as long as it takes to determine whether they are entitled to remain in the United States—violates material provisions of the Agreement.

These provisions require ICE (1) to "release a minor from its custody without unnecessary delay" to a parent, a legal guardian, or other qualified adult custodian, except where the detention of the minor is required "either to secure his or her timely appearance before the INS or the immigration court, or to ensure the minor's safety or that of others"; and (2) "[u]pon taking a minor into custody, ... [to] make and record prompt and continuous efforts on its part toward family reunification and the release of the minor ...." (Agreement ¶¶ 14, 18.)

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants, by making no effort to locate custodians for minors who are apprehended with their mothers and by refusing to release these minors even when a qualified custodian is available, have not only breached the Agreement but also have unilaterally revised it to create an additional exception to release—for minors who have been apprehended as part of a female-headed family. See Walnut Creek Pipe Distrib., Inc. v. Gates Rubber Co. Sales Div. , 228 Cal.App.2d 810, 816, 39 Cal.Rptr. 767 (1964) (courts should not imply additional terms, except in cases of "obvious necessity").

a. The Agreement Encompasses Accompanied Minors

As a threshold matter, the parties dispute whether minors who are apprehended as part of a female-headed family are class members covered by the Agreement. The plain language of the Agreement clearly encompasses accompanied minors. First and most importantly, the Agreement defines the class as the following: "All minors who are detained in the legal custody of the INS." (See Agreement ¶ 10 (emphasis added).) The Agreement defines a "minor" as "any person under the age of eighteen (18) years who is detained in the legal custody of the INS." (See id. ¶ 4.) Defendants argue in their brief that this definition should not be dispositive of who was intended to be in the class because the parties' purpose in defining "minor" in that manner was merely to distinguish the Agreement's definition of a minor from the INA's definition of a "child" as "an unmarried person under 21 years of age," 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1). The language defining "minor" in the Agreement, however, is wholly unambiguous and Defendants have offered no reasonable alternative reading that would make it ambiguous. As such, extrinsic evidence of intent is inadmissible, even if Defendants had proffered any, which they did not.

The text of the Agreement provides further support for the...