Flores–Flores v. Horizon Lines of P.R., Inc.

Decision Date13 July 2012
Docket NumberCivil No. 12–1191 (SEC).
Citation875 F.Supp.2d 90
PartiesOrlando FLORES–FLORES, Plaintiff, v. HORIZON LINES OF PUERTO RICO, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Adaliz Ramirez–Rivera, Carolina, PR, for Plaintiff.

Antonio M. Cuevas–Delgado, Cuevas Kuinlam & Bermudez, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

SALVADOR E. CASELLAS, Senior District Judge.

Before the Court are plaintiff's motion to remand to state court (Docket # 7), and defendant's opposition thereto (Docket # 11). After reviewing the filings and the applicable law, plaintiff's motion is GRANTED.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an action to recover damages stemming from defendant Horizon Lines of Puerto Rico Inc.'s (Horizon) alleged refusal to provide plaintiff Orlando Flores–Flores with meal periods. The pertinent facts are easily summarized. Flores worked for Horizon as a crane maintenance electrician for twenty-two years. He ceased working there on October 2, 2011. During his years of service, the complaint states, Horizon never granted Flores a meal period. Docket # 1–4, ¶ 8. Flores specifically alleges that, during his regular and extraordinary work schedules, Horizon never allowed him to interrupt the rendering of his services in order to take his meal period. Id., ¶ 9.

Although not entirely clear when, Flores processed a claim for a meal period through his labor union, Seafarers International Union of North America (the “Union”),given that his “position [was] an unionized position.” Id., ¶ 6. The relationship between Horizon and the Union had been governed by a collective bargaining agreement (the “CBA”). Id., ¶ 7. But, according to the complaint, the regulation of the meal period “ha[d] not taken place through the [CBA].” Id. Curiously, on November 2, 2011 (a month after Flores' departure), the Union and Horizon subscribed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding “a longstanding verbal agreement that the meal period for crane maintenance electricians should be one half hour.” Docket # 1–7, Exh. 4–D. The Memorandum, which allegedly sought to “formally materialize” the verbal agreement between the Union and Horizon, was fully incorporated into the CBA on even date. See id.

Then, on December 23, 2011, the Union informed Flores that it had closed his claim and would no longer represent him regarding such matter. Docket 1–7, Exh. 4–B. Undeterred, on February 15, 2012, Flores filed this action in state court, seeking damages for Horizon's alleged refusal to provide him with meal periods. Flores couched his claim on Law 379, as amended, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 283, which establishes the right of an employee to take time for meals during the regular working day as well as during overtime.1

In removing the case to this court (Docket # 1), Horizon maintained that § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, “completely preempted” Flores' state law claim, thereby converting it into a federal claim and permitting removal under federal question doctrine, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(b). Horizon also moved to dismiss the complaint (Docket # 2), while Flores moved to remand to state court, contending that removal had been improper (Docket # 7).

Flores' argument is straightforward: because at the time he worked for Horizon the meal period regulation formed no part of the CBA, the resolution of his state-law claim neither bears relation to the CBA nor requires its interpretation to determine whether there had been a violation of his right to a meal period. Consequently, Flores reasons, § 301 does not control. Docket # 7, p. 4. Horizon disagrees, arguing that the subject of the meal period “was and is part of the collective bargaining process” and thus is “substantially dependent” on the CBA. Docket # 11, p. 4.

Standard of Review

It goes without saying that a suit filed in state court, founded on a claim arising under federal law, may be removed to the federal district court, irrespective of the parties' residence. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). A cause of action arises under federal law only [w]hen the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon [federal law] or [the] Constitution.” Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152, 29 S.Ct. 42, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908). Under this well-pleaded complaint rule, the fact that a defense to the plaintiff's cause of action may involve federal law is insufficient grounds for removal. Id. It is also common ground that “the plaintiff [is] the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). Therefore, the burdenof proof on jurisdiction lies with the party seeking removal. Pruell v. Caritas Christi, 645 F.3d 81, 84 (1st Cir.2011) (citing BIW Deceived v. Local S6, Indus. Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 132 F.3d 824, 831 (1st Cir.1997), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1969, 182 L.Ed.2d 818 (2012)).

