Flores v. Smith
| Decision Date | 14 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:17-CV-215-TLS |
| Parties | ERIBERTO FLORES, Plaintiff, v. FRANK SMITH, in his official capacity as Chief of Police and individually; MARK BECKER, in his official and individual capacity; GERARDO GARZA, JR., in his official and individual capacity; and FRANK ALIMON, in his official and individual capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 26] and the Defendants' Motion to Strike [ECF No. 34]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the motion to strike, grants the motion for summary judgment as to the federal claims, and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.
Alleging violations of his rights in relation to his arrest and detention on May 10, 2015, the Plaintiff Eriberto Flores filed the instant Complaint [ECF No. 1] on May 9, 2017 against Defendant Frank Smith individually and in his official capacity as Chief of Police as well as Defendants Mark Becker, Gerardo Garza, Jr., and Francisco Aleman III,[1] each in his individual and official capacities.[2] The Plaintiff brings the following federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) First Amendment Retaliation against all Defendants based on the Plaintiff's prior participation with and campaigning for the Concerned Citizens of East Chicago (Count I); (2) Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment false arrest and excessive force against (a) Officer Garza when the Plaintiff was arrested without probable cause, taken into custody, and detained and when Officer Garza grabbed, twisted, exerted excessive pressure, and otherwise manhandled the Plaintiff's arms and shoulders, causing him injury, (b) Officer Aleman, Officer Garza, and then-Chief Becker for failing to prevent the deprivations of his rights, and (c) the Chief of Police under a theory of Monell liability (Count II); (3) Fourteenth Amendment unlawful detention against (a) Officer Garza for detention without probable cause, (b) Lieutenant Smith for refusing to accept the bond money presented by the Plaintiff's mother, and (c) the Chief of Police under a theory of Monell liability (Count III); and (4) Fourteenth Amendment failure to train against the Chief of Police under a theory of Monell Liability in relation to Officer Garza's conduct during the Plaintiff's arrest (Count IV). In Counts V-VII, the Plaintiff alleges Indiana state law claims of battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence.
The Defendants filed Answers [ECF Nos. 8-11]. Following discovery, the Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 26]. The Plaintiff filed a response [ECF No. 31], and the Defendants filed a reply [ECF No. 33]. The Defendants also filed a Motion to Strike [ECF No. 34], to which the Plaintiff did not respond.
Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
The movant may discharge this burden by “either: (1) showing that there is an absence of evidence supporting an essential element of the non-moving party's claim; or (2) presenting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's claim.” Hummel v. St. Joseph Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 817 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). In response, the non-movant “must make a sufficient showing on every element of his case on which he bears the burden of proof; if he fails to do so, there is no issue for trial.” Yeatts v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc., 940 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. (citation omitted). A court's role Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Facts that are outcome determinative under the applicable law are material for summary judgment purposes. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In support of his opposition to summary judgment, the Plaintiff submitted a four-page, handwritten, unsigned, and undated letter allegedly from Curtis Hill. See Pl. Ex. 4, Dep. Ex. 5, ECF No. 32-5. The Plaintiff's response brief relies on Hill's out-of-court statements for the truth of the matters asserted therein. The Defendants move to strike the letter as inadmissible hearsay. On summary judgment, materials must be admissible as evidence at trial, “although the form produced at summary judgment need not be admissible.” Igasaki v. Ill. Dep't of Fin. and Prof'l Regulation, 988 F.3d 948, 955 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). A court cannot “consider inadmissible hearsay, over proper objections, in deciding summary judgment.” Lewandowski v. City of Milwaukee, 823 Fed.Appx. 426, 428-29 (7th Cir. 2020); see Eaton v. J. H. Findorff & Son, Inc., 1 F.4th 508, 512 n.3 (7th Cir. 2021). The Defendants offer evidence that they twice scheduled the deposition of Hill during discovery but that he failed to appear both times. The Plaintiff offers no response to the Defendants' hearsay objection. The Court hereby SUSTAINS the objection and GRANTS the Defendants' Motion to Strike.
