Flores v. Lynch, Case No. CV 85–04544 DMG (Ex)

• Decision Date: 21 August 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. CV 85–04544 DMG (Ex)
• Citation: 212 F.Supp.3d 907
• Parties: Jenny Lisette FLORES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General of the United States, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

212 F.Supp.3d 907

Jenny Lisette FLORES, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General of the United States, et al., Defendants.

Case No. CV 85–04544 DMG (Ex)

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Signed August 21, 2015

212 F.Supp.3d 908

Schey, Marchela Iahdjian, Los Angeles, CA, Elena Garcia, Orrick Herrington and Sutcliffe LLP, Irvine, CA, Katina Ancar, Oakland, CA, Michael S. Sorgen, La Raza Legal Inc., Virginia Elizabeth Corrigan, Alice Bussiere, San Francisco, CA, Steven H Schulman, Latham and Watkins, Washington, DC, Holly S. Cooper, UC Davis School of Law Immigration Law, Davis, CA, for Plaintiff.

John E. Nordin, II, SAUSA—Office of US Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, Peter D. Keisler, Office of the Immigration Litigation—Civil Litigation US Department of Justice, Carlton F. Sheffield, Christina Parascandola, Colin A. Kisor, Vinita Andrapalliyal, Yamileth G. Davila, US Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Leon Fresco, Holland & Knight LLP, Sarah B. Fabian, US Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation, William Charles Silvis, US Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation—District Court Section, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

ORDER RE RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

DOLLY M. GEE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I.

INTRODUCTION

"An error does not become truth by reason of multiplied propagation, nor does truth become error because nobody sees it."

—Mahatma Gandhi

On February 2, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the parties' 18–year-old consent decree ("the Agreement") against Defendants Jeh Johnson and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") and its subordinate entities, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") and U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP").¹ See Plaintiffs' First Set of Exhibits in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement, Exh. 1 [Doc. # 101.] On April 24, 2015, the Court held a hearing on the motion. [Doc. # 143.] After giving the parties an opportunity to informally resolve their dispute, the Court ultimately

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granted the motion on July 24, 2015, finding that Defendants had indeed breached the Agreement, and ordered Defendants to comply with the Agreement within 90 days. [Doc. # 177 ("July 24, 2015 Order").]

In particular, contrary to Defendants' interpretation, the Court found that the Agreement encompasses both accompanied and unaccompanied minors. In accordance with the consent decree, therefore, the Court ordered Defendants to release class members subject to specific provisions of the Agreement, while they await the results of removal proceedings. See July 24, 2015 Order at 24–25. The Court then gave Defendants an opportunity to respond to the Court's six-point remedy. Id .

Instead of responding to the Court's Order to Show Cause ("OSC") solely as to the proposed remedies, Defendants submitted a 51–page brief that served primarily as a vehicle for a thinly-veiled motion for reconsideration, rehashing many of the same arguments which the Court previously rejected. [Doc. # 184 ("Defendants' Resp.").]² Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed their response to the OSC. [Doc. # 186 ("Plaintiffs' Resp.").]

Because Defendants fail to meet the standard for a reconsideration motion by, among other things, demonstrating the existence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of the July 24, 2015 Order, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion for reconsideration. As such, the Court's July 24, 2015 Order stands, with some clarifications to the remedy. Defendants must implement the Court's remedies for their breach of the Agreement as set forth below by October 23, 2015.

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Reconsideration

The Court construes Defendants' brief as a motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). This rule permits a court to relieve a party from any prior order or decision for a number of reasons including, but not limited to: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence; and (3) any other reason that justifies relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), (6).

Local Rule 7–18 limits reconsideration, however, to three enumerated grounds: "(a) a material difference in fact or law from that presented to the court before the decision that in the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have been known to the party moving for reconsideration at the time of the decision, or (b) the emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of the decision, or (c) a manifest showing of a failure to consider material facts presented to the court before the decision." C.D. Cal. L.R. 7–18. Additionally, "[n]o motion for reconsideration shall in any manner repeat any oral or written argument made in support of or in opposition to the original motion." Id.

Notably, "[m]otions for reconsideration are disfavored and rarely granted." Brown v. United States, 2011 WL 333380, *2 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 31, 2011). "Whether to grant a motion for reconsideration under Local Rule 7–18 is a matter within the court's discretion." Daghlian v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 582 F.Supp.2d 1231, 1251 (C.D.Cal.2007).

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Here, while Defendants frame their brief as a "Response to the Court's Order to Show Cause Why the Remedies Set Forth in the Court's July 24, 2015 Order Should Not Be Implemented," the brief is actually a motion for reconsideration, albeit an improper one. See, e.g., Defendants' Resp. at 9 ("Defendants respectfully request that the Court reconsider its order"); id. at 46 ("Because the Court failed to take account of the history of the litigation and the intent of the parties, the Court's conclusion merits reconsideration."). Indeed, despite repeatedly stating that the Court should "reconsider" its findings made in the July 24, 2015 Order, Defendants fail to discuss the legal standard governing motions for reconsideration, including the limitations imposed by the Local Rules. In particular, Defendants fail to assert which of the three enumerated grounds under Local Rule 7–18 serves as the basis for their motion.

The Court discusses below whether any of the three enumerated limitations can support Defendants' motion for reconsideration.

1. Material Difference in Fact or Law That Could Not Have Been Known Before the Order

First, to properly bring a motion for reconsideration based on Local Rule 7–18(a), Defendants must show that there is a material difference in fact or law that could not have been known to them, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, before the Court's July 24, 2015 Order. Defendants have not established this basis.

For instance, as to material differences in fact, Defendants refer to the "May and June directives" issued by the DHS Secretary and ICE Director. Defendants' Resp. at 41. According to Defendants, these "directives" consist of "publicly announced policies fundamentally changing the character of family detention and the use of ICE's family residential centers." Id. at 18 (citing Homan Decl. ¶¶ 24–26 [Doc. # 184–1].) Specifically, on May 13, 2015, ICE announced it would implement a review process for any family detained beyond 90 days. Homan Decl. ¶ 25. Further, on June 24, 2015, the DHS announced that it would commit to evaluating claims for humanitarian relief "within a reasonable timeframe." Id. ¶ 26.

Yet, as the directives' dates indicate, these policies were known to Defendants well before the July 24, 2015 Order. In fact, the Court noted in its July 24, 2015 Order that Defendants lodged a press release on May 13, 2015, announcing a series of changes as to the family residential centers. See July 24, 2015 Order at 7 n.4.

Still, Defendants may argue that the results of those directives could not have been known until after the July 24, 2015 Order, even with the exercise of reasonable diligence. For instance, according to Defendants, "of those families booked into a family facility during the two-week period of June 28 to July 11, 2015, more than 60% had been released or removed by July 29–or within two to four weeks ... compared to the last six months of 2014, in which only 21% of families booked into family facilities were released or removed within 30 days." Defendants' Resp. at 14 (citing Homan Decl. ¶¶ 22, 27). Thus, this 60–percent statistic touted by Defendants involved detainees released or removed by July 29, 2015, or five days after the July 24, 2015 Order. Yet, Defendants have not shown how their subsequent remedial measures bear any significance to the question of whether Defendants breached the Agreement before the May and June policy announcements. At most, these announcements show that Defendants may be less in breach than they were before.

As to material differences in the law, Defendants also fail to identify any that

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