However, “a plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions.” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 22, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983) (citations omitted). The “necessary ground” for the creation of the artful pleading doctrine “was that the preemptive force of [a federal statute was] so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action.” Id. at 23, 103 S.Ct. 2841. It follows that, if a court finds that “a plaintiff has ‘artfully pleaded’ claims in this fashion, it may uphold removal even though no federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff's complaint.” Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 475, 118 S.Ct. 921, 139 L.Ed.2d 912 (1998). Finally, the First Circuit has showed skepticism about [t]he applicability of the artful pleading doctrine outside of complete federal preemption of a state cause of action.” Rossello–Gonzalez v. Calderon–Serra, 398 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2004) (citation omitted).

Applicable Law and AnalysisSection 301 Preemption

Here, the claim contained in the state court complaint seemingly arises under Puerto Rico law, which under the well-pleaded complaint rule would normally preclude removal, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9–11, 103 S.Ct. 2841, were it not for the so-called “complete preemption” exception. The complete preemption doctrine applies when a federal cause of action supplants the state law cause of action, [a]nd thus converts the state claim into a federal claim.” SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488 F.3d 525, 536 n. 4 (1st Cir.2007), cert. denied,552 U.S. 1185, 128 S.Ct. 1258, 170 L.Ed.2d 68 (2008). In such a scenario, the putative state claim is so entwined with federal law as to allow the removal. Cavallaro v. UMass Mem. Healthcare, Inc., 678 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2012).

The Supreme Court has refined this doctrine principally in labor cases, such as the instant one. Id. at 7 (collecting cases). In fact, [t]he most familiar example is a claim brought under state contract law to enforce a CBA subject to federal jurisdiction under section 301 of the LMRA.” Id. (citing Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102–04, 82 S.Ct. 571, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962); Allis–Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210–13, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985)). The complete preemption doctrine, the First Circuit recently has explained, emanated from the Supreme Court's holding that

(1) section 301 required the federal courts to create a body of federal common law for CBAs affecting interstate commerce; (2) this body displaced state contract law; and (3) by this alchemy the purported state claim became a federal contract claim allowing removal as one within the federal ‘arising under’ jurisdiction under section 1441(b).

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court has expressly extended complete preemption to state law claims ‘founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements' or ‘substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.’ Id. (quoting Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. 386 at 394, 107 S.Ct. 2425). On one hand, a claim so fits if it adduces conduct that arguably comprises a breach of a duty that arises pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. Flibotte v. Pennsylvania Truck Lines, 131 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir.1997) (citing United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 369, 110 S.Ct. 1904, 109 L.Ed.2d 362 (1990), cert denied,523 U.S. 1123, 118 S.Ct. 1806, 140 L.Ed.2d 945 (1998)). On the other hand, [a] claim so qualifies if its resolution arguably hinges upon an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.” Id. (citing Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220, 105 S.Ct. 1904). In short, “this test boils down to whether the asserted state-law claim plausibly can be said to depend upon the meaning of one or more provisions within the collective bargaining agreement.” Id. If one of those circumstances is satisfied, [t]he pre-emptive force of § 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action....” Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 394, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (citation and internal quotations marks omitted).

The analysis begins with the threshold issue: whether there is a clear indication that Flores is covered by the CBA, [f]or it is that fact that establishes subject matter jurisdiction in the federal district court. Pruell, 645 F.3d at 83.” Flores' complaint explicitly states that his position is an unionized one and, as such, covered by the CBA. Thus, subject matter jurisdiction is potentially satisfied. Having established that preliminary matter, the inquiry turns on whether complete preemption engulfs Flores' state law claim. That is, whether Flores' state law claim is “founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements” or “substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 394, 107 S.Ct. 2425. Flores...

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    • United States
    • Maine Superior Court
    • 13 Noviembre 2019
    ...U.S. 202, 220 (1985); Lydon v. Boston Sand & Gravel Co., 175 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1999); see also Flores-Flores v. Horizon Lines of Puerto Rico, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 90, 93-94 (D.P.R. 2012) ("[T]he court has expressly extended complete preemption to state law claims 'founded directly on ri......
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    ...of a CBA's terms." Id. (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985)); see also Flores-Flores v. Horizon Lines of Puerto Rico, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 90, 93-94 (D.P.R. 2012) ("The Court has expressly extended complete preemption to state law claims 'founded directly on rights cr......

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