Plaintiff Eriberto Flores became a community activist in 2005 and a member of the Concerned Citizens of East Chicago in 2007 or 2008. Pl. Ex. 12, 358:15-20, 359:12-23, ECF No. 32-13. As a result of his involvement with the group, an ordinance was passed in 2010 that addressed parking on the street where the Plaintiff lives. Id. at 359:24-360:18. Prior to the passage of the ordinance, the Plaintiff had never been arrested in the City of East Chicago. Id. at 360:2-5. The Plaintiff complained to the City on numerous occasions about the ordinance not being enforced. Id. at 361:7-25.
On January 16, 2015, the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the City of East Chicago, Mark Becker as chief of police, and three police officers. See Flores v. City of East Chicago, et al., No. 2:15-cv-22-PPS. The Plaintiff alleged that, on January 16, 2013, he contacted the dispatcher for the City to report ordinance violations occurring outside his residence. See Am. Compl. ¶ 15, ECF No. 15, Flores, No. 2:15-cv-22. As he was leaving his home, he saw two police officers drive past his house; he approached the officers and inquired on the status of his complaint. Id. at ¶¶ 18, 21. The Plaintiff was arrested and later charged with disorderly conduct and resisting law enforcement. Id. at ¶ 30. The state criminal charges were dismissed on July 17, 2014. Pl. Ex. 3, ECF No. 32-4. The Plaintiff brought § 1983 claims based on First Amendment retaliation; Fourth Amendment false arrest, excessive force, and unlawful detention and confinement; and failure to train. Am. Compl. 6-11, Flores, No. 2:15-cv-22. The Plaintiff alleged that the arresting officer injured his left shoulder and arm during the arrest. Id. at ¶ 42(f). On January 3, 2017, the Court granted partial summary judgment. Op. & Order, ECF No. 47, Flores, No. 2:15-cv-22. The lawsuit settled on February 1, 2017. ECF No. 50, Flores, No. 2:15-cv-22.
Defendant Officer Gerardo Garza, Jr. applied to the East Chicago Police Department in late 2013 and was hired in June 2014. Pl. Ex. 4, 8:1-9:6, ECF No. 32-5. After completing training, he began working as a probationary police officer in April 2015. Id. at 11:1-12.
On May 10, 2015, Officer Garza observed a vehicle disregard a stop sign. Pl. Ex. 4, 16:314. The driver of the vehicle was Curtis Hill, who did not have a valid driver's license. Id. at 17:8-18. At approximately 4:10 a.m., the Plaintiff was awoken by a phone call from Hill, who told the Plaintiff that he had been pulled over by the police and needed someone to drive his car. Def. Ex. 1, 82:23-83:6, ECF No. 28-1. Hill explained that he only had a learner's permit, but that the officer would allow him to have someone with a driver's license drive his vehicle. Id. at 83:7-10. During the call, the Plaintiff did not hear an officer state that it would be okay for the Plaintiff to drive Hill's vehicle. Id. at 91:2-5. Officer Garza testified that he never told Hill that he would allow another person to drive his vehicle. Def. Ex. 2, 12:9-11, ECF No. 28-2. The Plaintiff quickly dressed and headed toward Hill's location, which took approximately two minutes. Def. Ex. 1, 84:4-13; Pl. Ex. 5, 90:3-7, ECF No. 32-6. While talking on the phone to Hill, the Plaintiff heard Hill tell the officer that he was talking to “Bert Flores.” Pl. Ex. 5, 100:623. It was still dark outside. Def. Ex. 1, 88:2.
Upon arriving at the scene, the Plaintiff drove around the officers and their two vehicles and parked his vehicle. Id. at 96:17-20. He jumped out of his vehicle leaving the engine running and the door open. Id. at 98:5-12. He hurried toward Officer Garza and announced, “I'm here.” Id. at 98:17-20, 112:3-21. The Plaintiff did not identify himself. Id. at 108:21-109:15, 112:2021. Officer Garza did not know who the Plaintiff was when he...
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